在政府部门的主导下，我国初步确立了企业内部控制的基本框架，内部控制问题逐渐受到实务界和学术界的广泛关注。按照有效契约理论，适度的高管薪酬激励能有效降低代理成本，有助于提高内部控制有效性。然而近年来上市公司频频出现高管领取“天价薪酬”或是“CEO零薪酬”的现象，引发了人们对薪酬合理性的讨论。本文以2012-2015年全部A股上市公司为样本，将高管薪酬不合理性分为激励过度和激励不足两种，分别讨论其对内部控制有效性的影响。发现存在高管薪酬激励不足的公司多于激励过度的公司，激励不足在国有企业中会降低内部控制有效性，提高激励不足的高管薪酬水平，内控有效性上升，但该激励手段在非国有企业中并不适用；过度激励对内部控制有效性没有显著影响。

With the guidance of the government, China has primarily developed the basic framework of internal control establishment and implementation. Internal control has gradually become a focused issue in both practical and academic world. Based on the optimal contract theory, a moderate incentive on executive compensation will lower the agent cost and help to improve the effectiveness of internal control. However, in recent years, the“sky-high compensation”and the“￥0-salary”has aroused wide attention on the rationality of executive compensation. This article examines the influence of the two classes of irrational compensation, overpaid and underpaid, on the effectiveness of internal control by using all listed companies’ annual data from 2012 to 2015. The paper comes to the following conclusions: executives are underpaid in more listed companies; the underpayment of top managers will decrease the effectiveness of internal control in state-owned companies only; while the overpaid amount has no effect on internal control effectiveness.