长期以来，学术界对于日本对中国东北海关的影响有所忽视，这使得在探讨“东北海关事件”等近代中国东北海关相关的问题时，未能充分揭示出这些议题的内在演进逻辑。从清末东北危局到“九·一八”事变的30余年间，日本不断对东北海关施加影响力，使东北海关体制被置入深重的日本因素，构成“满蒙特权”的根基，进而影响了日本对中国海关体系的认知及态度。这一过程也塑造了中国海关的对日认知，并深刻影响了其在涉日海关事务中的决策。本文旨在以“国策会社”“南满洲铁道株式会社”对中国东北海关殖民介入活动为切口，分析日本影响东北海关的基本行为逻辑以及中国海关在应对中展露的内生性特质，力图更准确地揭示近代东北海关历史演进的内在逻辑，进而深化日本与中国海关关系的认识。
第一章追溯“满铁”与海关互动关系的起源。清末东北危局下，日俄以东北海关问题为契机介入中国海关事务，尤其是铁路公司运营东北海关问题的勃发，使中国海关旨在处理与列强关系的“国际化”策略难以为继。日俄战后，日本按照中俄原约制定“满铁”运营大连海关的方针，却遭到列强和清政府的阻击，显示出日本的列强身份和条约体制下的特权并未得到既有国际体系的认可。于是，日本调整“满洲开放”政策，主动选择加入中国海关体系，将大连海关归属中国海关总税务司统辖，又促使“满铁”在大连和安东设关用地、铁路用地分卡设置、协助海关缉私义务等问题上对海关予以配合，这是其寻求国际体系对其列强身份认同的迫切心态的反映。中国海关则将海关在东北的拓展视作实现维持自身主体性的重要契机，积极寻求“满铁”对海关业务的配合，并在东北海关运行机制中接纳了“满铁”的参与。日本与中国海关间的相互需要，使“满铁”与海关间关系就此开启，成为日本影响乃至干涉东北海关的重要路径，推动了其殖民东北的进程。
第二章关注东北海关体系形成过程中的“满铁”因素。“满铁”虽然未直接控制海关，但是却利用自身在东北的特殊地位介入东北海关事务，进而确立了其在海关事务中的主导权。“满铁”基于租借地二元体制，与外务省共谋颁布了违背海关原则的租借地出产物运入内地免税条款，径直干涉大连关务；在北满洲，“满铁”促使日本向清政府索取均沾东省铁路海关事务特权；在安东，“满铁”藉由对铁路通关制度的主导，深度参与了安东海关事务。在列强的“满洲门户开放”呼吁下，以及中国海关寻求“满铁”对关务的配合策略下，“满铁”收敛了对关务的干涉，与海关之间的关系逐渐稳定下来。“满铁”对东北海关体系的介入与主导权的确立，显示了日本意图深度参与中国海关体系的渴求，反映了其对既有列强在华利益体系的试探。
第三章关注伴随海关运行机制的“满铁”因素的不断强化，“满铁”与海关关系呈现出的多重样貌。在安东，“满铁”在海关的督促下被迫调整了整车运费政策并调整报关手续，与此同时“满铁”又不断向海关声索抚顺、烟台煤炭出口税再减免权益，铁路用地则成为了走私的庇护地和缉私关员的厄运之地。在东北铁路保税运输交涉中，中国海关为寻求“满铁”的配合，被迫放弃以长春设关强化海关对铁路运输的监管的计划，转而与“满铁”基于较为宽松的监管制度就奉天保税运输和长春设关问题达成协议，并进而与“满铁”和中东铁路达成南北满与中国本部间铁路保税运输章程，然而该章程最终仍因长春海关分卡运营费用问题、奉系集团地方财政利益问题以及中东铁路局势日趋动荡最终无法实施。“满铁”以“大连中心主义”打压营口贸易，间接操纵了营口海关的贸易业态与关税收入，还试图拓展港区停船界谋取更大利益。在这一过程中，“满铁”对海关阻滞铁路运输经营的不满不断累积，对海关束缚“满铁”特权扩张的感知逐渐强化，然而中国海关为寻求“满铁”配合却不断退让，“满铁”与海关关系的失衡现象愈发显著。
第四章讨论关税自主运动时期“满铁”与东北海关关系的破裂。北京政府在东北海关开征二五附加税时，“满铁”开始提出破坏海关的计划，这标志着海关与“满铁”间维持的微妙平衡开始被打破，双方关系开始破裂。至南京国民政府在东北全面推行新关税则，“满铁”将冲击东北海关的行动进一步具体化，还构想了通过接管东北海关并建立以“满铁”为核心的日本控制下的东北海关体系。对此，中国海关仍然将对日妥协作为应对海关危机的主要策略，海关不断与日本进行相互策应变更了国民政府的命令，又在安东铁路用地缉私问题上极力以对日协商的方式缓和安东局势，但是日本对海关的疑惧和提防心态正在不断强化。同时，海关的做法事实上让国民政府对海关的期待落空，影响了国民政府与海关之间的互信。日本此轮以“满铁”为核心发动的对抗东北关税自主的行动，宣告了“满铁”与海关关系的破裂，也成为东北海关危机的先声。
第五章关注中日在1930年签订《关税协定》后，关于“满铁”海关事务特权的所引发的争端。国民政府以关税自主权为凭仗，全面推动东北海关事务改革，这其中在东北海关实施新进出口税则、征收统税以及废除大连海关存票制度是最重要的三大举措。对此，“满铁”认为国民政府意在“封锁大连”和冲击“满蒙特殊权益”，遂悍然冲击大连和安东海关，将一直以来所策划的破坏海关计划付诸实施。同时，“满铁”还影响了外务省在东北海关问题上的决策，并与外务省共谋撕毁《关税协定》并策划冲击中国海关体系。面对日方的咄咄逼人，中国海关起初仍然试图尽可能满足日本的诉求，但这遭致国民政府的强烈不满，中国海关被迫调整对日策略以与国民政府保持一致。但是随着国民政府在东北海关问题上决定保留“满铁”的特权，中国海关也决定继续对日妥协方针，并将这种对日心态延续至“东北海关事件”。但最终海关的对日妥协策略因为触及中国国家主权底线而最终未能保全东北海关。
