随着数字经济的发展，数字货币的产生和使用得到了持续关注，但也加大了其交易的风险，此时政府的干预管理行为变得尤为重要。本文通过构建数字货币交易过程中民众与政府两方博弈的仿真策略演化模型，民众“参与”或“不参与”与政府“监管”、“支持”或“既不监管也不支持”构成不同策略组合，探究不同交易成本的设置下这些策略组合的稳定性。首先，利用复制动态建立策略演化的数学模型，然后通过Lyapunov第一法求解系统的演化稳定策略。最后进行不同情景下的仿真模拟，得到不同参数设置下民众与政府策略之间的演化趋势。分析结果显示：政府监管所带来的社会公信力效益和政府支持所带来的经济效益决定了政府策略是否收敛于“监管”或“支持”；通过降低民众“参与”数字货币交易的总收益，能够有效抑制民众“参与”数字货币交易活动的积极性，是民众策略最终收敛于“不参与”的收敛条件。

  With the development of the digital economy, the generation and use of digital currencies have received continuous attention, but it has also increased the risk of their transactions, and the government's intervention and management behavior has become particularly important. In this paper, by constructing a simulation strategy evolution model of the game between the public and the government in the process of digital currency trading, the "participation" or "non-participation" of the public and the government's "supervision", "support" or "neither supervision nor support" constitute different strategy combinations, and explore the stability of these strategy combinations under the setting of different transaction costs. Firstly, the mathematical model of strategy evolution is established by replication dynamics, and then the evolutionary stability strategy of the system is solved by Lyapunov first method. Finally, the simulation under different scenarios is carried out to obtain the evolution trend between the strategy of the people and the government under different parameter settings. The analysis results show that the social credibility benefits brought by government supervision and the economic benefits brought by government support determine whether government strategy converges to "regulation" or "support". By reducing the total income of people's "participation" in digital currency trading, it can effectively inhibit the enthusiasm of people to "participate" in digital currency trading activities, which is the convergence condition for people's strategy to eventually converge to "non-participation".