作为一种对人的价值的思考，先秦儒家性命思想探讨的核心是道德问题——换言之，在儒家看来，道德即人的价值所在。道德的根源、内容以及完成是这个问题紧密联系的三个方面，而落脚点尤在道德的完成上。先秦诸儒所论虽不尽相同，但其内在祈向却并无二致，都力图把完成道德的力量赋予每个人自身。性与命是思考的两极：命代表着外在与一，性则接近内在与众。作为先秦儒家性命之思的起点，西周性命思想以天命的形式将人的价值建立在道德之中，认为人的道德根源于天、以天之所命为内容且完成的最终决定者是天。如此则人虽有道德却外在且仅为王所有，距普遍的人的价值相去甚远。后来的思考者致力于将天命与人性融合。尽管人性归根结底亦为天所生，但相较于天命而言，人性远为内在且为人人所有。这一努力有两条思路，一路以《中庸》、《易传》为代表，倾向于以天命融合人性，其主张可谓“天命之谓性”；另一路以《论语》、《孟子》为代表，更倾向于以人性融合天命，其主张可谓“性之谓天命”。这一努力虽已将外在与一向内在与众推进了一大步，但人性终究处在天的笼罩之下，距普遍的人的价值终有一层之隔。把道德从天命安放于人性的努力被荀子推进了一步，其“天人相分”、“性恶伪善”之说将道德根源归于人为。但他在把道德由天归于人的同时，又把它归于圣人，如此则道德内于一而非内于众，结果其圣人虽无天之名却有主宰之实，反而跌向了法家的专制。这种由外至内、由一至众的艰难推进及反复构成了先秦儒家性命思想演进的主线。在这一演进过程中，孔子、孟子以及荀子在困厄不遇时，都曾试图反过来借助天的力量来完成道德；但即便是如此，面对命运，任何对道德力量的承诺都显得过于苍白。对命运的无奈是儒家性命思想困境的集中体现。从周初的天命观到荀子的性恶论，距离把完成道德的力量赋予每个人自身的目标越来越近却最终失之交臂。正是这种逐步逼近却又永远无法到达，使先秦儒家性命思想自身的困境一点点凸现了出来。 儒家性命思想以其追求与失败深刻揭示了人之不能自我完成的生命困境。与孔、孟、荀等人主要是通过抽象思辨不同，文人更多地通过对具体人生遭遇的咏唱，表现这一困境。屈原对不遇之感的抒写，具有震撼人心的巨大力量，远远超出了对一己遭遇的纠缠、对个人情感的宣泄，深刻揭示了士人的普遍困境，为中国文学开创了“士不遇”主题。在屈原之后，汉代士人继续抒写着自己与世之间的冲突、无法自我完成的痛苦。他们对时世的感受，既有与屈原大致相同的诸如昏君的反复无常、听信谗言，奸佞的结党营私、贪婪嫉妒，俗众的善恶不辨、随波逐流等等，又有远远深于屈原的大一统专制时代的士人为人君所任意播弄；而他们对感受的抒写，同样既有步趋经典、过度模拟的雷同，又有“答客难”类作品一空依傍、自铸伟辞的新异。汉人对时代新变的抒写以及他们不约而同的集体歌唱，进一步揭示了不遇绝非个别士人一己的遭遇，而是人不能自我完成的普遍困境，为中国文学确立了“士不遇”主题。 文学不仅给了这些无法平静的灵魂一个幽栖的家园，它的介入更使命运问题发生了微妙的变化：原本只是穷困不遇时的歌咏，却往往会造就千秋万岁不可磨灭的声名。这样，文学就不必只是人对命运的无奈叹息，而有可能成为力求超越的抗争。在对文学超越性的建构与反建构的过程中，韩愈以儒学为中心，对道德、政治与文学之间的关系进行了重新整合，很好地应对了来自才德悖离论的挑战，把穷困不遇之于文章不朽的积极意义推向了极致，确立了中国古代文人力图征服命运、以文学来完成自己作为士人的价值的理想。后来欧阳修提出“穷者而后工”，给了它一个简明扼要的表述。当然，仅以人生境遇的穷困不遇，无法解释全部甚至大部分的文学创作的成功。然而，也正是这种理论与实际的不相符，凸显了穷而后工命题的出现，其实是对文学超越的苦苦追寻，是士人力图借助文学超越生命困境的一次痛苦挣扎，是儒家在其价值承诺落空后变换形式所做的又一次无奈承诺。 在唐、宋时期儒学复兴的历史过程中，围绕着文道关系，形成了“载道”、“贯道”等一系列文论命题。对于它们的区别，以郭绍虞为代表的现代学者，在判断上出现了一些失误。首先，“载”与“贯”的字面并不能表明“载道”说与“贯道”说的差异。其次，反对作文害道而主张有德者必有言，也是古文家的主张，而并非道学家的专利。古文家与道学家在创作实践上的区别非常明显，但在文道关系的理论表述上的区别却非常细微。道学家的着眼点在道之传上，文只是可资利用的外在工具；而文学家的着眼点则在言之传上，道与文都是决定是否能传的内在因素。这个细微的差别决定了同样主张有德者必有言，而古文家更加关注如何才能做到心手一致；同样反对作文害道，而道学家更加如临大敌。道学家与文学家在文道关系说上的差异，与他们在人性论上的差异有对应之处。相比之下，古文家对人性的理解更契合文学的内在规律。 作为儒学最高范畴的通称与唐代儒学最高范畴的特称，“道”的双层涵义及其与“理”、“心”之间的关系，在儒学领域内是非常清楚的。但在儒学进入文论领域、围绕核心范畴生成序列命题的过程中，却出现了复杂的情况。古文家论文论道相矛盾而不自知；理学家依其道论建立了文论，却与文学创作的实际规律多有牴牾；直至心学家把心建构为价值根源，高度弘扬了人的主体性，将儒学重视个性、情感体验、创造性的一面空前地凸显出来，才使文论与道论密合无间。

For the thought of human’s value, morality takes the core place among various Confucian agreements about the personality and destiny during the period of pre-Qin. In another words, Confucianism maintains that human’s value is reflected by one’s morality. The source, content and accomplishment of morality are closely interrelated within this proposition, with how to fulfill one’s morality as the focus. Although there are many different opinions in various schools of Confucianism, they all have the same inner seeking and they all believe that each individual should be given the power to complete their morality. Personality and destiny are the two sides of the thought: destiny represents external