近年来，我国实体企业金融化趋势受到党中央和国务院的高度重视。金融资产投资具有流动性管理和资本套利的双重属性。然而，多数企业投资金融资产却是受逐利动机驱使，大量实业资本涌入金融和房地产市场，导致资金空转。与此同时，国内积极推行ESG实践，逐步引导企业可持续经营，提高资金利用效率，或许能规范企业金融资产投资决策。不过，部分企业存在“漂绿风险”，即利用ESG评级掩盖其过度投资金融资产等伪善行为，此时企业ESG评级反而会助推企业金融化。所以，实体企业ESG评级究竟会不会影响金融资产投资？怎样影响？上述问题的回答有助于企业树立正确的ESG理念和金融资产投资动机，推动中国经济脱虚向实、高质量发展。

基于此，本文以2011-2021年我国A股非金融上市公司为研究对象，构建双向固定效应模型作为基准模型，研究企业ESG评级对金融资产投资的影响，并进行内生性和稳健性检验。随后，借助融资约束、代理成本情况探究该影响的作用渠道，加深对企业金融资产投资动机的理解。进一步地，构建模型测度企业是否过度投资金融资产，从过度金融化、产权属性和企业规模角度进行异质性分析。最后，基于实业资产投资、主业业绩视角，深入分析企业ESG评级影响金融资产投资的经济后果，形成较为完整的研究思路。

本文的主要研究结论如下：第一，实体企业提高ESG评级能有效治理企业金融化，表明积极践行ESG实践的企业会减少对金融资产的非必要投资。第二，企业提高ESG评级能通过缓解融资约束以抑制企业预防性储蓄动机下的金融资产投资行为，而且真实良好的ESG表现能够降低第一类和第二类代理成本，进而抑制企业的资本套利动机。第三，我国A股非金融上市公司存在过度金融化现象，过度金融化企业提高ESG评级更能显著降低企业金融资产投资程度。同时，相较非国有企业，国有企业较高的ESG评级对企业金融化的治理效果更为突出。而且企业ESG评级对企业金融化的抑制作用在小规模企业中更为明显。第四，过度金融化企业的ESG评级对金融资产投资的抑制效应能提升企业实业资产投资和主业业绩，推动企业发展。

基于上述研究结论，本文得出关于政府、企业、投资者三类主体的如下政策启示：第一，政府应完善ESG相关政策，充分发挥ESG的治理效应。不断完善我国企业ESG信息的披露体系、评价标准及监管制度，实现对实体企业的软监管。第二，政府应加大ESG宣传力度，推动企业积极承担ESG责任。出台利好政策激励企业积极提升ESG表现，强化国有企业在ESG实践方面的引领作用。第三，政府应强化金融监管，防范化解金融风险。既要利用企业ESG评级完善我国金融监管体系，也要改善实体投资的环境，平衡实体企业资金增值与主业发展的关系，减少过度金融化行为。第四，相关部门应关注对投资者的ESG投资教育。鼓励投资者将实体企业ESG评级纳入投资决策参考指标，倒逼企业完善ESG信息披露，形成资本市场良性互动。

Recently, the trend of financialization among real enterprises in China has garnered significant attention from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council. Financial asset investment has the dual attributes of liquidity management and capital arbitrage. However, most of enterprises investment in financial assets are driven by profit-seeking motives. Consequently, a substantial influx of industrial capital into the financial and real estate markets has occurred, leading to the phenomenon of capital idling. At the same time, the country is actively pursuing ESG practices, gradually guiding enterprises to operate sustainably, and improving the efficiency of capital utilization. It is possible that ESG ratings could standardize corporate investment decisions in financial assets. However, there is a risk of “greenwashing” for some enterprises, where they use ESG ratings to mask hypocritical behaviors such as over-investment in financial assets. In such cases, rather than mitigating, enterprise ESG ratings may inadvertently promote financialization. Therefore, do ESG ratings for real enterprises affect investments in financial assets? How does it influence them? The answers to the above questions will help enterprises establish correct ESG concepts and financial asset investment motives, and promote China’s transition from virtual to real economic development of high quality.

Based on this premise, this thesis focuses on A-share listed companies from 2011-2021 as samples, constructs a two-way fixed-effects model as the benchmark model, investigates the impact of corporate ESG ratings on the investment in financial assets, and conducts endogeneity and robustness tests. Then, the effects of financing constraints and agency costs in this impact are explored to deepen the understanding of corporate motives for investing in financial assets. Further, based on the model measuring corporate over-financialization, heterogeneity analysis is conducted in terms of over-financialization, property rights attributes and enterprise size. Finally, based on industrial asset investment and key business performance, economic consequences of corporate ESG ratings affecting investment in financial assets are analyzed in depth to form a more complete research idea.

The main findings of this thesis are as follows: Firstly, improved ESG ratings for real companies can effectively govern the financialisation of corporations, indicating that enterprises actively practicing ESG principles tend to reduce irrational investments in financial assets. Secondly, enhancing ESG ratings can curb financial asset investments driven by the “reservoir” motive by alleviating financing constraints. Furthermore, genuine high ESG performance can diminish both first and second category agency costs, thereby restraining speculative arbitrage motives. Thirdly, China's A-share non-financial listed companies exhibit over-financialization. Over-financialized enterprises show a stronger inhibition of financial asset investment with improved ESG ratings. Additionally, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, genuine good ESG performance in state-owned enterprises has a more prominent effect on mitigating corporate financialization. Moreover, the dampening effect of corporate ESG ratings on corporate financialisation is more pronounced among small-scale firms. Lastly, the inhibitory effect of ESG ratings on financial asset investment by over-financialized enterprises can enhance the enterprise's industrial asset investment and core business performance, promoting overall development.

Based on the above research conclusions, this thesis draws the following policy insights on the three types of subjects, namely government, enterprises and investors: First, the government should improve ESG-related policies and make the most of the governance effect of ESG. It should continuously improve the disclosure system, evaluation standards and regulatory system of ESG information of enterprises in China, so as to realize the soft supervision of real enterprises. Second, the government should increase ESG publicity and promote enterprises to actively undertake ESG responsibilities. It should introduce favorable policies to incentivize enterprises to actively improve their ESG performance and strengthen the leading role of state-owned enterprises in ESG practice. Third, the government should strengthen financial supervision and prevent and resolve financial risks. It should not only improve China's financial regulatory system, but also improve the environment for real investment, balance the relationship between capital appreciation of real enterprises and the development of their main business, and reduce over-financialization behavior. Fourth, relevant departments should pay attention to ESG investment education for investors. They can encourage investors to incorporate the ESG ratings of entity enterprises into the reference index for investment decisions, force enterprises to improve ESG information disclosure, and form a good interaction in the capital market.