纪检监察机关作为党和国家专责监督机关，关乎党的自我监督和自我净化，关涉社会公平正义、党的执政基础和人心向背。纪检监察机构最重要、最根本的使命和责任是保障公权力的正确运行。乡镇纪检监察机构作为纪检监察系统的“最后一公里”，既要落实上级要求，又要回应群众期待，其履职能力和水平关系到全面从严治党的质量。

各级纪委监委、党委与纪委嵌套于复杂的委托－代理链条之中，在委托－代理的视域下，县市纪委监委、同级党委和乡镇纪检监察机构分别扮演着委托人、监督人和代理人的角色，其中，乡镇纪检监察机构则承担着代理人的任务。伴随着深化纪检监察体制改革，作为代理人的乡镇纪检监察机构的职能在不断发生变化。作为委托人的上级纪检监察机构和同级党委，与作为代理人的乡镇纪检监察机构之间存在着明确的信息不对称问题，该种不对称为主动性的目标替代和被动性的目标替代提供了空间，这是乡镇纪检监察机构职能异化的重要原因。基于委托代理下分析目标替代产生的原因，有利于乡镇纪检监察机构走出一条高质量发展之路。

本研究以新疆维吾尔自治区喀什地区下辖乡镇纪检监察机构为研究对象，通过调查问卷、深入访谈等方式对乡镇纪检监察机构职能异化现象及原因进行描述分析，结合县市纪委监委和乡镇党委、村“两委”对乡镇纪检监察机构的评价和认知，发现了乡镇纪检监察机构履职的三大问题，职能越位、缺位和错位。这些问题表现为监督效果不突出、不聚焦主责主业、纪检监察干部能力有待提升且缺乏监督等等；从公共政策角度分析，导致乡镇纪检监察机构出现目标替代行为的主要原因有“双重领导体制”的依附关系模式的制约、不当激励约束、错位组织期望的引导、纪检监察机构自身价值行为的选择和差序信任格局等原因。

改革是摸着石头过河的探索。乡镇纪检监察机构的职能异化是改革不可预料的负面后果，研究乡镇纪检监察机构改革中出现的负面后果是纠正改革偏差、深化改革效果、提供改革方向的重要依据。鉴于此，本研究坚持问题为导向，对提升乡镇纪检监察机构工作质效提出六项对策建议：健全准入选择及退出机制、强化乡镇纪检监察机构独立性建设、强化对乡镇纪检监察机构的激励、完善对乡镇纪检监察的监督和制约、稳妥处理好双重委托之间的关系及加强乡镇纪检监察干部队伍建设。

The most important and fundamental mission and responsibility of the discipline inspection and supervision agencies is to supervise the correct operation of public power. As the "last mile" of the discipline inspection and supervision system, the township discipline inspection and supervision agencies are the basic links of the discipline inspection and supervision system and network, which not only have to implement the requirements of their superiors, but also respond to the expectations of the masses.

The upper and lower discipline inspection and supervision committees, party committees and discipline inspection committees are nested in a complex commission-agent chain, with the people, county and city discipline inspection and supervision committees, party committees at the same level and township discipline inspection and supervision agencies playing the roles of principal, supervisor and agent, respectively, with the township discipline inspection and supervision agencies undertaking the task of agent. Along with the deepening reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system, the functions of the township discipline inspection and supervision agencies as agents are constantly changing. There is a clear information asymmetry between the higher-level discipline inspection and supervision agencies and the township discipline inspection and supervision agencies as agents, and this asymmetry provides room for both active and passive goal substitution, which is an important reason for the alienation of the functions of the township discipline inspection and supervision agencies. Based on the analysis of the causes of goal substitution under the delegated agency, it is beneficial for the township discipline inspection and supervision agencies to come out of a high-quality development path.

This study takes the "Transformation of functions, style and manner" of the discipline inspection and supervision system as the background, and takes the discipline inspection and supervision agencies of townships under the jurisdiction of Kashgar region in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region as the research object, and describes and analyzes the phenomenon and causes of alienation of the functions of township discipline inspection and supervision agencies through questionnaires and in-depth interviews, and combines the work of county and city discipline inspection and supervision committees, township party committees, and village "two committees" on the functions of township discipline inspection and supervision agencies. The three major problems in the performance of the discipline inspection and supervision institutions in townships were identified through the evaluation and perceptions of the "two committees" of the township discipline inspection and supervision institutions, the overstepping, lack of and misalignment of their functions. These problems are manifested in the lack of effectiveness in supervision, lack of focus on main responsibilities, and lack of supervision of discipline inspection and supervision cadres; from a public policy perspective, the main reasons for the target substitution behavior of discipline inspection and supervision agencies in townships are the constraints of the dependency relationship model of the "dual leadership system," inappropriate incentives and constraints, misalignment, and the lack of supervision. The main reasons for the emergence of goal substitution behavior in discipline inspection and supervision institutions are the constraints of the dependency relationship model of the "dual leadership system," inappropriate incentive constraints, misplaced organizational expectations, the choice of the discipline inspection and supervision institutions' own value behavior, and the poor order of trust patterns.

Reform is the exploration of crossing the river by feeling the stones. The functional alienation of township discipline inspection and supervision institutions is an unpredictable negative consequence of reform. Studying the negative consequences of the reform of township discipline inspection and supervision institutions is an important basis for correcting reform deviations, deepening reform effects, and providing reform directions. In view of this, this study proposes six countermeasures to improve the quality of the work of township discipline inspection and supervision agencies: improve the access selection and withdrawal mechanisms, strengthen the construction of the independence of township discipline inspection and supervision agencies, strengthen the incentives for township discipline inspection and supervision agencies, improve the supervision and constraints on township discipline inspection and supervision, handle the relationship between dual commissions appropriately, and strengthen the construction of the cadre of township discipline inspection and supervision.