正如世界银行报告中所述：“地方政府对一国经济和社会发展以及这种发展能否持续下去有着举足轻重的作用。在追求集体的目标上，政府对变革的影响、推动和调节方面的潜力是无法比拟的。当这种能力得到良好改革的发挥，该国经济便蒸蒸日上。但是若情况相反，则发展便会止步不前。”改革开放三十年以来，中国地方政府对于实现宏观调控目标、地方经济发展、制度创新与变革等做出了重要贡献，但由于中央对地方相对“软化”的制度约束环境以及自身独立的经济主体等多种因素，地方政府经济行为已经发生偏差，出现了违背追求全社会公共福利的变异行为。本文从委托代理理论出发，从地方政府面临多任务委托合同、绩效评价标准缺乏参照、固定任期制导致短期行为严重以及地方政府间“准联邦式”竞争关系四方面分析这一行为变异内容。最后，依然围绕委托代理理论，提出相应纠正地方政府经济行为变异建议措施。具体为一是完善财政分权体制，重塑中央政府与地方政府委托代理关系；二是引入激励和约束机制，建立科学的绩效考核指标体系；三是积极倡导制度创新，加强各区域间合作。

Report of World Bank says,”The local governments play a significantly important role on one country’s economic and social development. The potential is quite enormous when governments influence, push and accommodate on reformation to purse collective goals. When the potential ability plays well, the economy of the country will be booming. But if the contrary, the development will be stalled.” Since three decades of reform and opening up, Chinese local governments have made momentous contributions to local economic development, institutional innovation and change, achievement of macro-control targets. However, due to relatively “softening” system constraints from central government to local governments, local governments’ own independent economic main body and other factors, the economic behaviors of local governments have deviated from original track, which have been contrary to the pursuit of the whole social and public welfare. Based on principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes governments’ variation behaviors from four aspects, which are the local governments facing multi-task commission contract, lack of reference to the performance evaluation criteria, a fixed tenure system leading to serous short-term behavior of local governments and “quasi-federal” competition among local governments. In the conclusion of this paper, we propose corresponding measures to correct variation behaviors of local governments, still based on principal-agent theory. First of all, to improve the fiscal decentralization system, remodeling the agency relationship between central government and local governments. Secondly, to introduce incentive and restraint mechanisms, establishing a scientific performance evaluation index system. Thirdly, to actively promote system innovation, strengthening the regional cooperation.