本文根据国民政府对苏外交政策发展的三个阶段分为三个部分。 第一部分，从“九·—八”时的中苏断交状态到1932年12月12日中苏复交。国民政府的对苏外交呈上升趋势。文中在分析了国民政府“九·一八”之初没有及时与苏联改善关系的原因之后。又分析了国民政府被迫改变其僵硬的对苏外交的诸多因素。 第二部分，从中苏复交之后至1935年华北事变前，中苏关系处于停滞徘徊状态。本部分分析了出现这种局面以及在这种局面下国民政府对苏外交政策缓慢演变的原因。 第三部分从华北事变国民政府调整其外交政策到“七·七”事变，国民政府的对苏外交重新走向积极。本部分论证了国民政府在华北事变后对苏政策的转变的原因及过程，并详细地阐述了国民政府对苏谈判以及在此基础上中苏如何走向初步合作。 在结语中，我得出结论:国民政府的对苏外交政策的演变是其在中日民族矛盾日益加深。大地主大资产阶级利益受到严重损害的特定环境下。在不变更其反共反苏亲帝的立场的前提下，为寻找反对日本的间接同盟军而作出的一种策略上的转变。

According to the three phases of the development of Nanjing National Government's policy to USSR from the September 18th Incident of 1931 to the July 7th Incident of 1937, this thesis contains three main parts. The 1st part is from the state of severing diplomat io relation between Gllina ^hd USSR when the Septeniber 18th 工ncident of 1931 broke out to the reesta-blishlng on December 12th of 1932 when the diploinatic policy to USSR of the National Government was in the ascendent 。Having analysed why Nanjing Go verm ent ci id not improve the relation between the two coimtries in time at the ’oegginnlng of the September 18th Incident，I researches several factors for that the National Government had to adjust its rigid diplomatic policy to USSR. The 2nd part is from reestablishing the relation between the two countries to the North China Incident of 1935 when the Sino-Russian relations stagnated. In this part, I have analysed the reasons why the things took on the aspect and the National Government had to made a slow progress under the stagnant state." The 3rd part is from the National Government's adjusting its diplomatic policy after the North China Incident of 1935 to the July 7th Incident of 1937 when the National Government's diplomatic policy to USSR began to become positive again. This part has proved the seasons and process that the National Government changed its policy to USSR, and has remarked the negotistions bet-ween the National Government and thevgovernment of USSR and how the two countries went to cooperate preliminary-ly on the basis.of the negotiations. Finally, I have concluded the development of the National Government's diplomatic policy to USSR was a kind of tactial transformation for seeking indirect allies to be against Janpan, under the special environment of that the national contradition between Chinese and Japa-nese went more and mre worse and that the interests of the big landlords and big bourgeoisies were damaged badly. On the condicions that the against the Communist Party and USSR and goodwill to the imperialists stand was not changed.