中文题名: | 重申理性的地位:试析戴维森对意志薄弱的阐释 |
姓名: | |
保密级别: | 公开 |
论文语种: | chi |
学科代码: | 010101 |
学科专业: | |
学生类型: | 学士 |
学位: | 哲学学士 |
学位年度: | 2023 |
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学院: | |
第一导师姓名: | |
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提交日期: | 2023-06-14 |
答辩日期: | 2023-05-16 |
外文题名: | Reaffirming the status of Rationality: Davidson’s Theory of Weakness of the Will |
中文关键词: | |
外文关键词: | D. Davidson ; Weakness of the Will ; J. McDowell ; Prima-facie judgement ; All-out Judgement |
中文摘要: |
戴维森通过区分初步判断与终极判断解释意志薄弱或不自制现象。戴维森将意志薄弱中的矛盾拆解为三个似乎不可同时为真的前提之间的矛盾,并且强调最佳判断在不自制行动中的重要性。戴维森之后的哲学家对其理论进行批判时,要么放弃三个前提中的某条,如:沃森、布莱特曼等人;要么否定最佳判断在不自制行动中的关键性地位,如麦克道。对这些批评的回应更清晰地展现出戴维森的理论的特点——强调理性在不自制行动中的地位及作用,而非立足解释不自制行动本身。 |
外文摘要: |
Davidson’s theory of weakness of the will explains the possibility of weakness of the will by distinguishing prima-facie judgement and all-out judgement. Davidson sees the contradiction involved in weakness of the will as a contradiction between three premises that seem to be true. He also emphasizes the role of better judgement in incontinent actions. Philosophers after Davidson either give up one of the three premises or take better judgement as an inessential element. Replying to these criticisms shows that Davidson’s theory focuses on rationality rather than the action itself. |
参考文献总数: | 9 |
馆藏号: | 本010101/23019 |
开放日期: | 2024-06-14 |