结论，日本对中国东北海关的侵略，分为内部和外部两条路径，“满铁”是其中的核心。在内部路径上，日本藉由“满铁”对海关运行机制的介入与主导，强化海关体系中的日本因素，使海关成为日本获取和扩大“满蒙特殊权益”的重要基础。在外部路径上，“满铁”凭借其在东北地区的特殊垄断地位，运用运费政策、线路条件、港口条件等会社经营手段，实现对东北海关运转的间接操纵。藉由对东北海关的两条影响路径，日本更全面掌握了东北地区的经济、贸易等情报，更以此为基础谋划对东北海关乃至东北经济体系的全面控制。同时，日本破坏海关的行径，使其为攫取东北利益而悍然与国际体系为敌的心态进一步强化，其占领东北乃至全中国的野心由此进一步膨胀。作为被侵略者的中国海关，在面对“满铁”为代表的日本势力影响时，始终将所谓“协作”——实则对日妥协视作维持东北海关体系运转的根基，其对日本的一系列运作都是以对日妥协为最终归宿。在对日妥协策略下，中国海关的中国立场和中国信念不断滑坡，实际上为日本推进“满洲”殖民经营提供了助力，加速了东北的殖民地化。因此，中国海关自身对最终失去对东北海关的控制实则负有不可推卸的责任。特别是，洋员的任用和活动，虽然使海关在与日本等列强交手中起到了举足轻重的作用，但是也正因为洋员特别是日籍关员在母国利益与中国主权利益冲突时选择了违背中国海关机关原则的选择，导致了中国海关在对日交手时往往选择了满足日本的利益，造成国家主权的丧失，充分体现出中国海关体制在近代中国所扮演的不可忽视的负面作用。“满铁”与东北海关的交手，显示出殖民因素在近代东北历史进程中扮演的重要作用，启示我们实现中华民族的独立与解放，才是谋求中国繁荣发展的根本前提，而这其中去殖民化是中国实现民族独立、解放和发展至关重要的一环。
 

For a long time, academics have neglected Japan's influence on Chinese Maritime Customs System (CMCS) in Northeast China, which makes it impossible to fully reveal the internal evolutionary logic of these issues when discussing issues related to Northeast China Customs in modern China, such as the “Manchuria Customs Incident”. From the end of the Qing Dynasty to the “Mukden Incident” Incident, in more than 30 years, Japan constantly exerted its influence on the CMCS in Northeast China, whose  operation mechanism was put into the deep Japanese factors, which constituted the foundation of the “Manchurian-Mongolian privilege”, and then influenced Japan's perception and attitude towards CMCS. This process also shaped the CMCS's perception of Japan and profoundly influenced its decision-making in Japan-related Customs affairs. The purpose of this dissertation is to take the colonial intervention of the “South Manchuria Railway Company” (S. M. R.) in the CMCS in Northeast China as an entry point to analyze the basic behavioral logic of Japan's influence on the CMCS in Northeast China as well as the endogenous qualities of the Customs' response to it, and to try to more accurately reveal the internal logic of the historical evolution of the CMCS in Northeast China in the modern era, and to deepen the understanding of the relationship between Japan and the CMCS.
