互联网、云技术、算法、人工智能的蓬勃发展催生了数字经济。大数据的产生从根本上改变了企业的运营模式和竞争方式，数据已经成为企业的关键生产要素和核心资源。为了快速获取更大规模和范围的数据，数据驱动型并购成为很多互联网巨头的首选，也引起反垄断法的高度关切。一方面，大数据技术能够帮助企业提高产品和服务的质量，增强消费者黏性和忠诚度，提高市场竞争力。另一方面，数据集中增强了互联网平台的网络效应，容易形成“数据孤岛”，造成“强者更强”的马太效应，提高市场进入壁垒。同时，处于数据竞争优势地位的企业倾向于发起“猎杀式收购”，损害行业创新势力发展，降低用户隐私保护水平。这些决定了数据驱动型并购需要反垄断法予以规制。近年来，国内学界对于数据驱动型并购的研究逐渐增多。但是因为我国反垄断执法部门在针对互联网领域的经营者集中行为一直以来保持避之不谈的态度，我国缺乏相关的实践案例可供参考。所以关于数据驱动型并购的很多研究需要考察域外的判例。本文从大数据和数据驱动型并购入手，结合域外的相关案例及国内外理论研究成果，梳理我国对数据驱动型并购进行规制应当注意的问题，为完善数据驱动型并购的审查提出建议。

本文共分为四个章节。第一章介绍大数据和数据驱动型并购。主要是结合大数据的“4V”特性和数据驱动型并购的特点，从数据集中提升企业市场竞争力，同时产生损害竞争的效果分析对数据驱动型并购进行规制的必要性。

第二章介绍传统的反垄断规制思路处理数据驱动型并购时，有些捉襟见肘，需要反垄断执法部门解决很多适用上的难题。首先是我国的以单一的营业额为主的申报标准不足以囊括数据驱动型并购，产生漏网之鱼。同时，关于营业额的具体计算方法缺乏法律规定。然后，在数据驱动型并购的审查标准方面。由于数据驱动型并购大多集中在互联网平台，面临着多边市场难以界定相关市场的问题。界定单独的数据市场或用户注意力市场还不符合学界通说。另外，在对申请实施集中的各方当事人的市场力量进行审查时，传统的市场份额标准难以有效评估，互联网市场高度动态竞争的特点让企业的竞争优势充满不确定性。数据集中可能引起市场壁垒提高并没有得到重视。

第三章主要分析欧盟和美国在立法和法律实践中对于数据驱动型并购的应对。在处理是否要将消费者隐私保护纳入竞争法考虑的范畴的问题上，欧盟委员会在微软并购领英案实现态度转变，对此问题持赞同态度。欧盟考察了数据集中对市场两边的影响并积极采取行为救济措施。同时，欧盟已经认识到对数据市场的规制需要多部门协同参与。美国反垄断执法机构认为数据集中可能造成原料封锁，提高市场进入壁垒。在界定相关市场问题上，美国2010年修订的《横向并购指南》首次规定了在一些特定情况下可以不直接对相关市场进行界定。同时，FTC已经对美国科技巨头近十年来的并购案件进行审查，调查他们是否存在恶意逃避集中申报的行为，加大了主动审查的力度。

在第四章，针对如何在我国进行数据驱动型并购的规制提出意见。在申报标准方面，本文建议我国要明确营业额的计算方式，并且探索采用多元化的申报标准，防止科技巨头 通过并购消灭市场创新势力，同时可以建立重点观测名单，反垄断执法部门也应当加强主动审查的能力。在界定相关市场方面，要考察平台的网络效应、多边平台之间的相互影响，特定情况下可以淡化相关市场界定。审查标准方面，淡化市场份额的认定，应当更关注用户活跃度等指标。面对数据驱动型并购这种新形式，执法部门保持审慎监管的标准，多采用行为救济，比如开放数据、接口等，要定期对允许集中的案件进行复评。我们可以借鉴欧盟的“守门人”制度，适当加重科技巨头的法律责任，以消除他们的垄断势力对竞争的不良影响。

