随着近年来“天价高管薪酬”事件的不断发生，学者对高管显性和隐性报酬的研究也逐渐深入。根据管理层权力理论，高管的自利本性使得高管存在利用自身权力的便宜，在所有者监督力度不足的情况下制定或提高自己的薪酬的可能性。本文以中国上市公司2005年-2014年间的数据为样本探讨高管在薪酬角度自利的原因，依据上市公司所有权性质的不同，分别考察了高管薪酬与高管权力及企业内部薪酬差距与高管权力的相关关系，最后分析了高管权力对薪酬绩效敏感度和薪酬粘性的影响程度。研究结果表明，我国上市公司高管权力自利是薪酬自利的原因之一，在自利性的驱使下，随着高管权力的提高，高管薪酬和企业员工的薪酬差距在国有企业与非国有企业中也随之有不同程度的提高，除此之外高管权力还提高了薪酬业绩的敏感系数，然而在业绩下降的时候，权力的运用对改变与业绩上升时的薪酬业绩敏感性之间的非对称性并无作用。

With the occurring of "astronomical executive pay" event, the study of explicit and implicit compensation of top executives has been gradually deepening in recent years. According to the theory of management power, top executives motivated by the self-interest intention will take the advantage of his or her power utilization in raising their own compensation when lack of sufficient supervision. This paper carries out the self-interest behavior study of top executives in compensation by using data of China's Listed Companies between 2005 and 2014. According to the difference in nature of ownership of the listed companies were investigated, the passage explored the correlation between executive compensation and executive power, as well as the internal pay gap and executive power. Finally, it analyses the influencing degree of the executive power on pay-performance sensitivity and compensation stickiness. The results of the study indicate that Chinese listed company executive’s power is one reason to high compensation. Driven by self-interest, the higher the executive power is, the bigger the pay gap between executive pay and corporate employees enlarges which shares different degree in state-owned enterprises and in non-state-owned enterprises. In addition to that, the executive power also improves the pay-performance sensitivity coefficient. However, the power has no effect on enlarging the asymmetry movement of pay-performance sensitivity between the growth and decline of enterprise performance.