近年来，不断有国内外学者对破产重整程序进行法经济学研究分析，取得了丰硕的学术成果，然而遗憾的是未能重构一套符合我国法律规定的可操作的破产重整程序。本文尝试将现有的法经济学理论与目前我国破产法的规定相融合，设计研究一套适合我国现行法的破产重整程序。为了完成上述研究成果，本文正文部分按如下五部分展开论述： 第一章，引言部分。介绍本文的研究背景、研究意义、研究内容与方法以及论文的基本框架，着重通过文献综述的方式阐述关于破产重整领域的法经济学分析的学术成果，为后文的进一步研究进行理论上的支撑。 第二章，论述我国现行破产重整程序中的主要问题。破产重整程序中存在着公权力的不当干预、破产重整程序效率较低、无法有效解决重整过程中利益冲突这三个重要的问题，并指出解决上述问题的方向。 第三章，介绍新模型的理论基础，即竞价模型并对该模型进行反思。本节重点介绍了域外学者研究得出的四种模型：“Roe模型：出售部分重整公司证券进行估值”、“Baird模型：引入第三方投资者进行竞价”、“Bebchuk模型：创立可操作的利益分配程序”、“AHM模型：加入非现金投标机制”。同时指出了“竞价模型运行的前提假设与法律规定不符”和“目前我国实施该程序的配套制度不健全”两点需要改进之处。 第四章，分析竞价模型成立的前提并提出适合我国破产重整程序现行规定的新模型。该模型借鉴了经济学定量分析的思路，将整个企业的价值分为若干等分，将等分的企业价值依据清偿顺位以及各个债权的比例分配到各担保债权人和非担保债权人的手中，同时将破产企业的各类信息在专门网站上进行公示，吸引投资者进行投资，并且劣后顺位的债权人可以选择通过清偿优先顺位的债权人的债权获得优先顺位债权人所持有的企业价值，通过交易确定每份企业价值的具体数额后，对全体债权人进行清偿，根据债权人所获得的企业价值数额的多少确定其表决权，依据表决结果确认通过重整计划。最后，将新模型应用于“中核钛白”的破产重整案例之中，证明其可操作性较强。 第五章，结合实际案例论证新模型对于解决上文所提出的问题的优势。新模型创设的机制充分发挥了市场的作用，减少了单纯由法官进行主观判断可能出现的失误，减少了权力寻租和滥用“强裁”权力的行为。新模型通过借助互联网的竞价机制，大幅度提高重整程序的效率，还寻找到了破产企业价值最大化的一致目标，通过程序的安排将这一目标贯穿在整个破产重整过程之中，从而化解了重整过程中的利益冲突。

In recent years many scholars have been studying and analyzing the bankruptcy reorganization procedure, and have achieved fruitful academic results. However, most of the academic results only stay at the theoretical level and fail to design a set of operable bankruptcy reorganization procedure which is suitable for the real cases. This paper attempts to integrate the law and economic theory and the current bankruptcy law in China and design a set of bankruptcy reorganization procedure which is suitable for the current law. In order to complete research results, this thesis will be divided in the following five parts: Chapter One, introduction. This part introduces the research background, research significance, research coherence and methods, and the basic framework of the paper. It focuses on the academic achievements of law and economic analysis in the field of bankruptcy reorganization through literature review, which provides theoretical support for the further research of the paper. Chapter Two, analyzed the main problems in current bankruptcy proceedings. There are three important problems in the bankruptcy reorganization procedure: improper intervention of public power, low efficiency of the bankruptcy reorganization procedure, and inability to effectively solve the conflicts of interests in the process of reorganization. The direction of solving these problems is pointed out. Chapter Three, introduces the theoretical foundations that is the bidding model. This section will focus on four models drawn by foreign scholars: "Roe model: selling part of the restructured company securities for valuation", "Baird model: introducing third-party investors for bidding", "Bebchuk model: creating operational profit allocation procedures", "AHM model: adding non-cash bidding mechanism", and provides theoretical support for the following new bankruptcy reorganization model. Chapter Four, analysis the shortage of bidding model and propose a new model that is suitable for the current provisions of bankruptcy law. This model draws lessons from the idea of quantitative analysis of economics, divides the value of the whole enterprise into several equal parts, distributes the equal value of the enterprise to the secured creditors and non-secured creditors according to the liquidation order and the proportion of each creditor's rights, and publishes all kinds of information of the bankrupt enterprise on the special website, attracting investors to invest, and the debt in inferior order. The oblige may choose to obtain the enterprise value held by the preferred creditor by liquidating the creditor's rights of the preferred creditor. After determining the specific amount of each enterprise value through the exchange, the oblige can liquidate all the creditors, determine the voting rights according to the amount of enterprise value obtained by the creditor, and confirm the adoption of the reorganization plan according to the voting results. Finally, the new model is applied to the bankruptcy reorganization case of "Nuclear titanium dioxide", which proves that it is more operable. Chapter Five, introduce the advantages of the new model in solving the problems mentioned above with practical cases. The mechanism created by the new model gives full play to the role of the market, reduces the errors that may occur when judges make subjective judgments, and reduces the power of rent-seeking and abuse of the power of "forced adjudication". The new model greatly improves the efficiency of reorganization process by means of the competitive mechanism of the Internet. It also finds the consistent goal of maximizing the value of bankrupt enterprises. Through the arrangement of procedures, the goal runs through the whole process of bankruptcy reorganization, thus resolving the conflict of interests in the process of reorganization.