本文旨在研究列维纳斯哲学中的内在性与超越性问题。在列维纳斯的哲学中，自我是有限性的、感受性的、内在性的，而他者是无限性的、外在性的、超越性的。列维纳斯的哲学要求自我破碎自己，将自己完全地向他者敞开，于是这里就产生了一个不可弥合的分歧——内在性的自我与超越性的他者之间的关系如何发生？列维纳斯说,“我看到了他者的面容”，却又强调这种“看”并不是视觉上的看见；列维纳斯强调，他者的苦难令“我”心碎，他者是受苦的弱者，但他者却又能对“我”发出神圣的绝对命令；列维纳斯说，我与他者之间的关系是一种“无关系的关系”……在这一系列内蕴矛盾的语言中，列维纳斯想表达的正是内在性与超越性的矛盾问题。 内在性与超越性的难题在于，一方面，按照同一性哲学的看法，超越性就是内在性，内在性就是超越性，那么超越性的维度就被取消了，上帝不再是上帝，他者也不再是他者，伦理和善失去了形而上学的根据；另一方面，如果认为内在性与超越性之间存在着绝对的差别，从内在性的角度永远无法达到超越性，超越性也永远无法进入内在性，也就是说二者之间无法产生任何关系，那么善的启示如何发生？人类的信仰何以可能？神人关系如何维持？ 面对内在性-超越性的难题，本文试图通过列维纳斯的哲学思考进行回应。本文首先从主体性、认识论（现象学）、本体论（存在论）三个角度细致地分析、重构了列维纳斯的哲学。在主体性方面，列维纳斯认为存在着一个绝对外在于我、超越于我的他者。同时，主体可以通过对他者的责任和爱欲（伦理学）超越自身的内在性和有限性，与超越性和无限性产生联系。第二，在认识论方面，列维纳斯引入了异质性的瞬间打破了胡塞尔自我综合、自身明证的内时间，以不可还原的启示性瞬间打破了共时性的时间流，从而为主体打开了朝向未来的可能性；另外，从康德主义认识论的观点来看，列维纳斯的超越性指的是超越了“所有可能性经验构成的内在性领域”，列维纳斯以否定神学的形式反对用理性把握一切的认识论。最后，在本体论方面，列维纳斯认为存在论缺乏伦理和善的维度，并且，海德格尔把此在（内在性）朝向无限（超越性）的潜能等同于“死亡”这个不可能的可能性，列维纳斯认为这把人类的全部希望都推进了虚无主义的深渊。因此，列维纳斯反对存在论，以主体对他者的“爱欲”打开了主体朝向“善”和“超越性”的潜能。 接下来，本文将会解读列维纳斯在塔木德研究中对神人关系问题的演绎。在列维纳斯的宗教研究中，内在性-超越性的难题关涉到上帝的神圣性和绝对超越性、人的罪性和有限性问题，上帝给人颁布的律法和神圣命令的重要性，以及妥拉的核心——“伦理学就是神学，爱他者就是爱上帝”。 最终，从列维纳斯哲学中的主体性、认识论、本体论的视角，以及他对犹太教的研究来看，列维纳斯的超越性不仅指绝对他者，还指内在性的爱欲、无限责任、启示的瞬间以及伦理的善——这是一种“内在性的超越”，既不是纯粹的内在性，又不是纯粹的超越性。但列维纳斯的这种回答不能使我们满意，因为列维纳斯的理论内部存在着彼此反驳的张力。例如，他一直在严谨地论证我与他者之间的绝对差异性，也就是内在性与超越性之间的绝对差异、不可弥合的鸿沟；同时却提出了，我对他者承担的无限责任是“内在性的超越”。还需要注意，列维纳斯所提出的“无限责任”这一概念本身就是不可能的。列维纳斯说，他者不会被我的欲望总体化，但又说他者是我的爱欲对象。然而在这些矛盾存在的情况下，列维纳斯却像变魔术一般，用主体对他者的爱欲和无限责任，在内在性和超越性之间架起了沟通的桥梁，这个论证过程是有漏洞的。许多研究者认为，这就是一种现象学视域中的内在性超越。但在我看来，现象学是一种内在性哲学，而列维纳斯的哲学立场属于超越性哲学，因此把列维纳斯等同于现象学的做法不可取。 因此在文章的最后，我将试图用“能”（εν?ργεια）的理论修补列维纳斯这种回应的缺陷，从“能”的角度解决内在性-超越性难题的矛盾，并论证列维纳斯的“内在性的超越”是如何实现的。“能”的视角与本质主义的视角不同。虽然内在性与超越性在本质上有着绝对的差异，但“能”可以突破本质主义，沟通内在性和超越性。从“能”的视角来看，内在性有向超越性维度敞开的潜能（δ?ναμι?），并且内在性具有和超越性结合的“潜能”。在列维纳斯哲学中，“能”（εν?ργεια）是一种生产性的活动，一种不断繁衍的爱欲，一种不被本质或隐德莱希所规定的无限潜能，一种主体永远无法承担得起、但又不断地为了他者去承担的无限责任。当内在性的人与超越性的上帝相遇，内在性的人被打开、被倾倒、被清空，人自己的“能”被降到最低。人的无能和上帝的能结合在一起，人的生存方式被彻底改变了——人从利己主义、自我中心主义的“存在论的人”，变成了能够为他者承担无限责任，甚至可以为了他者牺牲自己的“伦理学的人”，这就是“内在性的超越”。

The purpose of this thesis is to study the problem of immanence and transcendence in Levinas’s philosophy. In Levinas‘s philosophy, the self is finite, immanent and sensible, while the other is infinite, exterior and transcendent. Levinas’s philosophy requires that the subject breaks himself and completely opens himself to the other. So, there is an irreparable contradiction: how could the immanent subject (self) relate to the transcendent other? For some instances, when Levinas said, “I see the face of the other,” but stressed that, this “look” was not a sensual sight. Levinas stressed that the other is suffering and dying, but at the same time, the other can give me the divine and absolute command. The other is saying that, Thou shalt not kill. Levinas says that the relationship between subject and the other is an “unrelated relationship”. It is the contradiction between immanence and transcendence that he wants to express in this series of intrinsically contradictory languages. The problem of “immanence and transcendence” is that: On the one hand, according to the philosophical tradition of identity, transcendence is immanence, and immanence is transcendence, then the dimension of transcendence is cancelled. God is no longer God, the other is no longer the other. Ethics and morality lose their metaphysical ground. On the other hand, if there is an absolute difference between immanence and transcendence, so that the transcendence can never be achieved from the perspective of immanence, and the transcendence can never enter into the immanence, then can there be any relationship between the two? How does the revelation from the Goodness happen? And, what makes human’s faith possible? This thesis will clarify Levinas’s response to the immanence-transcendence problem from both philosophical and religious aspects. I first carefully analyzed and reconstructed Levinas’s philosophy from the perspectives of subjectivity, epistemology (phenomenology), and ontology (existence theory). From the perspective of subjectivity, Levinas believes that there is an absolute external other who transcends me, and the subject can transcend its own finiteness and connect with infinite other through