1945年抗日战争胜利后，国民政府迅速着手接收具有战略价值的北方城市。青岛作为日伪海军驻扎的主要地区，因扼守胶济铁路东端起点、连接南北海运而受到国民政府重视。蒋介石一方面将海军总司令陈绍宽召集回国主持海军接收事宜，一方面却委任海军教导总队队长唐静海等人作为接收专员，以削弱陈绍宽的势力。与此同时，在中共军事压力和美军建议的双重影响下，蒋介石指定由美国海军登陆青岛协助接收。

在接收过程中，美军抢占先机，扣留多数日伪物资，并霸占了受降典礼。具体的接收事宜，则由陈绍宽任命的接收专员余振兴负责主持。随后，伪海军司令鲍一民与唐静海势力建立联系，驱逐了余振兴，夺取了接收权。

驻青岛美军在协助接收的外交借口下，服从于美军支持蒋介石政权的安排。在协助接收、遣返日军之外，它们还帮助蒋介石控制青岛周边局势、运送国民党军队登陆东北。档案表明，蒋介石的运兵诉求与美军只负责协助接收、而不干涉中国内战的任务之间存在矛盾冲突。美国方面关于协助接收的美军是否撤离也存在内部争论。最后，上述矛盾和争论在杜鲁门“暂不撤军、运兵东北”的政策下被搁置。在蒋介石的请求下，接收后的青岛成为承接美国海军援助的基地。

国民政府对青岛地区日伪海军的军事接收，反映了蒋介石利用接收来削弱旧有海军势力、发展嫡系海军力量的策略，也表明蒋介石试图将美国与国民党政权“捆绑”的意图。蒋介石在一定程度上实现了他的战略构想。

After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War in 1945, the National Government quickly began to take over the northern cities with strategic value. Qingdao, as the main area where the Japanese and puppet Navies were stationed, was attached great importance to by the National Government for guarding the eastern starting point of the Qingdao–Jinan railway and connecting the north and south sea transportation. On the one hand, Chiang Kaishek called Chen Shaokuan, the commander-in-chief of the Navy, back to China to take charge of the reception of the Navy. On the other hand, he appointed Tang Jinghai, the leader of the Navy's Training Corps, and others as reception officers to weaken Chen Shaokuan's power. At the same time, under the influence of the Chinese Communist military pressure and the US military proposal, Chiang Kaishek appointed the US Navy to land in Qingdao to assist in the reception.

In the process of reception, the U.S. Army seized the opportunity, detained most of the Japanese and puppet materials, and seized the surrender ceremony. Yu Zhenxing, the reception officer appointed by Chen Shaokuan, was responsible for the specific reception matters. Later, Bao Yimin, the commander of the puppet Navy, established contact with Tang Jinghai, expelled Yu Zhenxing and seized the power of reception.

Under the diplomatic pretext of assisting in taking over, the US military in Qingdao obeyed the US military's arrangement to support Chiang Kaishek's regime. Besides helping to receive and repatriate Japanese troops, they also helped Chiang Kaishek control the situation around Qingdao and transport Kuomintang troops to the northeast. The archives show that there was a conflict between Chiang Kaishek's demand for military transportation and the US military's task of only assisting in receiving and not interfering in China's civil war. There was also an internal debate in the United States about whether to withdraw the U.S. troops. Finally, the above contradictions and disputes were shelved under Truman's policy of "temporarily not withdrawing troops and sending troops to the northeast". At the request of Chiang KaiShek, Qingdao became a base for US Naval aid.

The National Government's military acceptance of the Japanese and puppet Navies in Qingdao reflected Chiang KaiShek's strategy of weakening the old naval power and developing the legitimate naval power by taking advantage of the acceptance, and also showed Chiang KaiShek's intention of "binding" the United States and the Kuomintang regime. To a certain extent, Chiang KaiShek realized his strategic vision.