谦虚谎是出于谦虚的目的而故意做出的虚假陈述。这种谎言在中国社会中极其常见且有着悠久的历史，对这种谎言的研究不仅仅能给说谎认知的相关理论观点增添新的证据，更重要的是，可以从一个侧面帮助我们了解古老的中国文化对现代人的影响。本研究关注的是儿童对谦虚谎的说谎认知，由两个实验组成。在实验一中，我们用个别施测的方法考察了7岁，9岁和11岁儿童对谦虚谎和黑谎的说谎概念理解和道德评价。结果发现，3个年龄的儿童对各种条件下的概念判断有相似的趋势。相比于黑谎，儿童更少将谦虚谎判断为谎话，尤其是11岁儿童。三组年龄的儿童对于黑谎及其对应真话的道德评价都不存在年龄差异，但对谦虚谎及其对应真话进行的评价则有显著的年龄差异。在对谦虚谎的评价中，7岁儿童和9岁儿童之间没有显著差异，但是7岁儿童和9岁儿童的评价都和11岁儿童的评价显著不同。另外，11岁儿童对做了好事说真话的评价也和7岁，9岁儿童不同。说明11岁儿童对做了好事之后说谦虚谎还是说真话有着与其他年龄的儿童所不同的看法。在实验二中，我们采用ERP技术考察了11岁儿童对谦虚谎的道德评价的神经机制。结果发现儿童对谦虚谎和黑谎进行道德评价时ERPs在晚期平均波幅上存在差异，对做了好事或坏事后说真话的评价也存在差异。说明被试的确把谦虚谎的视做不同于一般谎言。比较了两对“谎言－真话”之间的差异，发现两对“谎言－真话”都存在差异。且两项差异表现在不同的时间窗和不同的脑区，说明谎言和真话引发了被试不同的加工，且再次证明谦虚谎不同于普通的黑谎。根据以上两个实验，本研究得出结论：和7岁以及9岁儿童相比，11岁儿童对谦虚谎有着不同的认知，他们对谦虚谎的道德评价有其独特的神经机制，本研究支持习俗模型。

Modest lies are false statements made intentionally out of the purpose of being modest. This kind of lies is extremely common in Chinese society and has a long history. Study on this kind of lies can not only add new evidence for lying cognition theories, but more importantly, can help us understand the influence of ancient Chinese culture on our modern society. Our main concern is children’s lying cognition of modest lie. This study includes two experiments. In the first one, we test 7-year-old, 9-year-old and 11-year-old children of their concept understanding and moral evaluation of black lie and modest lie individually. The results showed that 7-year-old, 9-year-old and 11-year-old children have the similar trend on concept judgment under all conditions. Compared to black lies, children were less likely to judge modest lies as lies, especially 11-year-olds. Three age groups of children showed no age difference on their moral evaluation of black lie and the corresponding truth, but showed significant age difference on their moral evaluation of modest lie and the corresponding truth. 7-year-old children and 9-year-old children has no difference on their evaluation of modest lie, however, they both showed significantly different from 11-year-olds. Furthermore, compare to 7-year-olds and 9-year-olds, the 11-year-olds have different moral evaluation on truth telling after good deeds. Indicate that 11-year-old children have a very different idea of whether to lie or tell the truth after a good deed has been done. In the second experiment, we used ERP to inspect the 11-year-old children’s neural mechanisms of moral evaluation of modesty lies. The results showed average amplitude differences between children’s moral evaluation on two kinds of lies, and between two kinds of truth-telling after good or bad deeds have been done. Indicate that participants do view modest lies different from black ones. Comparison within both pairs of "lie-truth" showed differences within pairs, which happened in different time windows and lied in different brain areas. This indicates that participants’ process of lie and truth is different, and once again proved modest lies different from classic black lies. According to these two experiments above, the study concludes: compared with 7-year-old and 9-year-old children, 11-year-old children have different understanding on modest lies. This also indicates there might be a unique neural mechanism for moral evaluation of modest lies. This study provides new evidence for the folk model.