his eros to the other. From the perspective of epistemology, Levinas broke Husserl‘s self-synthesis and the self-evident internal time. Levinas broke the synchronic time flow by diachronic moments, thus opening up the future dimension for the subject. In addition, from the point of Kantian epistemology, Levinas’s transcendence refers to transcending the “internal field of possible experience”. Levinas opposes the epistemology that holding everything rationally in the form of “negative theology”. From the perspective of ontology, Levinas believes that ontology lacks the dimension of ethics. Especially Heidegger equates Dasein’s potential toward infinity with the impossible possibility of “death”. Levinas believes that Heidegger pushes all human hopes into the abyss of nihilism, so Levinas opposes existentialism and opens up the subject’s potential towards goodness with his eros to the other. After discussing the problem of immanence-transcendence in Levinas‘s philosophy, I turned to Levinas’s study of Judaism. It mainly involves the sanctity of God and His absolute transcendence, the sinfulness of human and their finiteness, the law issued by God to human and God’s divine command, and the ethics is theology, the love to others is the love to God. From Levinas’s thinking about the Jewish Bible and Torah, we can see his understanding of the problem of immanence and transcendence in a more comprehensive way. In the end, from Levinas’s philosophy of subjectivity, epistemology, ontology and his study of Judaism, Levinas’s transcendence is not only refers to the absolute otherness, but also refers to the internal eros, infinite responsibility, the instant inspiration from revelation, and ethics of the goodness. This is a kind of transcendence-in-immanence, which is neither the pure immanence, nor pure transcendence. But Levinas’s answer cannot satisfy us, for within Levinas’s theory, the ideas contradict with each other. For example, he has been rigorously demonstrating the absolute difference between the self and other. That is, the absolute difference between immanence and transcendence, the unbridgeable gap, while proposing that, responsibility is a kind of “transcendence-in-immanence”. Levinas says that, the other is not to be generalized by my eros, but he also says that the other is the object of my eros. His concept of “infinite responsibility" is inherently impossible. However, Levinas magically builds a bridge between immanence and transcendence by the eros and infinite responsibility of the subject to the other. Many researchers believe that, this is a kind of immanent transcendence in phenomenology. But as far as I am concerned, phenomenology is a kind of immanence philosophy, while Levinas’s philosophical position belongs to transcendental philosophy, so it is wrong to equate Levinas with phenomenology. At the end of this thesis, I will try to repair the defects of Levinas’s response with the theory of “ENERGY” (εν?ργεια), and solve the contradiction between immanence and transcendence from the view of “energy”. It could also demonstrate how could Levinas’s transcendence-in-immanence realize. The perspective of energy is different from that of essentialism. Although there is an absolute difference between immanence and transcendence in “essence”, energy can communicate immanence and transcendence. From the perspective of “energy”, immanent eros makes it possible for the self opens up to the transcendental dimension. In Levinas philosophy, “energy” is a productive activity, a growing desire for love, an infinite potential that is not defined by nature or Entelecheia, a kind of infinite responsibility that the subject can never bear, but he continues to bear for the sake of other. When the immanence human meets the transcendent God, human passively opens up, dumps out and empties himself, and the “energy” of God enters into the inner nature of human. Human is completely changed by the “energy” of God, changed from egoism “ontological person” to an “ethical person” who can bear infinite responsibility for the other, and even sacrifice his own life for the sake of the other. This is “transcendence-in-immanence”.