本文研究了两种不同的重复博弈：非对称囚徒困境及收益随机环境下的博弈。在非对称囚徒困境研究中，非对称性体现为博弈双方选择合作的收益-代价之比不同。Axelrod 策略竞赛被用于检验不同非对称参数下不同策略的收益，最终得到了优势方更加倾向于合作的结论。在收益具有随机性的博弈中，收益矩阵中的每一项被设定为一个均值为 0 的随机变量，参与者根据一段时间的累计收益被决定在演化过程中死亡或复制自身策略以产生新策略。仅考虑响应式策略时的进化稳定策略被计算出来，并对两种极端情况下参与人会选择的策略做了理论解释。

We investigates two different asymmetric repeated games: asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma and games in a random payoff environment. In the study of asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma, the asymmetry is represented by the different ratios of payoffs-costs incurred by the two players. The Axelrod strategy competition is used to test the payoffs of different strategies under different asym-metric parameters, and the conclusion is that the dominant player is more inclined to cooperate. In the game with random payoffs, each item in the payoff matrix is set as a random variable with a mean of zero. Participants are determined to die or replicate their strategy in the evolutionary process based on the cumulative payoff over a period of time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are calculated under settings of reactive strategies, and the strategies that participants will choose in two extreme situations are theoretically explained.