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中文题名:

 行动、习惯与德性——亚里士多德行动理论研究    

姓名:

 解红勋    

学科代码:

 010105    

学科专业:

 伦理学    

学生类型:

 博士    

学位:

 哲学博士    

学位年度:

 2013    

校区:

 北京校区培养    

学院:

 哲学与社会学学院    

研究方向:

 西方伦理学;古希腊哲学、伦理学;亚里士多德伦理学    

第一导师姓名:

 廖申白    

第一导师单位:

 北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院    

提交日期:

 2013-06-19    

答辩日期:

 2013-06-01    

外文题名:

 Action, Habit, and the Virtue:Research on Aristotle’s Action Theory    

中文摘要:
行动理论是亚里士多德伦理学的重要主题。实践哲学视域下的行动范畴涉及亚里士多德有关目的、德性、理智、选择、情感、欲望、理性、明智等范畴和理论的分析和阐述,任何有关行动理论的说明不得不纠缠于概念的分析和说明之中。鉴于德性与行动、行动与习惯以及习惯与德性的关系,以“习惯”为主线而梳理和分析亚里士多德的行动理论不仅是可行的,而且可以为我们反思德性教化的可能性进路提供重要参照。亚里士多德对“行动”的引入源于德性的实践性质。对希腊人而言,德性是一个重要概念,然而希腊人对德性的理解是变化和发展的。当希腊人在城邦背景下探寻德性的时候,以实践为“目的”的德性概念就逐渐形成和发展起来。总的来说,古希腊德性观念的发展和演变可归纳为三个阶段:荷马时期“力量”主导的英雄德性,以“竞争”为其特征,德性被理解为在战争和竞赛中获得奖赏和荣誉;城邦形成和发展时期,德性的神话色彩逐渐消解,人的智慧和思想能力被理解为德性的重要内容;古典时期,在智者与苏格拉底的论辩中,德性被理解为与知识相关的灵魂的内在规定性。借助功能论证,柏拉图最终将德性引向实践:“功能”本身就意味着活动和实现。特别是,以灵魂习性为特征的德性逐渐被理解为通过习俗(习惯)而形成的品性。而亚里士多德借助“潜能-现实”这对范畴并结合“自然目的论”的说明,将德性理解为不仅使得具有德性的事物状态好,而且也使得该事物的功能实现的好的品质。“状态”与“实现活动”构成“德性”的两个向度,正是借助“习惯”,亚里士多德将二者统一于行动着的人的行动之中。同时,我们从希腊人德性概念的嬗变中可以发现,作为德性的来源,“习惯”不仅统摄“状态”与“实现活动”,而且消解了“智者运动”以来“自然与人为”之间的论争:德性出于习惯,但并不反乎自然,习惯对自然潜能的完善使得希腊人最终完成了对德性的探究。德性源于习惯,但习惯在本质上是行动的反复和训练。在第三章中,本文从事物运动谈起,结合《物理学》关于运动本质、原因的说明,借助《形而上学》对“潜能与现实”的分析,将“潜能”看作事物运动的原因。“潜能”作为原因并不是从现实性上理解的,而是说它能够使事物运动。无论有生命物还是无生命物、无论动物还是人,以何种“潜能”为原因,其运动的方式表现出本质差异。无生命物的运动是被推动的,作为原因的“潜能”被理解为能够被推动或者“遭受”运动。动物是自动的,潜能在运动者内部,原则上是动物内在的推动者即欲望在推动动物运动。对人来说,除欲望之外还有理性,欲望和理性一起作为“潜能”推动人的行动。作为有理性存在物,欲望是人行动的最终原因但不是首要原因,因此,严格来说,人的行动是理性主导的。但在具体行动中,是欲望还是理性占主导,在不同的人和不同情境中造成不同行动。对人而言,行动原因的复杂性反映在行动的实施上就表现为各种不同情况,影响行动的因素是多种多样的,由此造成不同的道德评价。第四章试图说明,以实践为目的的德性是如何在具体行动中获得的。虽然德性通过具体行动展现,但并不是任何行动都是有德性的。德性行动不仅要具有某种性质,而且必须出于某种稳定的、持续的状态。“习惯”正说明了行动合于德性的状态。习惯不仅是通过模仿而形成的行动模式,而且表现为通过反复行动和训练而形成的灵魂情感状态,即高尚的爱与恨。正确情感的培养是养成德性品质的重要内容,但习惯并不意味着德性。良好习惯的培养是获得德性的准备,但德性在本性上是一种适度,是行动者在具体情境中如何选择和做到适度的品质。我们关于德性的“关系性”说明,进一步表明培养习惯对获得德性的意义,但在习惯之外,德性的完善或者严格意义的德性的获得还须借助实践智慧,这是由德性的适度本性决定的。在第五章中,本文试图借助功能论证以及人的理性本质的说明,培养习惯、获得德性的最终目的是为了完善人的理性功能。严格意义的德性是自然、习惯和理性的和谐一致,通过培养习惯而获得的德性只有借助理性能力和明智的发展才能得以完善。虽然习惯的培养在先,但理性的主导作用决定了德性的本性。在综合分析行动、习惯与德性的关系的基础上,结合习惯培养和理性教导的先后顺序,我们可以发现,习惯作为德性教化的一种进路是可能的。但是,如果我们并不能像亚里士多德那样诉诸好的城邦制度和立法,那么诉诸完善的理性能力将成为一种迫切地需要。在这种意义上,我们对德性的引导者或德性教师提出了更高要求。
外文摘要:
The action theory is the important subject of Aristotle’s ethics. The theory of action under the sight of practical philosophy involves Aristotle’s analysis and elaboration on the concept and theory of end, virtue, intellect, choice, emotion, desire, reason and prudence, and any description about the action theory had to dwell on the onanalysis and illuminate of these concepts. Whereas of the relationships between virtue and action, action and habit and the habit and virtue, taking habit as the paramount to analyze Aristotle's action theory is not only feasible, but also provides an important reference for us to rethinke the possibility approach for the virtue’s enlightenment. The introduction of the action for Aristotle stems from the nature of practice of virtue. For the Greeks, the virtue is an important concept, however, their understanding of the virtues is changed and development. When the Greeks search the Virtue under the background of the city-state, the conception of virtue for the "purpose" of practice have gradually formed and developed. In general, the development and evolution of the ancient Greek concept of virtue can be summarized into three stages: During Homer, the Heroic virtue is dominant by strength, its characteristics is competition, and the virtue is rewarded and honor in the war and race; and on the period of formation and development of the city-state, the mythology of virtue is gradually digestion, the wisdom and thinking ability is understood as the important part of the virtue for human beings; The classical period, in the the argument between Sophist and Socrates, the virtue is understood as the knowledge related to the Internal restriction of the soul. With function argument, Plato led the virtue to practice ultimately: by ergon it means activities and to complete. Especially, by the characteristic of soul habits of virtue gradually being understood as the character through ethos. With the potency-actuality and combined the description of the Natural Teleology, Aristotle comprehends the virtue as one character which not only make the thing of which has good state, but also makes the function of that thing to be achieved well. It is very the state and activity making up of the two dimensions of Virtue, and by means of habit, Aristotle unites the two into the actions of the acting people. At the same