and unique; while personality embodies internal and numerous. As the starting point of the meditation of personality and destiny in pre-Qin times, the thought of personality and destiny in Western Zhou’s Dynasty builds human’s value into morality in the form of God’s will and takes a view that the root of human’s morality comes from heaven, its substance is the will of heaven, and God will make a final decision on whether one can fulfill his morality. Therefore, although men have their morality, it is the external force and belongs exclusively to the king, which is far from the common value of human beings. The successive thinkers devote themselves to combining personality and destiny. Though personality comes from the heaven in their proposition, it is more internal and is owned by every one, compared with destiny. This thought has two schools. One of them claims that destiny stays within the personality, with The Doctrine of the Mean and the Book of the Changes as their representative works. On the contrary, the other school maintains that personality exists within the destiny, with The Analects of Confucius and Mengzi as their representative works. The latter one attempts to improve the destiny, which embodies external and unique, to personality, which means internal and various. However, it can not fuse the personality with destiny by the name of “benevolence”. As to the first school, personality is still under the control of destiny and it is far from constructing the common value for every one. Later, Xunzi makes his effort to promote morality and makes it closer to personality from destiny. But while he confers more personality on the morality, he thinks that it is only belongs to the sages. So morality reflects nothing but the unique. Thus, the sages become the morality themselves, although they are also among the average humans. This thought leads to the autocracy of Legalists. Therefore, the difficult movement and repeated construction of how to change from the unique to the various or from the external to the internal have become the main threads of thinking of personality and destiny in pre-Qin times. During this developing progress, Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi all attempt to complete their morality with the help of the power from heaven when faced with difficulties, disasters and misunderstandings. However, no promise of the force of morality is useful in the face of destiny. The Confucian thought of personality and destiny makes no alternative choices when it encounters the fate. From the concept of destiny in the early Zhou Dynasty to Xunzi's theory of evil by nature, the goal to give the power of morality to individuals is gradually approached but never reached after all -- the thought of destiny and personality in the pre-Qin period has and is caught in its own predicament.