随着我国经济市场的发展，控股股东与投资人之间的利益冲突已经成为严重问题，掏空行为是利益冲突的表现之一。控股股东对上市公司的掏空不仅会侵害上市公司及投资人的利益，而且可能会对整个金融市场的稳健发展造成不利影响。与此同时，股权质押凭借其融资优势也已成为我国企业中的常见现象，控股股东出质股权不仅是其本身的融资行为，由于其出质物的特殊性，也会对其所在企业产生很大影响。已有研究发现，控股股东出质股权会加剧代理问题，对企业的盈余管理、股价崩盘风险、内部治理等方面都会产生影响。本文重点探讨控股股东股权质押和掏空程度之间的关系。

本文在对我国股权质押的制度背景、规模等现状进行展示的基础上，选择2015年到2019年深沪两市A股上市公司为样本，检验不同所有权性质下控股股东质押股权对掏空程度的影响。得出的结论主要有：（1）控股股东出质股权对掏空程度有正向影响。（2）存在控股股东股权质押的企业中，控股股东的质押比例越大，其对掏空程度的正向影响越大，且这种正向影响在非国有企业更显著。

With the development of China's economic market, the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and external shareholders and investors has become a serious problem, and tunneling behavior is one of the performance of the conflict of interest. The hollowing out of the listed company by the controlling shareholder will not only infringe the interests of the listed company and the investors, but also may adversely affect the steady development of the whole financial market. At the same time, equity pledge has become a common phenomenon in Chinese enterprises by virtue of its financing advantages. The pledging equity of the controlling shareholder is not only its own financing behavior, but also has a great impact on the enterprise in which it is committed due to the particularity of its pledging. Studies have shown that the pledging equity of the controlling shareholder will aggravate the agency problem, which will have an impact on earnings management, stock price crash risk, internal governance and other aspects of the listed company. This paper focuses on the relationship between controlling shareholders' equity pledge and the degree of hollowing out.

On the basis of demonstrating the institutional background and scale of equity pledge in China, this paper selects A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2015 to 2019 as samples to test the influence of controlling shareholders' pledged equity on the degree of hollow out under different ownership nature. The main conclusions are as follows :(1) There is a positive correlation between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and the degree of hollowing out. (2) In the companies with controlling shareholders pledging equity, the greater the proportion of controlling shareholders pledging equity, the greater the positive impact of equity pledging on the degree of hollowing is, and this positive impact is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.