本文旨在研究斯宾诺莎哲学中的个体化问题。 在其一元论体系中， 实体是单一的、 无 限的、 自因的， 但个体作为现实的个别事物， 总是复多的、 有限的、 外因的。 于是， 个体 化的问题就体现为作为个体的有限样式或个别事物如何能够在实体之中区分得来。 围绕本 质、 存在、 因果三条线索， 本文借助斯宾诺莎的区分理论， 试图对个体化的内在逻辑给出 解读。 从“实体不可分”这一难题出发， 本文首先区分了分割逻辑和区分逻辑的差别， 进而阐 明在何种意义上， 斯宾诺莎继承了笛卡尔所使用的区分理论， 并以独特方式超越了笛卡尔 体系的二元论以及超验性特征， 而且始终把区分的操作维持在内在性的平面上。 进而， 在 水平的维度上， 实体作为生产性的活动， 其属性可以被理解为其活动的质性形式， 实体之 本质可以被理解为这种活动依赖并表现的力量。 在垂直的维度上， 能动的自然和被动的自 然这对范畴呈现了实体活动的不同环节， 而在被动的自然之下， 直接无限样式和间接无限 样式就体现为实体之活动的结构法则以及最终结果。 在这个框架下， 间接无限样式即“宇宙 的全貌”扮演着个体化过程中最核心的中介性环节，整体和部分的关系在此替代了因果关系， 实现了从无限且自因的实体向有限且外因的个体的过渡。 进一步， 个体间的彼此区分则依 赖来自于属性和直接无限样式所规定的那些差异性要素， 而这些差异由能够凭借因果的整 合性操作被结合为作为个体的统一体。 最终， 沿着个体化过程的逻辑发展， 本文从本质、 存在和因果三个角度描述了什么是斯宾诺莎哲学中的个体、 以及这种个体之构想所暗含的 哲学史意义上的复杂内涵。

The task of this research is to explain the logic of individuation in the philosophy of Spinoza. As well-known, in the philosophy of Spinoza, the substance is one, infinite, and selfcaused, but the singular things as individuals, are always many, finite, and caused by other. So, the problem of individuation can be defined as how the individuals as finite modes or singular things can be distinguished from and within the substance. Following the three lines of essence, existence and causality, and with the help of the theory of distinction in Spinoza, we will present an interpretation of inner logic of the process of individuation in the philosophical system of Spinoza. This investigation will start with the problem of the proposition “the substance is indivisible.” In analysis of this proposition, the logic of division and the logic of distinction can be clearly distinguished. Then, it is necessary to demonstrate that how Spinoza inherits the theory of distinction from Descartes, and in what sense he criticizes the wrong application of it by Descartes which leads to the dualism and transcendence, and keeps all his philosophical operation in an immanent plain. On the horizontal level, the substance can be understood as a productive activity, the attributes are its qualitative forms, and the essence of substance is the power which the activity expresses. On the vertical level, the substance as nature have the different moments of “natura naturan” and “natura naturata”, in which we can locate the immediate infinite modes and the mediate infinite modes, as the structure and the consequence of the activity of substance. In this frame of interpretation, we try to understand the mediate infinite modes as the essential moment of the transition from substance to individual, in which the individual is defined by the parts in whole instead by the logic of causality. Then, we explain how the individuals could be distinguished from each other by the differential elements inherited from the immediate modes, and the causality plays the role of unifying those difference to make the individual as an unity. Finally, as the end of the process of individuation, we describe what is an individual for Spinoza in the dimensions of essence, existence and causality, and show the implication of this conception of individual in the history of philosophy.