近年来，随着畜禽养殖业的持续发展和农村居民环保意识的不断提升，畜禽养殖污染治理议题受到越来越高的重视。2013年，国家专门出台了《畜禽规模养殖污染防治条例》，填补了畜禽养殖污染在农业环境保护类法律法规方面的空白，强化了对整个畜禽养殖业持续健康发展的科学引导与规范约束。由于畜禽养殖污染物具有污染量大、构成复杂、时效性强、涉及面广而散等特点，加之养殖户的技术水平和环保意识差异巨大，导致监管难度非常大。传统政府单一中心的治理模式效果不尽如人意，治理中也存在监管成本高、效果差等诸多问题。党的十九大报告提出要构建政府为主导、企业为主体、社会组织和公众共同参与的环境治理体系，着力破解环境问题监管治理难、主体及其相互关系复杂等困境，也体现了环境治理多元化发展方向。在畜禽养殖污染的治理中，引入多元主体互动的分析视角对理解和改善畜禽养殖污染治理具有一定参考价值和实践意义。

本文聚焦于畜禽养殖污染治理主题，基于实证调研对畜禽养殖污染治理困境的来源和成因进行深入研究，并从多元主体治理视角对当前的治理困境进行剖析，在此基础上提出相应的对策建议。具体而言，本文基于已有研究文献，依据公共物品理论、“经济人”假设和多中心治理理论构建了多元主体行动逻辑分析框架，采取问卷调查法和访谈法等对川东G区的畜禽养殖污染治理进行实证研究，收集并分析畜禽养殖污染治理过程中的相关数据及材料，通过分析政府、养殖场、村民三方的具体行为及其互动关系，提炼出治理过程中多元主体不同的行动逻辑，再深入研究畜禽养殖污染治理存在的困境和产生的原因。

本文发现，在现有制度框架下，不同主体行动逻辑所形成的主体间利益冲突是畜禽养殖污染治理困境产生的最根本原因。具体而言，对地方政府来说，在行政任务逻辑下，其有优先发展经济和优先治理环境两种行为选择；对养殖场来说，在经济优先逻辑下，若无环保压力，其更倾向规避环境治理责任；对村民来说，在利益需求逻辑下，其主要根据环境申诉的时间、精力等成本与养殖场给与的补偿作对比，从中做出符合自己利益需求的选择。不同主体的利益诉求不同，在各自的行动交互中形成对环境破坏的“合谋”或环境保护的“冲突”，从而产生治理困境。要解决这些治理困境，需要通过制度设计和制度激励让三方参与主体都将对生态利益的追求作为纳为己方的利益诉求。由此，本文建议在明确各方角色定位和环境职责的基础上，协调不同主体的利益诉求，优化各主体之间的互动关系，从环境共治意识、环境共治意愿、环境共治渠道、环境共治救济等方面着力，构建更加有效的多元主体良性互动环境共治模式。

With the rapid development of livestock and poultry breeding industry and the increased environmental protection awareness of rural residents, the issue of the livestock and poultry breeding pollution governance has been paid more and more attention. In 2013, the Regulations on Pollution Control of Livestock and Poultry Scale Farming was issued to fill the lacuna in agricultural environmental protection laws and regulations, witch contains scientific guidance and normative constraints for the sustainable and healthy development of the entire livestock and poultry breeding industry. The livestock and poultry breeding pollution is large, complex,timeliness and easy to defuse widely, thus the single center governance model of government difficult to be effective, witch leads to many problems such as high supervision cost and poor effect. The Report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed to build an environmental governance system that government as the guidance, enterprise as the main body, and jointly participated by social organizations and the public, aiming to solve the problems of environmental governance and the conflict of multiple relations, which reflect a diversified direction of environmental governance. In livestock and poultry pollution governance, it’s of theoretical and practical significance to analyze multiple interactions.

Based on existing research literature and the case of G area in eastern Sichuan, from the perspective of multiple interaction, this paper tries to find the source and reason that lead to the dilemma of poultry breeding pollution governance, and introduce some solutions. Specifically, this paper use public goods theory, hypothesis of economic man and multi-center governance theory to form the framework of multiple action logic analysis by using this analysis framework, adopting research methods such as questionnaire survey method and interview method to conduct empirical research, and integrate the relevant basic data in the work, then combing the specific behavior, endogenous interest demands and the interaction among the government, farms and villagers, refining the action logic of multiple subjects in this process to analyzes the dilemma and its causes in livestock and poultry breeding pollution governance.

We find that under the existing institutional framework, the conflict of interest among different subjects(which based on their action logic), is the fundamental cause of the dilemma in livestock and poultry breeding pollution governance. Specifically, for local government, under the logic of accomplishing administrative tasks, there are two choices, economic development first or environmental governance first; for farms, under the logic of pursuing economic interest, if not forced to protect the environment, they will be more inclined to evade the responsibility of environmental governance; for villagers, under the logic of demanding self-interest, they will compare the costs of their time and environmental interest with the compensation given by the farm, and make the best choice for themselves. In order to achieve effective co-governance of the livestock and poultry pollution, the three parties involved must take the pursuit of ecological interests as the core, while in reality, different parties have different interests, when interacting with one another, there might be two results—the "collusion" of damaging the environment or the "conflict" of whether to protect the environment，which leads to dilemmas in the governance of livestock and poultry breeding pollution. To solve these dilemmas, institutional design and institutional incentives must be used to make the three parties regard ecological interest as their own interest. In conclusion, this paper suggests we should clarify the role and environmental responsibilities of all subjects, optimize the interaction between various subjects, improve the consciousness in environmental co-governance, the willingness in environmental co-governance, the means in environmental co-governance and the relief in environmental co-governance, and build a more effective model in environmental co-governance that based on positive interactions among multiple subjects.