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中文题名:

 基于市场势力企业减排行为研究--基于碳排放交易市场    

姓名:

 高子豪    

保密级别:

 公开    

论文语种:

 中文    

学科代码:

 020401    

学科专业:

 国际经济与贸易    

学生类型:

 学士    

学位:

 经济学学士    

学位年度:

 2018    

学校:

 北京师范大学    

校区:

 北京校区培养    

学院:

 经济与工商管理学院    

第一导师姓名:

 刘兰翠    

第一导师单位:

 北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院    

提交日期:

 2018-06-28    

答辩日期:

 2018-05-24    

外文题名:

 Study on the Emission Reduction Behavior of Enterprises with Market Power: Based on Carbon Emission Trading Market    

中文关键词:

 市场势力 ; 减排行为 ; 碳排放权交易    

中文摘要:
多年以来,我国在碳市场建设方面做了大量的工作,取得一定的成就。基 于国际国内碳市场的有关研究,结合我国 7 个试点地区特殊情况,利用微观 经济学、博弈论等相关知识,本文首先构建了行业-企业的减排成本曲线,然 后通过市场结构的相关理论识别出具有市场势力的企业,最后通过计算具有 市场势力企业对新的市场均衡条件的影响,进而判断其策略行为。本文发现: 在七个试点地区都存在一定具有市场势力的企业,通过影响交易价格降低自 身的减排成本。同时整个市场减排成本上升,交易量下降。为此,本文??出了 构建完备的碳交易监督管理机制、重点关注特殊企业、加强市场信息公开等相 应的政策建议。并??出关于市场势力测算、企业合谋行为分析等相关领域的未 来研究建议。
外文摘要:
Over the years, China has done a lot of work in the construction of the carbon market and achieved certain achievements. Based on relevant studies of international and domestic carbon markets, combined with the special circumstances of seven pilot regions in China, and using micro-economics, game theory, and other related knowledge, this paper first (1) established the industry-company emission reduction cost curve, then (2) identified the enterprises with market power by relevant theory of market structure, and (3) ended up analyzing their strategic behavior and the according influence. This paper finds that there are certain enterprises with market power in all seven pilot regions, which will reduce their own abatement costs by affecting transaction prices. At the same time, the transaction costs of the entire market rise and the trading volume decreases. For this reason, this paper proposes corresponding policy recommendations for building a complete carbon trading supervision and management mechanism, focusing on special enterprises, and strengthening market information disclosure. It also proposes future research proposals on related fields such as market power measurement and corporate collusion behavior analysis.
参考文献总数:

 52    

馆藏号:

 本020401/18001    

开放日期:

 2019-07-09    

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