劳动投资效率指的是公司在劳动方面的投资效率，分析的是管理层能否根据企业发展的实际需求对公司的雇员数量进行调整。与以人均净利润衡量的劳动生产率不同，劳动投资效率更直接地受到管理层机会主义行为的影响。管理层作为代理人，其机会主义行为会造成企业劳动投资效率下降，而低效率的劳动投资不利于公司未来的业绩表现。在我国控股股东持有较多股权的背景下，股东对管理层的监督更多地表现为控股股东对管理层的监督。然而，核心期刊中尚没有将控股股东作为影响劳动投资效率的主要解释变量进行分析。此外，上市公司的股东之间普遍存在着产权、亲缘与一致行动人等关联关系，因此，本文借鉴关系股东的研究思路，衡量控股股东控制力，在此基础上分析控股股东控制力对劳动投资效率的影响。

本文的实证结果表明：第一，控股股东控制力会提升劳动投资效率，这一作用在劳动投资过度和劳动投资不足的样本中均存在。进一步分析发现，低效率的劳动投资的确会降低公司在今后的业绩表现，不利于公司未来发展。第二，控股股东控制力提升进而改善劳动投资效率的作用在国有企业中不显著，而在民营企业中显著。在制度环境较差、行业竞争程度较低时以及总经理不持股时，控股股东控制力更会提升劳动投资效率。这表明，作为外部治理机制的制度环境与行业竞争，以及作为内部治理机制的总经理股权激励，能够在一定程度上替代控股股东控制力对劳动投资效率所发挥的积极作用。第三，总经理战略领导能力在控股股东控制力与劳动投资效率之间发挥着部分中介的作用。控股股东控制力的增加会提升总经理的战略领导能力，进而会提升企业劳动投资效率。

本文得出如下启示：第一，应该辩证看待控股股东。控股股东控制力提升在客观上加大了对管理层的监督力度，能够提升劳动投资效率。这表明控股股东在具有占用上市公司资金等相对消极的作用的同时，并不影响控股股东在企业管理方面发挥促进作用，二者之间并不冲突。第二，控股股东应该使总经理积极提升并充分发挥其战略领导能力，以此提升企业的劳动投资效率。第三，国有企业应该从除了控股股东之外的治理机制中，寻找提升劳动投资效率的有效方法。此外，需要完善制度环境，加大对行业竞争程度较低的企业的外部监督力度，适当进行总经理股权激励，使管理层拥有提升劳动投资效率的内在驱动力。

Labor investment efficiency refers to the company's investment efficiency in labor. Labor investment efficiency analyzes whether managers can adjust the number of employees according to the actual needs of enterprise development. Different from the labor productivity measured by per capita net profit, labor investment efficiency is more directly affected by the opportunistic behavior of managers. Managers are agents. Their opportunistic behavior will reduce labor investment efficiency, and labor investment inefficiency is harmful to the future performance of the company. In China, controlling shareholder owns a number of shares. Thus, supervision of shareholders on managers is transformed into supervision of controlling shareholders on managers. However, the important papers with labor investment efficiency as the dependent variable do not take the controlling shareholder as the main explanatory variable. In addition, among China's listed companies, there are relationships among the top ten shareholders of many companies, such as property rights, relatives and persons acting in concert. Therefore, this paper uses the framework of shareholder relationships to analyze the impact of controlling power of controlling shareholder on labor investment efficiency.

The results show that: first, the improvement of the controlling power of controlling shareholder will increase labor investment efficiency. Whether in the sample of under-investment in labor or the sample of over-investment in labor, the improvement of the controlling power of controlling shareholder will increase labor investment efficiency. In addition, labor investment inefficiency will lead to the poor performance of the company in the future. Second, the impact of controlling power of controlling shareholder on labor investment efficiency is not significant in the sample of state-owned enterprises, but significant in the sample of private enterprises. In the samples with poor institutional environment, in the samples with low degree of industry competition and in the samples without CEO equity incentive, the improvement of the controlling power of controlling shareholder is more conducive to the company to increase labor investment efficiency. This means that institutional environment, industry competition and CEO equity incentive can replace the supervisory role of controlling shareholders on managers. Third, the improvement of the controlling power of controlling shareholder is conducive to the improvement of CEO’s strategic leadership, and will further increase labor investment efficiency.

The enlightenment of the article is as follows. First, we should view the controlling shareholders comprehensively. The improvement of the controlling power of controlling shareholder is conducive to increasing the supervision of managers, and then can increase labor investment efficiency. This shows that there is no conflict between the negative role of controlling shareholders in corporate governance and the positive role of controlling shareholders in corporate management. Second, controlling shareholders should enable CEOs to actively improve their strategic leadership and give full play to their strategic leadership, so as to improve the labor investment efficiency of enterprises. Third, state-owned enterprises should look for ways to increase labor investment efficiency from the corporate governance mechanism other than controlling shareholders. In addition, we should construct a better institutional environment, increase the supervision of enterprises with low degree of industry competition, and appropriately carry out CEO equity incentive, so as to reduce the opportunistic behavior of managers, and make managers have the consciousness to increase labor investment efficiency.