本文以2007-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，采用Probit模型来研究控股股东股权质押对上市公司违规的影响。回归结果显示，如果年末上市公司存在控股股东股权质押的情况，那么上市公司越有可能发生违规行为，而且随着控股股股东股权质押比例的上升，上市公司违规的可能性越大。本文在使用工具变量法解决可能存在的内生性问题，以及使用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit估计方法解决样本选择偏误问题后，这些结果仍旧保持稳健。进一步地，控股股东股权质押会通过直接影响和间接影响两种作用机制，来加剧上市公司违规的真实发生。一方面，就控股股东股权质押的直接影响而言，股权质押后控股股东的控制权和现金流权两权分离的程度加大，对上市公司进行“掏空”的成本降低，此时控股股东会有强烈的动机通过资金占用、非公开发行股票、关联交易等“隧道挖掘”行为侵占中小股东利益；另一方面，就控股股东股权质押的间接影响而言，股权质押后控股股东将面临着控制权转移风险，并且会对股价的下跌更为敏感，所以控股股东会通过操纵市值管理的方式，比如向上真实盈余管理、隐性选择会计政策、选择性地进行信息披露和税收规避等手段来维持股价，避免股价崩盘风险，进而防止控制权发生转移。本文还发现，由于受到政府“父爱效应”的庇护，且在质押实现过程中也会涉及国有产权转让问题，因此国有控股上市公司在股权质押后受到的约束和风险都相对较小，所以其控股股东股权质押与上市公司违规的正相关关系更强；而非国有控股上市公司面临的风险高，行为决策更谨慎，以避免因股价崩盘而导致控制权最终发生转移，所以非国有控股上市公司的控股股东股权质押与上市公司违规的正相关关系更弱。此外，通过进一步分析，本文发现相比于非机构投资者持股的上市公司，机构投资者持股的上市公司治理水平更高，盈余信息更透明准确，而且机构投资者也会积极地对公司管理层和控股股东进行监督，所以机构投资者持股的上市公司控股股东股权质押，更能够降低上市公司违规的可能性。最后，本文还将公司违规类型划分为信息披露违规、公司经营违规和高管行为违规三种，研究发现相比于上市公司经营违规，控股股东股权质押与上市公司信息披露违规和高管行为违规的正相关关系更强。本文的研究结果丰富了控股股东股权质押经济后果和上市公司违规影响因素方面的研究，同时提供了一定的理论基础，能够帮助有关部门更好地监督上市公司违规行为，及时发现潜在的公司违规事件，也有助于提高投资者的投资防范意识。

Taking all China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as the research object, this paper examines whether controlling shareholder’s share pledge affects the corporate’s likelihood of committing frauds by using the Probit model. The regression results show that if there is a pledge of the controlling shareholder's share in a listed company at the last of year, the more likely it is for the listed company to commit frauds. And with the increase of the pledge of controlling shareholders’ proportion, the listed companies’ possibility of fraud is greater. In this paper, after using the instrumental variable method to eliminate possible endogenous effects and adopted the partially observable Bivariate Probit estimation method to solve sample selection bias problem, these results are still significant. This shows that the controlling shareholder's share pledge will promote the true occurrence of listed company violations through direct and indirect effects. On the one hand, from the direct impact of the controlling shareholder's share pledge, after the share pledge, the controlling shareholder's control and cash flow rights are separated to a greater degree, and the cost of “hollowing out” the listed company is reduced. At this time, the controlling shareholder meeting has a strong motivation to invade the interests of small and medium shareholders through "tunnel excavation" such as capital occupation, non-public issuance of shares, and related party transactions. On the other hand, from the indirect impact of controlling shareholder's equity pledge, the controlling shareholder will face control transferring risk after the share pledge and is particularly sensitive to the decline of stock prices. Therefore, the controlling shareholder will maintain the stock price by manipulating market value management methods, such as upward real earnings management, implicit choice of accounting policies, selective information disclosure and tax avoidance. To avoid the risk of stock price crashes, and thus prevent the transfer of control. This article also finds the state-owned listed companies are protected by the government's "fatherly effect". At the same time, because the realization of equity pledge involves the transfer of state-owned property rights, the constraints and risks of equity pledge are relatively small, while the non-state-owned listed companies are faced with relatively high risks, so their behavior decisions are more cautious to avoid the final transfer of control due to the stock price crash. Therefore, the non-state-owned holding listed companies make the positive correlation between share pledge and listed company violations weaker, while the state-owned holding listed companies make the positive correlation stronger. Through further analysis, this article finds that compared with listed companies held by non-institutional investors, listed companies held by institutional investors have higher levels of corporate governance, more transparent and accurate earnings information, and that institutional investors will actively manage the company’s management and the controlling shareholder, so institutional investors holding shares of the listed company's controlling shareholder equity pledge, more able to reduce the possibility of listed companies. At the last, this article also divides the types of company violations into information disclosure violations, company operation violations and executive behavior violations. It is found that compared to listed company operation violations, the controlling shareholder's share pledge is positively related to information disclosure violations and executive behavior violations of listed companies more significant. The research results enrich the controlling shareholder equity pledge economic consequences and the factors influencing the listed company. At the same time, it provides a certain theoretical basis, which has important policy implications for regulators and investment guidance for investors.