本文基于“十八大”以来我国推行的反腐新政，探究获得政府补贴的上市公司的投资效率受反腐败政策的影响效果。研究结论表明，获得政府补贴企业的非效率投资在反腐败工作开展后显著减少，进一步研究发现，实施反腐败政策对获得补贴的国有企业过度投资的抑制作用明显强于非国有企业。本文的研究利用反腐新政这一准自然实验事件，考察了反腐败机制对于获取补贴企业投资效率的影响，相应补充与发展了国内外文献关于企业投资效率影响因素的相关探讨。此外，本文将为反腐政策在宏观市场和微观企业层面上提供进一步分析研究的基础和数据支持，亦对我国建立新型政企关系，合理化分配行政资源，促进国民经济持续、健康发展有一定的理论意义。

In 2012, The National Congress of the CPC in China officially launched the program that improving the legal system and fighting corruption to strengthen the institutions of governance. This paper uses financial data of listed companies' financial report by the end of 2015 as study objects, explores the effect of anti-corruption policy on the efficiency of investment in listed companies after using the Anti-Corruption New Deal, which has been carried out since the 18th National Congress. The research analyzes the sustained effect of anti-corruption on the corporate investment, especially those that belong to the high subsidy group. The empirical results show that the inefficient investment of government-subsidized companies is significantly reduced after anti-corruption work. Further study shows that the state-owned enterprises are more likely to reduce overinvestment than the non-state owned enterprises. These results indicate that the anti-corruption policy can lower subsidized corporations’ inefficient investment level and improve the performance of the government. This paper will provide an analytical basis and data support for the positive role of anti - corruption policy in both macro and micro market. It also has some theoretical significance for establishing a new type of government - enterprise relationship, rationalizing the allocation of administrative resources and promoting the sustained and healthy development of the national economy.