客观性的主题是真理和事实，规范性的要旨是权威和责任；客观性通常以物为中心，规范性则主要以人为关切。在罗蒂提出二次启蒙之后，外在之物对人类话语实践的统治权威逐渐被祛魅，与此同时也带来了话语内容客观性丧失和主观性膨胀的威胁。布兰顿赞同罗蒂倡导的二次启蒙，不过他并没有像罗蒂一样放弃对话语内容客观性的追求。在布兰顿看来，话语实践的规范性是使话语内容避免主观性、实现客观性的一条有效进路；话语实践的规范性结果与话语内容所追求的客观性目标理应是一枚硬币的两面。

本文试图以当代分析哲学在处理话语内容客观性问题时面临的主要困境为问题背景，以布兰顿的推理主义语义学为理论工具，在尝试运用布兰顿的推理主义语义学分析和解决相关问题的同时，探讨一种在推理主义框架下通过话语实践的规范性来实现话语内容客观性的可能性。

概言之，在当代分析哲学的理论视域中，主流的观点认为，能够衡量人类话语内容的客观性标准必须来自于某种独立于人类自身的外部实在，即，当且仅当一个语句的概念内容与外部实在相符合时，它才是真实的，因而也才是客观的。分析哲学中较早流行的真值条件语义学是这一主流观点的典型代表，它主张，语句的概念内容是否客观主要取决于该语句是否与使其为真的真值条件相符合。这是一种真值优先的理论路径，然而，这一路径长期以来面临的一个主要困境是，总是存在着一些语句，其概念内容的客观性无法通过真值条件来衡量，如（1）包含空名的语句；（2）碰巧为真的知识断言；以及（3）道德判断，等等。布兰顿认为，传统的真值条件语义学之所以无法走出上述困境，主要原因在于，这一路径所坚持的真值优先的理论预设是成问题的。

相比之下，布兰顿的推理主义语义学主张，使话语内容具有客观性的真正权威并非直接来自独立于我们的外部实在，而是首先来自我们自身，来自话语主体在对话交流实践中彼此产生的规范性约束。因此，对一个语句概念内容的客观性评价不在于看它是否符合了某个标准或条件，而是要让对话者彼此之间进行道义计分，追问说话者如此断言的资格和理由，以及他为此担负的权威和责任。据此，在推理主义框架下，话语内容的客观性主要取决于其在理由空间中所处的位置，并且需要历史对此做充分的推论性阐明。从理论上讲，推理主义语义学从对话主体的语用实践入手来阐明语义内容，这的确有助于解决分析哲学面临的上述困境；不过从现实来说，是否真的能通过主体间的对话交流来对说话者的话语实践产生规范性约束，以据此来确保话语内容的客观性，则还需要进一步的讨论和商榷。

本文共分6章对布兰顿的客观性概念进行不同领域和不同维度的论述。

第1章将首先指出，在传统的真值条件语义学路径下，当代分析哲学在存在论、知识论以及元伦理学中所面临的主要困境。通过在以上三大领域当中分别选取典型哲学案例：即存在论领域中空名无指称的问题、知识论中的盖梯尔问题、以及元伦理学中的弗雷格-吉奇问题为典型案例，本章将分析说明当代分析哲学在存在论领域面临的语词与世界二分的问题、在知识论领域面临的怀疑论问题、以及在元伦理学领域面临的道德客观性问题，均是由于坚持了真概念的优先性这一错误的解释次序而引发的，并且这些问题是真值条件语义理论自身长期以来都无法解决的。

第2章主要阐述布兰顿提供的推理主义语义学路径的主要思想和基本理论内核，指出其推理主义语义学何以能够建基于规范语用学，即何以能够首先通过推论而非真值来理解概念内容。在此基础上，本章将指出概念内容本质性的视域性特征，并由此阐述布兰顿对概念规范的客观性证明，以说明概念内容何以能够在不优先诉诸于真值条件的情况下而具有客观性的可能性。本章将指出，布兰顿所谓的客观性首先仰赖于推论实践的规范性，而非传统意义上依附于真概念来理解的客观性。据此，本章最后将对布兰顿所面临的“丧失世界”的指责进行回应。

