基于混合所有制企业差异化管控的现实需要，如何优化混改企业中股东抑或实际控制人与高管之间的权力配置以提升公司治理效率成为了亟需回答的理论问题。基于不完全契约理论，本文通过梳理企业剩余权力配置与公司治理效率的研究，发现企业剩余权力配置研究源起于所有权与控制权分离的代理问题，经历了资合情境下股东主导的剩余权力配置、人合情境下经理人主导的剩余权力配置和人资兼合情境下经理人与股东共享的剩余权力配置三个发展阶段。结合现有研究和中国企业集团化特征，本文提出了未来研究展望——剩余权力配置在差异化管控中的应用需要聚焦于剩余权力配置主体的拓展、剩余权力配置标准的优化和剩余权力配置效率的提升等，期望拓展企业剩余权力配置与公司治理效率研究的理论边界，同时为混合所有制企业的治理深化提供必要的理论探索。

在明确企业剩余权配置的边界后，基于中国关系型社会中的“信任”视角出发，尝试探索公司剩余控制权的权属问题。在公司治理实践中，实际控制人相较于大股东和母公司而言处于控制链更为隐蔽的位置，控制层级的形成在一定程度上可以让上市公司合理地隐藏与公司实际控制人或一致行动人关系的信息，在形式上回避了公司发生关联交易时所需的表决程序与披露程序。公司的实际控制人通过将剩余控制权向高管委任的方式可以有效的对高管团队进行奖惩或激励，以实现对公司的实际控制。由此，公司高管团队的权力实际来源为大股东抑或实际控制人基于专业、人情抑或其他关系链条建立的信任基础。基于此，本研究提出了实际控制人信任在上市公司高管薪酬激励中所扮演的角色几何的问题，旨在探究公司剩余控制权的现实权属与配置过程。

区别于现有研究，本文指出中国情境下的实际控制人信任是上市公司高管薪酬的重要影响因素，并能够显著提升上市公司高管团队的薪酬水平，原因在于实际控制人信任能够实现其与高管的激励相容、实现双方的激励相容，同时指出作用机理并不是源自实际控制人的合谋动机、管理层堑壕的自利动机等潜在解释路径。进而，实际控制人信任在高管薪酬激励对代理成本治理中发挥积极的调节作用、作为协同机制优化了薪酬激励的治理有效性。本研究的实践意义在于证实了实际控制人源自信任的主动风险共担能够优化高管薪酬契约的有效性，为企业家要素市场化定价提供了可借鉴的思路，也为研究企业剩余控制权配置提供了新的理论借鉴。

Stemming from the requirements of the differentiated control to mixed-ownership enterprises, this paper review the current research on the applications of incomplete contract theory to enterprises’ residual rights allocations. Aiming to reduce the agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control rights, incomplete contract theory has experienced three stages: shareholder-dominated residual rights allocation, manager-dominated residual rights allocation, and shareholders-managers sharing residual rights. Furthermore, considering the parent-subsidiary corporations in China context, the future research of incomplete contract theory should focus on the expansion of residual rights allocation subjects, the optimization of residual rights allocation standards, and the effective mechanisms of residual rights allocation. This paper expands the applicable boundary of the incomplete contract theory in the China, and provides a theoretical exploration of the residual rights allocation for the mixed-ownership corporations.

After defining the boundaries of residual right allocation, this paper explores the issue of ownership of residual control rights in companies from the perspective of "Trust" in China's relational society. In corporate governance practice, the actual controller occupies a more concealed position in the control chain compared to major shareholders and parent companies. The formation of control hierarchies can reasonably conceal information about the relationship between listed companies and their actual controllers or concerted actors, formally avoiding the voting and disclosure procedures required for related transactions. The actual controller can effectively reward and punish or incentivize the executive team by delegating residual control rights, so as to realize the company’s actual control. Therefore, the actual executive team's right is based on trust established by major shareholders or actual controllers through professional, or other cooperators. This paper raises the question of the role of actual controller trust in the incentive compensation of executives in listed companies.

What is the governance effect of ultimate owner's trust imposed on listed firms' executives incentive? Unlike the prior research, this paper proposes ultimate owner's trust is an important, if not decisive, factor which can impose effects on executives' incentive in Chinese context, and finds out ultimate owner's trust could significantly increase executives' compensation. Through distinguishing the mechanisms, interests aligning is the key mechanism in explaining the executives' increasing compensation with ultimate owners' trust, rather than ultimate owner's collusion intension and the entrenchment stemmed from executive' power. Further, ultimate owner's trust plays positively moderate effects in the relationship between ultimate owner's trust and executives' compensation, which demonstrates that ultimate owners' trust serves as the complementary mechanism to promote the governance effectiveness of executives' compensation. The practice implication is to show ultimate owners' trust, which originates ultimate owner's proactive risk-sharing, could play as a positive governance mechanism and offer the referential idea to improve the fair pricing of entrepreneur factors.