中文题名: | 中央政府与地方政府政策行为差异的博弈论分析 ——以房地产市场为例 |
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保密级别: | 公开 |
学科代码: | 082506T |
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学生类型: | 学士 |
学位: | 理学学士 |
学位年度: | 2009 |
学校: | 北京师范大学 |
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提交日期: | 2009-06-10 |
答辩日期: | 2009-05-19 |
外文题名: | A Game Theory analysis about the different policy between central government and local government ——Take the real estate for example |
中文关键词: | |
中文摘要: |
中央政府和地方政府之间的博弈关系是研究政府行为的一个关键方面,通过博弈论的方法对其进行分析,可以更深刻地理解现实,更好地理顺政府间的关系格局。
本文以房地产这一关系到国计民生的热点话题为研究对象,选择房地产调控时,中央与地方政府的不同政策表现作为切入分析的独特视角,并综合运用了构建博弈模型和结合事实分析的方法。
在核心模型上,本文进行了由浅至深的博弈分析,通过完全信息下中央与地方进行的静态博弈这一基本模型,揭示了地方政府出于最大化自己利益的考虑,有着不配合中央控制房价的内在激励。
在基本模型的基础上,本文加入地方差异这一因素而对其进行了扩展,说明了地方差异的存在放大了地方政府消极配合中央政策的倾向。进一步地,本文通过加入政策房和商品房的区别,再次扩展了模型,揭示了中央与地方在政策房建设上存在着不同的反应函数和资源分配比例。
通过层层递进的模型构造,本文一步步从理论接近现实,从而较有说服力地说明了中央与地方在房地产市场上各类政策行为差异的根源。
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外文摘要: |
The Game relation between central government and local government is a key point to study the action of governments. On the basis of Game Theory, it will be helpful to recognize the reality more profoundly and straighten out the relation between governments.
This thesis selects the real estate which is important for both country and common people as the object of study , and research this subject from the particular visual angle of the different actions between central government and local government when they doing macroeconomic control. In this thesis , both the method of models construction and examples analysis are being used.
In core Model, this thesis applis Game Theory from the shallower to the deeper. By a basic static Game Model between central government and local government under the condition of complete information, it reveals that local governments may not coordinate local government in controlling House prices with an intrinsic motivation to maximize their interest.
Then, this thesis adds with the elements of location differentiation to illuminate that they enlarge the tendency that local governments coordinate negatively with central government. Futhermore, it extends the Model again to manifest that there are different reaction functions and resource allocation proportions in constructing Economical Housing between central government and local government by distinguishing Economical Housing and Commercial Housing.
Constructing various Game Models step by step, this thesis persuasively analyzes the source which causes differentiation of policies in real estate market between central government and local government from theory to reality.
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参考文献总数: | 21 |
插图总数: | 4 |
插表总数: | 2 |
馆藏号: | 本081105s/0904 |
开放日期: | 2009-06-10 |