第3、4、5章在形式上是三个平行章，将根据第2章所阐述的内容，即运用布兰顿的推理主义语义学，分别处理在第1章中提到的当代分析哲学在真值条件语义学的理论路径下难以解决的三大难题。第3章试图在布兰顿提出的双模态质-形结构的概念实在论的基础上解决空名无指称因而无确定的概念内容的问题，据此表明包含空名的语句的客观性何以可能；第4章通过运用布兰顿推理主义语义学路径下的知识理论来为解决当代知识论中的盖梯尔问题提供思路，指出知识断言在社会维度和历史维度上的视域性特征，据此说明经验知识的客观性何以可能；第5章试图通过布兰顿对道德实践与道德判断之间关系的独特理解来着重说明其元语言表达主义的思想，指明规范语汇的独特表达作用，并据此解决当代西方元伦理学中的弗雷格-吉奇问题，为说明道德判断之客观性的可能性做进一步理论推进。

通过以上三章，本文试图表明，布兰顿的推理主义语义学与真值条件语义学的根本不同在于，它对客观性的诠释从对真值条件的符合转向了对我们自身的社会实践中所隐含的概念规范的遵循。那么概念规范本身的客观性又是如何可能的呢？第6章试图对这一问题进行回答。本章将首先论述布兰顿对概念规范的来源做出的康德-黑格尔式的说明，并分别对概念规范自身的客观存在问题和客观正确性问题做出回应。

The topic of objectivity is truth and facts, while the theme of normativity is authority and responsibility; objectivity is usually centered on things, while normativity is mainly concerned with humans. After Richard Rorty proposed the Second Enlightenment, the ruling authority of external things over human discursive practice was gradually demystified. At the same time, it also brought the threat of loss of objectivity of our discursive content and expansion of its subjectivity. Brandom agreed with the Second Enlightenment advocated by Rorty, but he did not give up the pursuit of objectivity of discursive content like Rorty. In Brandom’s view, the normativity of discursive practice is an effective way to avoid subjectivity of discursive content and achieve its objectivity; the normative results of our discursive practice and the objective goal pursued by our discursive content are in principle two sides of the same coin.

Taking the main dilemmas faced by contemporary analytical philosophy when dealing with the objectivity of discursive content as the problem background, this dissertation attempts to analyze and solve related problems by using Brandom's inferential semantics as the theoretical tool. The aim of doing this work is mainly to explore a possibility of realizing the objectivity of discursive content through the normativity of discursive practice under the framework of Brandom’s inferentialism.

In short, in the theoretical field of contemporary analytical philosophy, the mainstream view is that the objective standard that can measure the discursive content of human beings must come from the external reality that is independent of human beings themselves, that is, if and only if the content of a sentence corresponds to external reality, it is real and therefore objective. The earlier popular truth conditional semantics in analytic philosophy is a typical representative of this mainstream view. It maintains that whether the conceptual content of a statement is objective mainly depends on whether the statement conforms to the truth conditions that make it true. This is a truth-first theoretical approach. However, a major dilemma faced by this approach for a long time is that there are always some sentences whose objectivity of conceptual content cannot be measured by truth conditions, such as (1) statements containing empty names; (2) knowledge assertions that happen to be true; and (3) moral judgments, etc. Brandom thinks that the main reason why traditional truth-conditional semantics cannot get out of the above-mentioned dilemma is that its truth-first theoretical presupposition this approach adhered is problematic.