times, from the transmutation of the Greeks virtue conception, we can found that, as the origin of the virtue, the habit not only governs the state and activity, but also dissipates of the contestation between the φύσις and νόμος since the sophist movement: the virtue is out of habit, but not contrary to nature, the perfection of natural potential by habit makes the Greeks finally completed the investigation for the Virtue.Virtue derives from the habit, but the habit is essentially the repeated action and training. In chapter 3, the dissertation talk about from the movement of something, with the explanation about the nature and cause of the movement by the Physics, in virtue of analysis of the potency and actuality in Metaphysics, the potency has been regarded as the cause of the movement of things. The potency as the cause is not been understood as the reality, but it enables the moving of the thing. Whether the inanimate or animante ones, and the animante or human, the movement shows the essential difference by which potency as its causen. The movement of inanimate objects is being impulse, the potency as the cause is understood to be able to push or "suffer" movement. The animal is self-motion, and it is the desire that as the internal promoters to promote animal’s movemt in principle. For the people, there is reason besides the desire; the desire unites the reson as the potency to promote human being’s action. As the rational beings, desire is the ulitimate cause of human’s action, but not the primary reason; therefore, strictly speaking, our action is dominant by the intellectual. But in concrete actions, wether the desire or reason as the dominant cause, there is very different action in different people and different situations. For the people, the complexity of action’s reason performance of a variety of different situations reflection of the implementation of the action, there are variety of factors influence of the actions which resulting in different moral evaluation. The 4th chapter attempts to explain how to acquire the virtue which aimed at practice in concrete action? While virtue is shown through concrete action, but it is not any action will be virtuous. The virtuous action is not only to have some kind of quality, and it also must be out of some kind of stable and sustainable state. The habit is the very illumination of the state of action in virtue. Habit is not only formed by imitatting the action’s mode, and performance of the emotional state of the soul, that is noble love and hate, which formed through repeated acting and training. The cultivation of correct emotional is the impotent part to be cultivating the virtue, but the habit by itself is not virtue. Good habit is prepared to acquire virtue, but virtue is a mean in nature, that is a character of how to choose and achieve the mean in specific situations. Our description about the relationship of the virtue demonstrates the importance of the habit’s cultivation further, but outside the habit, the perfection of the virtue or the aquired of strictly virtue must be in virtue of φρόνησις, which is decision by the nature of mean. In the 5th chapter, this dissertation attempts to, with the help of the function argument and the human beings rational nature, show that the ultimate end of training habits and acquiring the virtue is to improve the rational function of the human beings. The virtue in the strict sense is the harmony with nature, habit and reason; the acquired virtue by cultivating habit can be perfect only through the development of the reason and practical wisdom. While cultivating of the habit is earlier, but the nature of virtue is decision by the dominant effect of reason.Based on comprehensive analysis the relationship of action, habit and virtue, and combining with the successively order of habit cultivating and rational teaching, we can find that, it is possible by the habituation as a virtue enlightenment approach. But, if we can not appeal to a good system of the city-state and the legislation, and then resort to the rational capacity will become an urgently require. In this sense, we put forward a higher requirement to the guide of the virtue or the virtue’s teachers.
参考文献总数:

 10    

作者简介:

 解红勋,河北保定人,师从北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院廖申白教授从事西方伦理学和伦理学原理的研究和学习。在校期间,主要兴趣领域为古希腊哲学和伦理学,实践哲学,行动哲学,特别是在亚里士多德哲学和伦理学方面兴趣浓厚,在完成伦理学与道德教育研究所规定课程和读书论文的基础上,在《道德与文明》发表研究论文《亚里士多德的功能论证》一篇,并顺利完成博士学问论文。另参加廖申白教授科研课题《古希腊罗马伦理学》项目,负责“小苏格拉底学派伦理思想”的撰写工作。    

馆藏地:

 图书馆学位论文阅览区(主馆南区三层BC区)    

馆藏号:

 博010105/1303    

开放日期:

 2013-06-19    

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