Chapter 1 traces the origins of the interaction between the S. M. R. and the Customs. Under the critical situation in the Northeast China at the end of the Qing Dynasty, Japan and Russia took the problem of the Customs in Northeast China as an opportunity to intervene in CMCS, especially the rising dispute of the operation of the Northeast China Customs by the railway company, which made it difficult for CMCS to sustain its strategy of “cosmopolitan” aimed at dealing with the relationship with the Powers. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan formulated the guidelines for the operation of Dairen Customs by the S. M. R. in accordance with the original Sino-Russian Treaty, but it was protested by the Powers and the Qing Government, which showed that Japan's status as a Power and its privileges under the current Treaty System were not recognized by the established international system. Therefore, Japan adjusted the policy of “Open Door in Manchuria”, took the initiative to join the CMCS, put Dairen Customs under the jurisdiction of the Inspectorate General of Customs, and prompted the S. M. R. to co-operate with the Customs in allocating land for Customs in Dairen and Antung, setting up sub-office in Railway Zone, and assisting Customs in anti-smuggling affairs, which is a reflection of Japanese urgent mentality to seek recognition of its identity as a Power in the international system. For its part, CMCS saw the expansion of Customs in Northeast China as an important opportunity to realize the maintenance of its own subjectivity, actively sought the co-operation of the S. M. R. in Customs affairs, and accommodated the participation of the S. M. R. into the Customs operation mechanism. The mutual needs of the Japan and CMCS led to the establishment of a relationship between the S. M. R. and the Customs, which became an important path for Japan to implant colonial facts into the Customs System in Northeast China, promoting the progression of Japanese colonization in Northeast China region. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the factors of S. M. R. in the formation of the CMCS in Northeast China. Although S. M. R. did not directly control the Customs, it utilized its special position in the Northeast China to intervene in the Customs affairs, which was then established its dominant power. Based on the dualistic system of the Kwantung Leased Territory, S. M. R. conspired with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promulgate the provisions that the Products raised in leased territory and goods manufactured therefrom transported into the Chinese territory could exempt duty, showing a violation of the Customs principles by interfered with the Dairen Customs; in Northern Manchuria, S. M. R. prompted Japanese Government to ask for equally sharing Chinese Eastern Railway (C. E. R.) 's privileges in Customs from Qing government; in the Antung, S. M. R. deeply participated in the Antung Customs affairs by dominating the Customs clearance system related to railway. Under the pressure of Great Powers holding high the banner of “Open Door in Manchuria”, and the strategy of CMCS to seek the co-operation of the S. M. R. in Customs affairs, the S. M. R. tightened its interference in Customs and the relationship between the S. M. R. and the Customs gradually stabilized. The involvement and dominance of the S. M. R. in the CMCS in Northeast China demonstrated Japan's desire for deeper involvement in the CMCS, reflecting its exploration of the interests net of the Great Powers in China.
Chapter 3 focuses on the strengthening of the factor of S. M. R. in the Customs operation mechanism, and the relationship between S. M. R. and the Customs presents a variety of patterns. In Antung, S. M. R. was forced by Customs to adjust its freight policy and declaring procedures, while at the same time the S. M. R. continued to claim Fushun and Yentai coal export tax reductions from Customs, and the Railway Zone a haven for smuggling and doom zone for the Customs staff that anti-smuggling. In the Transportation in Bond negotiation, CMCS was forced to give up its plan that opening Customs in Changchun aiming at strengthening Customs supervision of railway transportation in order to get the co-operation of S. M. R., but instead with an agreement with S. M. R. for Transportation of Foreign Goods to Mukden for Bond, which gave S. M. R. a more relaxed requirement. And then CMCS reach a Provisional Regulations for Transportation in Bond by rail of foreign goods from Treaty Ports in South Manchuria to Treaty Ports in North Manchuria and China Proper via Mukden Kwanchengtze-Changchun and vice versa with S. M. R. and C. E. R. However, the Regulations could not be implemented due to the operating costs of the Changchun Customs, the local financial interests of the Mukden Group, and the increasingly volatile situation of C. E. R. Furthermore, the S. M. R. suppressed the trade in Yingkow by “Dairen-centrism”, indirectly manipulated the trade form and tariff revenues of the Yingkow Customs, and tried to expand the Harbour Limit of the Yingkow harbor for greater benefits. In this process, the dissatisfaction of S. M. R. with the Customs' obstruction of railway transportation operations continued to accumulate, and its perception of the Customs' constraints on its expansion of the prerogatives intensified, yet CMCS continued to back down in its quest for co-operation of S. M. R., which made the relationship gradually fall into non-equivalence.
