随着互联网的普及，与此相关的餐饮业也快速发展。在线外卖由于方便快捷的服务激发了大量的新需求，包括对家庭自我服务的替代以及由外卖衍生出的市场化配送服务。据艾媒咨询公司的研究，2011年到2018年间，外卖餐饮服务业的市场规模扩大了10多倍外卖。外卖行业已经成为城市生活的一个组成部分，而外卖骑手也成为城市中一个重要的职业群体。

与这一行业蓬勃发展并行出现的是，城市中与外卖骑手相关的交通安全事故的频发 。为什么这一群体会不顾自身以及公共安全，奋力与时间赛跑？这一行为与其所在企业的管理和激励制度之间具有什么样的关联？这是本研究所关注的核心问题。本研究以美团和饿了么平台为例，对北京地区的外卖骑手进行了问卷调查，对北京市朝阳区望京地区的9名骑手、4名站长及助理、2名警察进行了访谈。

研究发现，外卖平台对于骑手的管理和激励制度赋予了骑手强有力的经济刺激，激励他们在送餐过程当中最大化的节约时间，具体包括如下几个方面：

每个外卖平台都设有骑手管理的严格的流动等级体系，不同的骑手因为其工作业绩不同，在等级体系中的位置不同，后续工作可以获得的收入不同。等级体系为所有的外卖骑手提供了强有力的刺激，激励他们尽最大可能去提高自己的积分，进而晋升等级。

除了等级体系之外，为了激励外卖骑手的工作热情，外卖平台会通过微信等方式提供流动的等级排名。流动的等级体系有两方面的作用，一方面是当下的王者给骑手们强大的榜样示范，这些“暂时的王者”每时每刻催人奋进。另一方面是每一个人都有可能成为王者。与等级排名相配合的还有各种奖励制度，冲单奖励、高温奖励等为骑手们提供了充足的经济激励。

决定骑手积分和晋级的最核心的因素是送单量、用户评价与准时送达率。在赋予骑手以强有力动力去追求升级的同时，每个外卖平台还出台了系统的、严苛的惩罚制度来保证高的送单量、准时送达率和好的用户评价。

在激励制度和惩罚制度共同作用下，时间成为这一群体最为稀缺的资源。对于时间的精细化管理成为他们日常工作的一部分，其中包括如何在送餐过程中最大化节约时间。

基于上述研究发现，笔者认为外卖骑手在外卖递送过程中的交通违规行为源于企业时效性要求与其自身安全之间的冲突。该冲突的改善一方面依赖于约束企业的处罚权，另一方面需要形成企业与交管部门协同治理的机制。

With the popularity of the Internet, the related catering industry has also developed rapidly.The convenience and convenience of online food delivery has stimulated a large number of new demands, including the replacement of home self-service and the marketization of delivery services derived from food delivery.Between 2011 and 2018, the takeaway foodservice market expanded more than 10-fold, according to research by imedia.Industry has become a part of urban life, and takeaway riders have become an important professional group in the city.

In parallel with the booming of this industry, traffic accidents related to takeaway riders are frequent in cities.Why would this group race against time, regardless of its own safety and public safety?The relationship between this behavior and the management and incentive system of the enterprise is the core issue of this study.Taking Meituan and ele. me platforms as examples, this study conducted a questionnaire survey on takeaway riders in Beijing, and interviewed nine riders, four stationmasters and assistants, two policemen and a lawyer in Wangjing district, Chaoyang district, Beijing.

According to the research results, the management and incentive system of the delivery platform for riders provides a strong economic incentive for riders to maximize time saving during the delivery process, including the following aspects:

Each delivery platform is provided with a strict mobile ranking system managed by riders. Different riders can obtain different incomes in the subsequent work due to their different performance and positions in the ranking system.The hierarchy provides a powerful incentive for all takeaway riders to try their best to improve their points and thus their rank.

In addition to the rank system, in order to motivate the work enthusiasm of the takeaway riders, the takeaway platform will provide mobile rank ranking by means of WeChat.The fluid hierarchy works in two ways. On the one hand, the current Kings serve as powerful role models for their riders.On the other hand, everyone can be king.In addition to the ranking, there are a variety of reward systems, such as charging single reward and high temperature reward, which provide sufficient financial incentives for riders.

The core factors that determine rider points and promotion are order quantity, user evaluation and on-time delivery rate.While empowering riders with strong motivation to pursue upgrades, each delivery platform has also introduced a systematic and strict punishment system to ensure high delivery volume, on-time delivery rate and good user evaluation.

Since the combination of incentive system and punishment system makes time the most scarce resource for this group, the refined management of time has also become a part of their daily work, including how to maximize time saving in the process of delivering food.

Based on the above findings and conclusions, the researchers believe that the traffic violations of takeaway riders in the takeaway delivery process are fundamentally caused by the conflict between the timeliness requirements of enterprises and their own safety. On the one hand, the improvement of this conflict depends on restricting the punishment power of enterprises; on the other hand, it forms the mechanism of collaborative governance between enterprises and traffic management departments.