政府间转移支付是财政分权制度的不可分割的组成部分，深入理解财政分权问题需要对转移支付制度进行细致的研究。从实践来看，全世界几乎所有国家都实行了不同程度的财政分权和不同类型的转移支付，但即便是历史和文化背景相似的国家，在经济表现上也会有很大差异。究其原因，不同的财政分权和转移支付制度组合对地方政府产生不同的激励和约束，地方政府会表现出不同的行为方式,这直接影响到整个国家的经济发展水平和人民福祉。由于财政分权和转移支付制度的最终效果取决于地方政府的行为，研究不同财政分权和转移支付制度组合条件下的地方政府行为成为财政分权理论研究中极其重要的课题。本篇博士论文将在此方面做出努力与尝试。文章的三个核心部分都建立在财政分权理论基础上，由三个紧密关联的话题组成，分别讨论了地方政府的税收、支出和行政行为。论文的第一个创新点体现在考察地方政府在不同财政分权和转移支付制度条件下的税收行为。通过比较不同的税收分权和转移支付制度组合，在理论上探索出了一套有效且易于实施的税收分权制度——税收垂直竞争（即中央和地方政府同时对相同的流动性税基征税）。该制度不仅能够有效地消除税收竞争带来的负外部性，还能够通过均等化转移支付而缩小地区财力差距，兼顾公平和效率，是对现有财政竞争理论的有益补充。根据经典税收竞争理论，当资本完全流动时，地方政府为了吸引资本会减小对资本税税率，从而导致整个经济体公共物品供给效率低于最优水平。论文通过比较发现：1、实行“税收垂直竞争”的税收分权和平衡性的转移支付能够有效地减少税收竞争带来的负外部性；2、税收分成加均等化转移支付制度，会扩大税收竞争负外部性；3、根据税基差异进行地方政府间横向资金调剂，能够有效地抑制税收竞争负外部性，而根据实际收入进行横向资金调剂则会扩大这种负外部性。论文的第二个创新点体现在分析可以自由支配转移支付对地方政府财政支出行为的影响。国内很多关于此话题的研究都认为地方政府支出结构“重生产、轻福利”，并提供了大量的经验证据。对其的理论解释几乎一致都遵循“为增长而竞争”的逻辑。本文从财政竞争这一角度提出了全新的理论解释。在资本完全流动环境下，增加政府生产性支出不仅能够吸引资本、扩大税基，还能提高居民收入水平，比直接将资金单纯投入福利性支出更有效率。经验研究部分利用中国2002-2006年县级财政和经济社会统计面板数据进行了计量分析，根据现有数据设计和定义了不同程度的无条件转移支付和政府生产性支出，发现随无条件转移支付的增加，地方政府会不断提高政府生产性支出的比重，效果显著，结果稳健，经验结果符合理论预期。论文的第三个创新点体现在从分税制改革和转移支付角度考察了地方政府的行为和市场整合。以往对中国市场分割的研究主要集中在指标设计和数据分析层面，缺乏合理的理论模型对此现象进行分析和解释。为了弥补此空缺，本文借鉴以往市场分割的测度数据，通过对比发现1994年之后国内市场迅速整合，随后建立理论模型诠释了分税制改革是促成国内市场整合的重要原因。分税制在本质上是一种财政集权改革，一定程度上松动了财政“包干制”条件下地方政府和企业之间的关系，降低了地方政府实行市场保护策略所得收益。当税收集权达到一定程度时，地方政府会主动地放弃地方保护主义，放开地区市场。从而上述逻辑可以合理的解释分税制改革后，国内市场迅速整合的现象。

Over the years, issues of fiscal decentralization have been paid close attention to by scholars and the effective implementation of fiscal decentralization system must be accompanied by transfer payments of different types in varying degrees. Hence, in-depth study of fiscal decentralization involves inspection of transfer payment system inevitably. From a practical point of view, almost all countries around the world have implemented fiscal decentralization in varying degrees and transfer payments of different types, while countries perform quite differently in economy even with similar historical and cultural background. The reason for this phenomenon is the combination of different fiscal decentralization and transfer payment system provides different incentives and constraints to local governments. Therefore, the local governments show great difference in behaviors which directly affectthe level of economic development in the whole country and the benefits of all the people. No matter what kind of combination of fiscal decentralization and transfer payments is chosen, it is bound to be realized through the behaviors of local governments. As a result, research on issues of fiscal decentralization is actually to investigate what kind of impact the different fiscal decentralization and the transfer payment system will place to local governments’ behaviors. My doctoral dissertation will make efforts in research in this area. The core part, which is based on the Theory of Fiscal Decentralization, is composed of three closely related topics which are taxation, spending and administrative actions by local governments.The first section - tax competition, transfer payment and fiscal decentralization- compares the impact of different types of fiscal decentralization and transfer payment system on the local governments’ tax behaviors. By comparing the different combinations of tax decentralization and transfer payment system, we innovatively found that tax vertical competition, which means central and local governments tax on the same tax bate at the same time, is an effective and easy to implement tax decentralization system. This system can not only effectively eliminate the negative externalities of tax competition, but also reduce regional financial gap by equalization transfer payments. It’s a useful complement to the existing fiscal competition theory. The second section- fiscal decentralization, transfer payment and structure of government expenditure- focuses on the free transfer of payment of the impact of the behavior of local government expenditure. This section uses the fiscal competition theory to explain the phenomenon of “emphasizing production while neglecting welfare” in fiscal expenditure structures in local governments. Under the conditions of full flow of capital, increasing productive expenditure of the government can not only attract capital, expand tax base, but also improve the level of residents’ income, which is superior comparing to direct funds for welfare expenditure. In the subsequent empirical part of this research, econometric analysis is done with financial data at the county level and economic and social statistical data from 2002 to 2006 in China. And we find that the local governments continue to increase the proportion of governmental productive expenditure along with the augment of unconditional transfer payments. Its effect is significant and the results are solid and steady.The third section is reform of tax distribution system, transfer payment and market integration. It first describes the rapid integration of Chinese domestic market after 1994 accurately, and then explains why the reform of tax distribution system implemented in China contributes effectively to it. Core logic is that the tax distribution system, as a financial centralized system in essence, cuts off the financial relationship between enterprises and local governments under the financial "overall rationing system" partly, thus facilitate local governments to give up market segmentation strategy in turn to market integration.