改革开放以来，大规模的人口流动在给各地区提供了劳动力资源的同时，也给区域经济注入了活力，尤其在人口红利逐步消失的现在，外来人口已成为各大地区争抢的稀缺资源。然而，外来人口在户籍和非户籍因素的影响下，社会融入水平不高，外来人口难以实现“本地化”仍是尚待解决的问题。与本地人通婚成为外来人口谋求融入当地的重要渠道。但由于外来人口与本地配偶存在着社会资源的差距，其在家庭中的议价能力博弈中也处于劣势，体现为外来人口在家庭内部资源分配中得到更少的资源。倘若长期处于家庭内部不平等之中，外来人口很难真正的实现本地化。

基于以上背景，本文利用CFPS2014数据，从决策权分配的角度，对外来人口不同婚配选择对其家庭内部议价能力的影响进行了研究。研究表明：与其他情况相比，外来人口与本地人结婚会显著削弱前者在新组建家庭内部的议价能力，导致其在家庭决策处于弱势地位。

机制研究结果表明，离婚会使外来人口失去本地人配偶提供的住房和本地社会网络，这一潜在威胁是削弱外来人口家庭议价能力的重要原因。并且，随着婚姻时长的增加，这种对外来人口家庭议价能力的削弱逐步消失，原因可能在于：（1）外来人口在本地逐步积累经济社会资源，缩小了与配偶的资源差距；（2）婚姻双方在婚姻中的感情、时间投入增加了沉没成本。这两个因素使得外来人口与本地配偶的家庭议价能力逐步接近，在家庭内部资源分配中不再处于弱势地位。

本文还根据性别、学历、户籍分类，进行了异质性分析，分析结果表明：（1）男性和女性外来人口在与本地人的婚姻中面临的家庭议价能力损失是十分接近的。（2）在与本地人的婚姻中，高学历外来人口不会遭受家庭议价能力损失，低学历外来人口会。（3）不管是否拥有本地户籍，外来人口都会在与本地人的婚姻中都会面临家庭议价能力损失，但保留外地户籍的外来人口面临更严重的家庭议价能力损失。本文的进一步研究发现：家庭议价能力的削弱还使得外来人口在家庭分工上处于弱势地位。但另一方面，与本地人结婚促进了外来人口更快地融入当地社会，具体表现为其在当地被歧视的概率降低、自评社会地位提升，以及生育意愿增加。

本文的研究拓展了家庭成员议价话题的研究视角，也从家庭层面丰富了外来人口本地化领域的相关研究。

Since the reform and opening up, the large-scale population flow has not only provided labor resources for all regions, but also injected vitality into the regional economy. Especially now that the demographic dividend has gradually disappeared, the migrant population has become a scarce resource for all regions. However, under the influence of registered residence factors, the level of social integration of migrant population is not high, and it is still a problem to be solved that migrant population is difficult to achieve "localization". Marriage with locals has become an important channel for foreign populations to seek integration into the local community. However, due to the social resource gap between migrant populations and local spouses, they are also at a disadvantage in the bargaining power game within the family, which is reflected in the fact that migrant populations receive less resources in the allocation of resources within the family. If long-term inequality within households exists, it is difficult for outsiders to truly achieve localization.

Based on the above background, this article uses CFPS2014 data to study the impact of different mating choices of migrant populations on their family bargaining power from the perspective of decision-making power allocation. Research has shown that compared to other situations, marriage between migrants and locals significantly weakens the bargaining power of the former within newly formed families, leading to their disadvantaged position in family decision-making.

The results of mechanism research indicate that divorce can lead to the loss of housing and local social networks provided by local spouses for migrant populations, which is a potential threat that weakens the bargaining power of migrant families. Moreover, as the length of marriage increases, the weakening of the bargaining power of migrant families gradually disappears, possibly due to: (1) migrant populations gradually accumulate economic and social resources locally, narrowing the resource gap with their spouses; (2) The emotional and time investment of both parties in the marriage increases the sunk cost. These two factors have gradually brought the bargaining power of migrant populations and local spouses closer, and they are no longer in a disadvantaged position in the allocation of resources within the family.

According to the classification of gender, education background and registered residence, this paper also conducts a heterogeneity analysis. The results show that: (1) The loss of family bargaining power faced by male and female migrants in their marriage with local people is very close. (2) In marriages with locals, highly educated migrants will not suffer from a loss of family bargaining power, while low educated migrants will. (3) No matter whether they have a local registered residence or not, the migrant population will face the loss of family bargaining power in their marriage with the local people, but the migrant population who retain a foreign registered residence will face a more serious loss of family bargaining power. Further research in this article found that the weakening of family bargaining power also puts migrant populations in a disadvantaged position in family division of labor. On the other hand, marrying local people promotes the faster integration of migrant populations into local society, which is manifested in a lower probability of discrimination in the local area, an increase in self rated social status, and an increase in fertility willingness.

The research in this article expands the research perspective on the topic of bargaining among family members, and also enriches relevant research in the field of localization of migrant populations from the family level.