中文题名: | 创始人持股及两职合一对企业研发投入的影响 |
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保密级别: | 公开 |
论文语种: | 中文 |
学科代码: | 020101 |
学科专业: | |
学生类型: | 学士 |
学位: | 经济学学士 |
学位年度: | 2019 |
学校: | 北京师范大学 |
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第一导师姓名: | |
第一导师单位: | |
第二导师姓名: | |
提交日期: | 2019-05-27 |
答辩日期: | 2019-05-22 |
外文题名: | Empirical Research on Influence of Founder’s Shareholding and Chair-CEO Duality on R&D Investment of Enterprise |
中文关键词: | |
中文摘要: |
本文通过2010—2016年A股1573家上市公司的相关数据,对创始人与企业研发投入的关系进行了实证分析。主要发现和结论是:创始人持股与企业研发投入存在显著的倒U型关系,适度的创始人持股更有利于提高企业的研发投入;创始人董事长和CEO两职合一与研发投入呈不显著的正相关关系;企业规模与企业研发投入显著负相关,小规模企业的研发投入更高;股权集中度对企业研发投入具有显著的不利影响,股权集中程度增高会导致企业研发投入的下降;高管薪酬与研发投入存在显著的正相关关系,高管薪酬激励越强,企业研发投入越高;独立董事占比与企业研发投入之间的关系不显著。
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外文摘要: |
Based on the data of 1573 Chinese listed companies in 2010-2016, this paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between founder and R&D investment. The main conclusions and findings are: the founder shareholding has a significant inverted U-shaped relationship with R&D investment so that the moderate founder shareholding is more conducive to improving R&D investment. There is a positive correlation between the Chair-CEO duality of the founders and R&D investment, but it is not significant. The size of company is significantly negatively correlated with the R&D investment, which means mall-scale companies have higher R&D investment. The equity concentration has a significantly adverse effect on R&D. There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and R&D Investment that stronger incentive of executive compensation results in higher R&D investment. The relationship between the proportion of independent directors and R&D investment is not significant.
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参考文献总数: | 55 |
作者简介: | 经济学本科生,无学术成果 |
插图总数: | 0 |
插表总数: | 9 |
馆藏号: | 本020101/19029 |
开放日期: | 2020-07-09 |