累积投票制是指公司在选举董事或监事时，股东所拥有的投票数等于所持股份乘以欲选的董事数，其可以将投票数只投给一人或分散给数人的制度。它最初来源于政治领域，后被广泛借鉴到公司法中。但由于适用累积投票制导致公司效率降低等副作用显现，加上保护中小股东权益的法律不断完善，国际上关于累积投票制立法模式普遍由强制适用转向许可适用。我国自2002年引入累积投票制以来，不乏学者撰文褒贬其效益。本文采用比较研究法、实证分析法等研究方法回应了对于累积投票制的诸多质疑，弥补了前人关于累积投票制实效性分析的不足，肯定了累积投票制的价值，分析了实施累积投票制面临的困境并据此提出完善建议。本文主要分为以下几个部分： 第一章主要对累积投票制进行概说。本文举例说明了累积投票制的计算方法以及它和直线投票制的联系与区别，纠正了广受援引的累积投票制的出处，进一步指出了孟德尔领导的“选举改革委员会”首次提出在公司法上适用累积投票制，介绍了强制性累积投票制和许可性累积投票制两种立法模式并分析其变化的内部和外部因素。 第二章介绍了我国累积投票制的立法变迁、实施现状和困境。笔者对发布了实施细则的上交所上市公司进行数据统计和分析，得出我国累积投票实施情况不佳的结论，指出我国存在董事会规模较小、公司股权结构“一股独大”等现实问题和缺乏累积投票制前置程序及事后保障程序。 第三章是对其他国家和地区的立法借鉴。在公司治理模式三分类的基础上，本文选取了美国、日本和我国台湾地区三典型，结合案例介绍了关于累积投票制的立法例。允许董事分批选举等举措对我国累积投票制的完善具有借鉴意义。 第四章主要是回应学界对累积投票制实效性的质疑。在现今时代背景之下，中小股东难以保持“理性的漠然”，本文通过评估累积投票制的实效、回应机构投资者参与公司治理的需求等方面，结合累积投票制对保护中小股东权益、缓解董事与中小股东紧张关系、刺激投资等诸多价值，论证我国沿用累积投票制的合理性。 第五章主要是针对我国董事会规模小等现实困境和累积投票制配套程序不足等问题，提出了扩大累积投票制的适用范围、规定书面通知程序、赋予股东合并选举请求权、设立累积投票制运用前置程序和事后保障程序等完善措施，以求对保护中小股东权益、改善公司治理有所裨益。

The cumulative voting system means that when a company elects a director or a supervisor, the number of votes owned by the shareholders is equal to the number of shares held by the number of directors to be elected. It can vote for one person or a system for several people. It was originally derived from the political arena and was later widely used in corporate law. However, due to the application of the cumulative voting system, the side effects such as the company's efficiency are reduced, and the law protecting the rights of minority shareholders is constantly improved. The internationally popularized voting system is generally applied from mandatory application to licensing. Since the introduction of the cumulative voting system in China in 2002, there has been no shortage of scholars writing their own ideas. This paper uses comparative research methods, empirical analysis and other research methods to respond to many questions about the cumulative voting system, make up for the lack of analysis of the effectiveness of the cumulative voting system, affirm the value of the cumulative voting system, and analyze the implementation of the cumulative voting system. The dilemma faced and the suggestions for improvement based on this. This article is divided into the following sections: The first chapter mainly introduces the cumulative voting system. This paper illustrates the calculation method of the cumulative voting system and its connection and difference with the linear voting system, corrects the source of the widely cited cumulative voting system, and further points out that Mendel's “Electoral Reform Commission” first proposed the company law. The cumulative voting system is applied, and the two legislative models of mandatory cumulative voting system and permissible cumulative voting system are introduced and the internal and external factors of the change are analyzed. The second chapter introduces the legislative changes, implementation status and predicament of China's cumulative voting system. The author conducts statistics and analysis on the listed companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and draws the conclusion that China's cumulative voting implementation is not good. It points out that there are practical problems such as the small size of the board of directors and the “one big share” of the company's shareholding structure. Cumulative voting system pre-procedure and post-warranty procedures. The third chapter is the reference to other countries and regions. On the basis of the three classifications of corporate governance model, this paper selects three typical models of the United States, Japan and Taiwan, and introduces the legislation on the cumulative voting system in combination with the case. Allowing directors to vote in batches and other initiatives can be useful for the improvement of China's cumulative voting system. The fourth chapter is mainly to respond to the academic community's doubts about the effectiveness of the cumulative voting system. In the current era, it is difficult for small and medium-sized shareholders to maintain “rational indifference”. This paper combines the cumulative voting system to protect the interests of minority shareholders and ease the directors by assessing the effectiveness of the cumulative voting system and responding to the needs of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance. It has many values ??such as tensions with small and medium-sized shareholders and stimulating investment, and demonstrates the rationality of the cumulative voting system in China. The fifth chapter mainly focuses on the problems such as the small scale of the board of directors in China and the lack of supporting procedures for the cumulative voting system. It proposes to expand the scope of application of the cumulative voting system, provide written notification procedures, grant shareholders the right to merge elections, and establish a cumulative voting system. Pre-procedural and post-warranty procedures and other measures to improve the protection of minority shareholders' rights and improve corporate governance.