In contrast, Brandom’s inferential semantics claims that the real authority that makes the discursive content objective does not come directly from external reality independent of us, but first comes from ourselves, from the normative constraints of discursive subjects interacting with each other in the practice of communication. Therefore, the objective evaluation of the conceptual content of a sentence is not to see whether it meets a certain standard or condition, but to ask the interlocutors to keep deontic score with each other, asking the speaker's entitlements and reasons for making such assertions, as well as his authority and responsibility for doing this. Accordingly, under the framework of Brandom’s inferentialism, the objectivity of discursive content mainly depends on its position in the space of reasons, as well as the sufficient inferential articulation of this position. Theoretically speaking, inferential semantics starts from the pragmatic practice of discursive subjects to articulate their semantic content, which is indeed helpful to solve the above dilemma faced by analytic philosophy; but from a practical point of view, whether the normative constraints to speakers’ discursive practice can really be achieved through inter-subject dialogue communication, so as to ensure the objectivity of their discursive content, it still requires further discussion.

This dissertation is divided into 6 chapters to elaborate on Brandom's conception of objectivity in different fields and dimensions.

Chapter 1 will first point out the main dilemmas faced by contemporary analytic philosophy in ontology, epistemology and metaethics under the traditional path of truth-conditional semantics. By selecting typical philosophical cases from the above three major fields: the problem of empty names having no ontological basis in the field of ontology, the Gettier problem in epistemology, and the Frege-Geach problem in metaethics as typical cases , this chapter will analyze and explain that the dichotomy between word and world faced by contemporary philosophy in the field of ontology, the skepticism problem faced in the field of epistemology, and the problem of moral objectivity faced in the field of metaethics are all due to the persistence of the priority of the concept of truth. That is, these problems are caused by the wrong explanatory order, and these problems have been unable to be solved by the theory of truth-conditional semantics itself for a long time.

Chapter 2 mainly elaborates the main ideas and basic theoretical core of the inferential semantics provided by Brandom, and points out why his inferential semantics can be based on normative pragmatics, that is, why concepts can be understood firstly in terms of inference rather than truth. On this basis, this chapter will point out the essential perspective characteristics of conceptual content, and thereby elaborate Brandom’s objectivity proof of conceptual norms to show how conceptual content can be objective without firstly appealing to truth conditions. This chapter will show that what Brandom calls objectivity firstly depends on the normativity of discursive practices, rather than the objectivity accompanied with the concept of truth in the traditional sense. Within this theoretical framework, this chapter will finally respond to the accusation of "lost world" faced by Brandom.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are three parallel chapters in form. Based on the content stated in Chapter 2, that is, by using the theoretical approach of inferential semantics provided by Brandom, we will respectively solve three major problems raised in Chapter 1. The following are three major problems that contemporary philosophy is difficult to solve under the path of truth-conditional semantics. Chapter 3 attempts to solve the problem of empty names having no reference and therefore having no definite conceptual content by applying Brandom’s bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism, thereby showing how the objectivity of statement containing empty name is possible. Chapter 4 provides ideas for solving the Gettier problem in contemporary epistemology by using the theory of knowledge under the path of Brandon's inferential semantics, and points out the essentially perspective characteristics of knowledge assertions in the social and historical dimensions, and accordingly shows how is the objectivity of empirical knowledge possible. Chapter 5 attempts to demonstrate Brandom’s metalinguistic expressivism through his unique understanding of the relationship between moral practice and moral judgment, illustrates the unique expressive role of normative vocabulary, and accordingly solves the Frege-Geach problem in contemporary Western metaethics, so as to provide further theoretical advancement for demonstrating the objectivity of moral judgments.

Through the above three chapters, this dissertation attempts to show that the key reason why Brandom’s inferential semantics is expected to compete to become an alternative theory to truth-conditional semantics is that its interpretation of objectivity changes from corresponding to truth conditionals to following the conceptual norms implicit in our own social practices. Then how can the objectivity of conceptual norms themselves to be possible? Chapter 6 attempts to answer this question. This chapter will first discuss Brandom’s Kantian-Hegelian explanation of the origin of conceptual norms, and then will respectively respond to the issue of the objective existence of conceptual norms themselves and the problem of their objective correctness.