Chapter 4 discusses the disintegration of the relationship between S. M. R. and the Customs during the Tariff Autonomy Movement. When the Peking Government introduced the 2.5% surtax at CMCS in Northeast China, S. M. R. began to put forward plans to destroy the Customs, which marked the beginning of the breakdown of the delicate balance between the Customs and S. M. R., and the collapse of the relationship started. By the time the National Government in Nanking fully implemented the new tariff in the Northeast China, the S. M. R. further materialized its plan to attack the Customs, and also conceived the idea of taking over the Customs with establishing a Japanese-controlled system with the S. M. R. as the core. In response, the Chinese Customs still regarded the concession with Japan as the main strategy to deal with the crisis, and the Customs kept on mutual coordination with Japan to change the order of the National Government, and also tried to ease the situation in Antung by negotiating with Japan on the issue of anti-smuggling of the Railway in Antung, but Japan's suspicion and caution towards the Customs were being strengthened continuously. At the same time, the practice of CMCS in fact let the National Government's expectations of the customs failed, which caused negative impact to their mutual trust. This round of Japanese action against the Tariff Autonomy of the CMCS in Northeast China, launched with S. M. R. at its core, announced the collapse of the relationship between S. M. R. and the Customs, and served as a precursor to the Crisis of CMCS in Northeast China.
Chapter 5 focuses on the arising disputes over the S. M. R. 's privileges in Customs after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement in 1930. On the basis of its Tariff Autonomy, the National Government pushed through a comprehensive reform of the CMCS Service in Northeast China, including the implement of new import and export tariffs, levying Consolidated Tax, and abolishing the Drawback systems in Dairen Customs. S. M. R. believing that the National Government's reforms were intended to “blockade Dairen” and to affect the “Privilege of Manchuria and Mongolia”, stormed the Dairen and Antung Customs and put into practice the plan to destroy the Customs that it had been planning all along. At the same time, S. M. R. also influenced the decision-making of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on the issue of CMCS in Northeast China, conspiring with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to tear up the 1930 Tariff Agreement and planned to strike the CMCS. In regard to Japanese aggression, the CMCS firstly still tried to satisfy the demands of S. M. R. as much as possible, but it was strongly displeased by the National Government and CMCS had to adjust its strategy towards Japan in order to keep in line with the National Government. However, as the National Government retained the privileges of the S. M. R. in Customs in the Northeast China, CMCS decided to continue to compromise with Japan, and this mentality continued until the Manchuria Customs Incident. In the end, however, the tactic of concession with Japan failed to preserve the CMCS in Northeast China because it touched the bottom line of China's national sovereignty. 
In conclusion, Japan's invasion in the CMCS in Northeast China is divided into two paths: internal and external, with the S. M. R. as the core. In the internal path, Japan strengthened its factor in the Customs systems through the intervention and domination by S. M. R. in the operation mechanism of the Customs, making the customs an important basis for Japan to acquire and expand the “Privilege of Manchuria and Mongolia”. On the external path, S. M. R., by virtue of its special monopoly position in Northeast China, indirectly manipulated the operation of the Customs through the freight policy, line conditions, port construction, and other means that as the result of the Company's policy. Through the two paths of interference on the Customs in Northeast China, Japan gained a fuller grasp of the economic and trade information of the Northeast China, and used it as a basis for planning its overall control over the Customs even the economic system in Northeast China. At the same time, Japan's act of striking the Customs further strengthened its mentality of being an enemy of the Powers in order to seize the interests of the Northeast China, and its ambition of occupying the Northeast China and even the whole of China was further expanded. Facing S. M. R. as the representative of the Japanese power, CMCS always regarded as the compromise to maintain the foundation of operation of the Customs system, a series of its interaction of Japan are to Japan “co-operation” for the ultimate destination. Under the strategy of compromise with Japan, the Chinese position and belief of the CMCS continued to slip, in fact, providing assistance for Japan to promote the colonial operation of “Manchuria” and accelerating the colonization of the Northeast East. Therefore, the Chinese Customs itself had an unshirkable responsibility for the eventual loss of control over the Customs in Northeast China. In addition, although the activities of foreign Customs staff provided the Customs with a special ability to deal with Japan and other Powers, it was also because of the struggle of foreign staff, especially those of Japanese nationality, chose to go against the principles of the CMCS when the interests of their home countries conflicted with the interests of China's sovereignty, which led to the fact that the CMCS often chose to satisfy Japan's interests, resulting in the loss of national sovereignty, fully reflecting the negative role played by the CMCS in modern China cannot be ignored. The encounter between S. M. R. and the CMCS in Northeast China shows the important role played by the colonial factor in the historical process of modern Northeast China, and reveals to us that the realization of the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation is the fundamental prerequisite for the pursuit of China's prosperity and development, in which decolonization is a crucial part of China's realization of national independence, liberation and development.