The vigorous development of the Internet, cloud technology, algorithms, and artificial intelligence technology has given birth to the digital economy. As a key production factor and core resource of enterprises, Big data has fundamentally changed the business and competition mode of enterprises. In order to quickly obtain data on a larger scale and scope, data-driven M&A have become the first choice of Internet companies, which has also caused great concern in the antitrust law. On the one hand, big data allows companies to improve the quality of products and services, enhance user-stickiness, and improve their market competitiveness. On the other hand, data concentration enhances the network effect of Internet platforms, and it is easy to form "data islands", causing the Matthew effect of "the strong are stronger", and increasing the barriers to market entry. At the same time, companies in a competitive position of data tend to initiate "killer acquisitions", damaging the development of industry innovation forces and lowering the level of user privacy protection. These determine that data-driven M&A need to be regulated by antitrust laws. In recent years, domestic academic circles have gradually increased research on data-driven M&A. However, because our country's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies have always kept a sloppy attitude toward the concentration of operators in the Internet field, we lacks of relevant practical cases for reference. Therefore, a lot of research on data-driven M&A needs to examine the jurisprudence outside the territory. This article starts with big data and data-driven M&A, combined with relevant cases in the foreign countries and theoretical research results, sorts out the issues that should be paid attention to in the regulation of data-driven M&A in our country, and proposes suggestions for the review of data-driven M&A.

This article is divided into four chapters. The first chapter introduces big data and data-driven M&A. It is mainly combined with the "4V" characteristics of big data and the characteristics of data-driven M&A, to enhance the market competitiveness of enterprises from data concentration, and at the same time produce the effect of harming competition to analyze the necessity of regulating data-driven M&A.

The second chapter introduces the traditional anti-monopoly regulatory thinking when dealing with data-driven M&A. It is somewhat stretched and requires anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies to solve many application problems. The first is that our country's reporting standard is not enough to cover all kinds of data-driven M&A. At the same time, there is a lack of legal provisions on the specific calculation method of reporting standard. Then, in terms of review standards for data-driven M&A，since data-driven M&A s are mostly concentrated on the Internet platforms, it face the problem that it is difficult to define relevant markets in multilateral markets. Defining a separate data market or user attention market is still not accepted in the academic community. In addition, when reviewing the market power of parties applying for concentration, the traditional market share standard is difficult to effectively evaluate, and the highly dynamic competition characteristics of the Internet market make the competitive advantages of enterprises full of uncertainty. The concentration of data that may cause market barriers to increase has not been taken seriously.

The third chapter mainly analyzes the EU and the United States' response to data-driven M&A in legislation and legal practice. On the issue of whether to include consumer privacy protection in the scope of competition law, the European Commission has achieved a change in its attitude in the case of Microsoft's merger with LinkedIn, and agrees with this issue. EU examined the impact of data concentration on both sides of the market and actively adopted behavioral relief measures. At the same time, EU has recognized that the regulation of the data market requires the coordination of multiple sectors. The United States believes that data concentration may cause raw material blockade and increase market entry barriers. In regard of the definition of relevant markets, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines proposes that under certain circumstances, the issue of relevant market definitions can be surpassed. At the same time, the FTC has reviewed M&A of US technology giants in the past decade to investigate whether they have maliciously evaded declarations. US has increased the intensity of proactive review.

In Chapter 4, opinions are put forward on how to regulate data-driven M&A in our country. In terms of reporting standards, this article suggests that our country should clarify the calculation method of turnover and explore the use of diversified reporting standards to prevent technology giants from eliminating market innovation forces through M&A. At the same time, we can establish a key observation list. Antitrust law enforcement agencies should also strengthen their active review capabilities. In regard of the definition of relevant markets, the network effects of the Internet and the mutual influence between multilateral platforms must be considered, and the relevant market definitions can be surpassed under certain circumstances. In terms of review standards, the importance of the determination of market share should be decreased, more attention should be paid to indicators such as user activity. Facing new forms of data-driven M&A, law enforcement agencies maintain the standards of prudential supervision and often adopt behavioral remedies, such as open data, interfaces, etc., and regularly review cases that allow concentration. We can learn from the EU's "gatekeeper" system and appropriately increase the legal responsibilities of technology giants in order to eliminate the adverse effects of their power on competition.