中文题名: | 群体最后通牒博弈的多主体模拟 |
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保密级别: | 公开 |
论文语种: | 中文 |
学科代码: | 120101 |
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学生类型: | 学士 |
学位: | 管理学学士 |
学位年度: | 2017 |
学校: | 北京师范大学 |
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第一导师姓名: | |
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提交日期: | 2017-06-01 |
答辩日期: | 2017-05-10 |
外文题名: | Multi - agent Simulation of Group Ultimatum Game |
中文关键词: | |
中文摘要: |
本文基于新产品培育阶段的消费市场特点,定义了群体最后通牒博弈模型,对其纳什均衡进行了分析,并从演化博弈论的角度构建了其多主体演化模型,模拟了群体最后通牒博弈长期演化稳定结果,分析了对模型中不同参数对演化结果的影响。
本文结果显示,群体最后通牒博弈的纳什均衡是多重均衡。所有提议者的最优反应策略只有一个且相同,但所有回应者的最优反应策略却不止一个且不一定相同。在无信息条件下,群体最后通牒博弈的演化结果并不能稳定到纳什均衡。回应者建立声誉的概率与提议者建立声誉的概率对演化结果的公平度有不同方向的影响,但同样会对演化结果的效率造成损失;而提议者与回应者两方对纳什均衡状态的积极探索则会促进公平度与市场效率的提高。
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外文摘要: |
Based on the characteristics of the consumer market in the new product cultivation stage, this paper defines the group ultimatum game model, analyzes its Nash equilibrium, and constructs its multi-agent simulation model, simulating the long evolution of the group ultimatum game.
The results show that the Nash equilibrium of the group ultimatum game is multi-equalization. Without any information, the evolution of the ultimatum game with multiple repetitions cannot be stabilized into one of the Nash equilibrium. The probability of the responder and the proposer establishing the reputation have different effects on the fairness, but both result in the loss of the efficiency; and the active exploration of the Nash equilibrium state between the proposer and the responder It will promote better fairness and market efficiency.
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参考文献总数: | 10 |
插图总数: | 7 |
插表总数: | 5 |
馆藏号: | 本120101/17008 |
开放日期: | 2017-10-31 |