“能”（古希腊文δύναμιζ，通常译作“潜能”），在亚里士多德哲学中占据重要地位。学界一般将“潜能—实现”（本文译作“能—实现”）作为亚里士多德形而上学概念进行研究，即认为“能—实现”学说的提出不仅是将其作为“存在”，回答“存在是什么”以及世界如何运动的需要，更是对柏拉图“诸神与巨人之争”问题的回顾与更新；在关于实体与灵魂的学说中，将“能—实现”与“质料—形式”结合在一起，即质料作为潜能，形式作为实现。往往忽视了在亚里士多德的德性伦理中，作为潜在地具有德性的灵魂同样具有自身的“能”，即能够运用并发挥思想和努斯之“能”实现自身的德性，让自身的德性能够展现或表现出来，繁荣灵魂、“实现”幸福与生命的“是其所是”。

本文对“德性之‘能’”的阐释与论证，首先从对“能—实现”的形而上分析入手。因为只有预先从逻辑上说明“能—实现”学说在亚里士多德形而上学中意味着什么，才能够进一步理解“能—实现”在亚里士多德整个哲学体系中的地位及作用。其实，在对“能—实现”的一般性澄清中就能够发现“能—实现”的伦理维度。这意味着“能—实现”虽然一开始被当作形而上学概念，但是它自身同样具有伦理内涵，对德性之“能”的发挥与成全起到了重要的形而上学奠基作用。总之，通过“能”之形而上学分析，“能”拥有了伦理维度，“能”从形而上学走向了伦理学，在德性的发挥与成全方面起到了重要作用。

展开德性之“能”的研究与阐发需要研究灵魂。因为亚里士多德伦理学阐明的是关于灵魂的德性伦理，要阐明德性之“能”就要首先研究作为生命存在的灵魂。通过分析生命存在论意义上的灵魂发现，灵魂是潜在地具有生命的自然躯体的“第一实现”，包括动植物与人在内的不同灵魂类型。但是，作为高阶的生命存在，人不同于动植物仅具有灵魂一阶之形式的“能—实现”，还有灵魂二阶之德性的“能—实现”，即“第二实现”。这是因为逻各斯作为人区别于动植物的特殊“[官]能”，能够揭示人作为生命[存在]的本质，并对德性伦理具有某种规定性；此外，从德性自身出发，德性是使一个人状态好，并使人特有的活动展现得好的品性。

指明德性作为灵魂的“第二实现”之后，需要阐发亚里士多德关于德性之“能”的自由运用的“实现”思想之大义。在这里，德性之“能”的自由运用从人能够“在德性实践中繁荣自身灵魂”和“在靠近神性生活中实现生命的是其所是”两方面展开。这是因为人不仅具有在政治与伦理的共同生活中进行德性实践的“能”，而且从更高的维度上来说，人还具有接近神性生活的德性之“能”。需要说明的是，亚里士多德德性之自由运用的“实现”，其实内属于个体“能—实现”之本体的充分实现。这是因为“能—实现”并不是独立于“存在”的存在，即诸范畴作为世界之存在方式而“能—实现”作为另外的存在方式，而是“能—实现”之存在是以诸范畴之存在为基础，寄生于诸范畴。

总之，本文从“能—实现”出发，通过对“潜能”语义上的解蔽，结合亚里士多德生命存在论[灵魂]与德性伦理，旨在探究亚里士多德德性如何“能”的基础与理论依据，为理解亚里士多德的德性伦理提供一个相对系统的讨论。

In Aristotle's philosophy, dynamis holds a crucial position. Scholars generally study "dynamis-actuality" as a metaphysical concept in Aristotle's metaphysics. This doctrine is considered not only as an answer to questions about "existence" and how the world moves but also as a review and update of the Platonic problem of the conflict between gods and giants. In the doctrine concerning substance and soul, "dynamis-actuality" is combined with "matter-form", where matter serves as potentiality and form serves as actualization. Often overlooked in Aristotle's ethical theory of virtue is the idea that the soul, as potentially possessing virtues, also has its own dynamis, namely the ability to utilize and actualize its virtues through the exercise of thought and nous, enabling the flourishing of the soul and the realization of happiness and the essence of life.

This paper begins by exploring and discussing the interpretation of the "dynamis of virtue", starting with a metaphysical analysis of "dynamis-actuality". Only by logically elucidating what "dynamis-actuality" means in Aristotle's metaphysics can we further understand its importance and role in Aristotle's entire philosophical system. Indeed, within the general clarification of "dynamis-actuality", one can discover its ethical dimension. This implies that although "dynamis-actuality" was initially treated as a metaphysical concept, it also carries ethical implications, playing a crucial metaphysical foundational role in the realization and fulfillment of virtue. In summary, through the metaphysical analysis of dynamis, it acquires an ethical dimension, transitioning from metaphysics to ethics and playing a significant role in the manifestation and fulfillment of virtue.

To delve into the study and interpretation of the "dynamis of virtue", it is necessary to examine the soul. Aristotle's ethical theory elucidates ethical virtues concerning the soul; thus, to clarify the dynamis of virtue, we must first study the soul as the essence of life. Through analyzing the significance of the soul in the ontology of life, it is discovered that the soul is the "primary actuality" of the potentially living natural body, encompassing different types of souls including those of animals, plants, and humans. However, as humans occupy the highest realm of life in the sublunar region, they possess not only the first-order form of soul as found in animals and plants, but also the second-order virtue of soul, the "second actuality". This is because logos, as the special "dynamis" distinguishing humans from animals and plants, can reveal the essence of human life and possess a certain normativity for ethical virtue. Furthermore, from the perspective of virtue itself, virtue is the disposition that makes a person's state good and enables the manifestation of uniquely human activities in a good manner.

After delineating virtue as the "second actuality" of the soul, it is necessary to explicate Aristotle's profound thoughts on the free exercise of the "dynamis of virtue". Here, Aristotle's notion of the free exercise of virtue involves flourishing the soul through the practice of virtue and realizing the being of life in proximity to divinity. This is because humans not only have the dynamis to practice virtue in political and ethical communal life but also, from a higher perspective, have the "dynamis of virtue" to live a life close to divinity. It should be noted that Aristotle's notion of the free exercise of virtue belongs inherently to the full realization of the individual's "dynamis-actuality". This is because "dynamis-actuality" does not exist independently of "existence"; that is, while the categories exist as modes of world-existence, "dynamis-actuality" exists based on the categories and parasitizes on them.

In conclusion, starting from "dynamis-actuality", this paper explores the basis and theoretical basis of how Aristotle's virtue can "dynamis" by uncovering the semantic meaning of "dynamis" and combining Aristotle's bio-ontology [soul] with ethical theory, so as to provide a relatively systematic discussion for understanding Aristotle's ethical theory.