对于转轨时期的中国股份制商业银行来说，因其产权结构的不同，更能适应市场化的进程以及体现高级管理层的意志。在此前提下，中国股份制商业银行的高管薪酬水平和薪酬结构是否合理？高管薪酬水平是否符合人力资本使用效率？高管薪酬水平与银行经营业绩是否具有关联性？这些问题即本文试图研究和回答的。本文以委托—代理理论、人力资本理论为基础，结合中国股份制商业银行的特殊性，从高管薪酬结构、薪酬水平、薪酬水平的合理性以及高管薪酬与经营业绩的关联性等角度进行分析探讨，探索银行高管薪酬激励机制及其行为效应，并对如何完善现有中国股份制商业银行高管薪酬制度提出相应探索性建议。

For joint-stock commercial banks in transitional period, they can adapt to the market-oriented process and reflect the will of senior management thanks to their specific ownership structure. In this context, are the level and structure of executives’ compensation in joint-stock commercial banks reasonable? Does the executives’ pay level fit the human capital efficiency? Is the level of executives’ pay related to the banks’ operating performance? This paper attempts to study these issues.Based upon the principal - agent theory and human capital theory, this paper combines the special natures of joint-stock commercial banks, and conducts the analysis and discussion from the executives’ pay structure, the executives’ pay level, the rationality of the pay level, and the relevance of the executives’ pay and the operating performance, and study to explore the bank executives’ pay incentives and their behavioral effects, and also puts forward some suggestions on how to improve the existing joint-stock commercial bank executives’ pay system.