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中文题名:

 创始人持股及两职合一对企业研发投入的影响    

姓名:

 周云皓    

保密级别:

 公开    

论文语种:

 中文    

学科代码:

 020101    

学科专业:

 经济学    

学生类型:

 学士    

学位:

 经济学学士    

学位年度:

 2019    

学校:

 北京师范大学    

校区:

 北京校区培养    

学院:

 经济与工商管理学院    

第一导师姓名:

 李由    

第一导师单位:

 北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院    

第二导师姓名:

     

提交日期:

 2019-05-27    

答辩日期:

 2019-05-22    

外文题名:

 Empirical Research on Influence of Founder’s Shareholding and Chair-CEO Duality on R&D Investment of Enterprise    

中文关键词:

 研发投入 ; 创始人 ; 股权结构 ; 公司治理    

中文摘要:
本文通过2010—2016年A股1573家上市公司的相关数据,对创始人与企业研发投入的关系进行了实证分析。主要发现和结论是:创始人持股与企业研发投入存在显著的倒U型关系,适度的创始人持股更有利于提高企业的研发投入;创始人董事长和CEO两职合一与研发投入呈不显著的正相关关系;企业规模与企业研发投入显著负相关,小规模企业的研发投入更高;股权集中度对企业研发投入具有显著的不利影响,股权集中程度增高会导致企业研发投入的下降;高管薪酬与研发投入存在显著的正相关关系,高管薪酬激励越强,企业研发投入越高;独立董事占比与企业研发投入之间的关系不显著。
外文摘要:
Based on the data of 1573 Chinese listed companies in 2010-2016, this paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between founder and R&D investment. The main conclusions and findings are: the founder shareholding has a significant inverted U-shaped relationship with R&D investment so that the moderate founder shareholding is more conducive to improving R&D investment. There is a positive correlation between the Chair-CEO duality of the founders and R&D investment, but it is not significant. The size of company is significantly negatively correlated with the R&D investment, which means mall-scale companies have higher R&D investment. The equity concentration has a significantly adverse effect on R&D. There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and R&D Investment that stronger incentive of executive compensation results in higher R&D investment. The relationship between the proportion of independent directors and R&D investment is not significant.
参考文献总数:

 55    

作者简介:

 经济学本科生,无学术成果    

插图总数:

 0    

插表总数:

 9    

馆藏号:

 本020101/19029    

开放日期:

 2020-07-09    

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