在科技已经成为企业核心竞争力的今天，企业的创新研发能力在企业的长期发展中扮演着愈发重要的角色，然而创新行为本身在有很高收益的同时，也有非常高的风险，企业创新行为通常需要大量投入并不断累积人力物力，最终成果何时能实现却很难把握，在现代企业所有权和管理权分离的情况下，这些特点使得代理问题在这创新决策方面尤为突出。本文选取了电子信息产业上市公司的CEO为代表，通过收集2013-2017年间的相关数据，研究了这一产业的企业对以CEO为代表的高级管理人员的激励措施对该企业创新研发投入的影响，最终得出了如下结论：（1）企业对CEO的总体激励水平对其创新研发投入有显著的促进作用；（2）企业对CEO的薪酬激励和股权激励均对其创新研发投入有显著的正向影响。通过关于在两职兼任情况下进一步的研究，本文还发现，当总激励水平相同时，CEO与董事长两职兼任可以显著地放大薪酬激励对企业创新研发投入的正向影响。

Nowadays, with science and technology having already become the core competitiveness of enterprises, the capability of innovative research and development play an increasingly important role in the long-term development of enterprises. But innovation behavior itself has the characteristics of high risk, high investment and high yield, which meaning that the effect is usually unpredictable and the time required is not only long but also difficult to estimate. In the case of a modern enterprise with ownership and management separating, these characteristics make the problem of agency decisions in this innovation is particularly prominent. In this paper, the CEO of a listed company in the electronic information industry is selected as the representative. By collecting relevant data from 2013 to 2017, the influence of the incentive measures of the company to the senior management represented by the CEO on the investment in innovative research and development of the company is studied. Finally, the following conclusions are drawn:（1）CEO's overall incentive mechanism has a significant positive effect on enterprises' R&D investment；（2）Both CEO compensation incentive and equity incentive have significant positive effects on the input of enterprise innovation and R&D. Through further research on the ownership structure, this paper also finds that when the total incentive level is the same, the dual roles of CEO and chairman can significantly magnify the positive impact of compensation incentive on enterprise innovation and R&D investment.