完善的高管薪酬激励制度有助于规制企业高管的价值取向，从而确保其符合企业长期利益的最大化。但是，传统的激励制度往往将高管薪酬水平与企业财务绩效挂钩，这就使得企业高管有动机不计环境代价地去追求更高的经济报酬。随着环境污染问题的不断凸显，推动环境保护从“末端治理”到“源头防治”转变刻不容缓。对此，我国政府陆续出台了各类“史上最严”的环境法律与政府规章，同时进一步加强了对排污企业的环境监管与执法工作。在此背景下，企业高管是否受到环境处罚的影响对企业市场价值与环境策略的转变具有重要意义，同时，这也体现了现有的高管薪酬制度对企业环境风险的反映情况。 利用2006-2015年中国沪深两市非金融类A股上市企业的混合截面数据，本文在考虑行业异质性的基础上就环境处罚对高管薪酬的影响进行了实证检验。研究结果显示，环境处罚显著降低了高管的薪酬水平，即企业受到的环境处罚越多，高管薪酬水平越低。从竞争特征考虑行业异质性发现，竞争行业中的企业受到的环境处罚对高管薪酬水平具有显著的负面影响，而垄断行业中企业的高管薪酬受环境处罚的影响并不显著。从污染特征考虑行业异质性发现，重污染行业中的企业受到的环境处罚对高管薪酬水平具有显著的负面影响，而非重污染行业中企业的高管薪酬受环境处罚的影响并不显著。进一步地，本文考察了高管在受到环境处罚的影响后，企业在未来期间的市场价值与环保策略的变动情况。结果显示，环境处罚引致的高管薪酬减损将进一步降低未来期间的企业价值，而企业高管推定企业披露更完善的环境信息来提高企业环境合法性与规避环境处罚的可能性。本文的主要研究结论在考虑内生性问题、国企“限薪令”及异方差问题可能造成的估计偏误后依旧是稳健的。 基于上述结果，本文建议企业应充分考虑可能出现的环境风险，从确保环境合规的角度改善公司治理水平。其次，需根据行业特性制定有针对性的环境管理政策，对于不同性质的行业制定有针对性的环境经济政策与环境管制措施，从而确保环境处罚能够真正推动企业向绿色生产方式转型。最后，应当进一步规范企业环境信息披露的各项内容，降低企业自愿披露环境信息的成本，提高企业环境信息披露的可靠性、及时性与可比性。

A well-established executive compensation incentive system helps to regulate the value orientation of corporate executives, which impel them to be consistent with the long-term interests of the company. However, traditional incentive systems often link executive compensation levels to corporate financial performance, which gives them the incentive to pursue higher economic returns regardless of environmental costs. With the continuous emergence of environmental pollution problems, it is a pressing issue to promote the transformation of environmental protection from “control in the end” to “prevention from the beginning”. In response, the Chinese government has successively introduced various types of " strictest ever" environmental laws or government regulations, and further strengthened the environmental supervision and enforcement of sewage companies. In this context, whether corporate executives are affected by environmental penalties is of great significance to the transformation of enterprise market value and environmental strategy. Meanwhile, it also reflects the reflection of the existing executive compensation system on corporate environmental risks. Using pool data of A-listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchange from 2006-2015, this paper investigates the impact of the environmental penalty on executive compensation with respect to the heterogeneity among industries. It was found that the environmental penalty would diminish the compensation of executives. Regarding the industry’s competitiveness, we found that environmental penalty would leave a significantly negative impact on the compensation of executives who belong to firms in a competitive industry, while such impact was detected to be insignificant if the firm was in a monopolistic industry. Regarding the industry’s pollution level, we found that environmental penalty would significantly decrease the compensation of executives who belong to firms in the heavy-polluting industry, while the impact was appeared to be feeble in terms of firms from the non-heavy-polluting industry. To analyze the successive impacts and firm’s response to the environmental penalty, we conducted further analysis on the impact of executive compensation losses due to environmental penalties on the changes of firms` future value and environmental strategy. The results revealed that the compensation losses due to environmental penalties would further impair firms` future value, while it could encourage the executives to promote better environmental disclosure policies. The main results of our study were proved to be robust with respect to the possible bias caused by endogeneity, executive compensation regulation of SOEs and heteroskedasticity. Based on the results, we suggested that firms should improve its corporate governance based on the consideration of environmental compliance. Secondly, it is necessary to formulate targeted environmental management policies with regarding industry heterogeneity and make targeted environmental economic policies for different industries, ensuring that environmental penalties can truly promote the transformation of enterprises into green production methods. Finally, governments should standardize the contents of corporate environmental information disclosure, reduce the cost of voluntary disclosure of environmental information, and improve the reliability, timeliness and comparability of corporate environmental information disclosure.