詹姆斯•普赖尔近年来倡导一种新的理论来反驳怀疑论，他称之为独断论。然而，这项尝试却被指责与贝叶斯主义不相容。贝叶斯主义的反驳直接指向了独断论的核心概念，即“直接的辩护”存在的可能性。如果这个反驳成立，那么独断论将失去反驳怀疑论的意图。在本文中，我将首先展示独断论的基本观点，其次我将分析贝叶斯主义论证的诸前提，最后，我将通过指出这些前提的缺陷来捍卫独断论。我将论证独断论不仅与贝叶斯主义是相容的，同时也具有反驳怀疑论的效力。

In recent years, James Pryor proposes a new epistemic project which he labeled dogmatism in order to refute skepticism. However, this attempt has been shown to be incompatible with Bayesianism. The Bayesian objection directly targets the possibility of immediate justification, which is the core concept of dogmatism. If this objection works, then dogmatism is false in its anti-skeptic project. In this thesis, I will firstly present the basic idea of dogmatism, and then I will analysis the premises of Bayesian argument. Finally, I will defend dogmatism by showing the flaws of those premises. I will argue that dogmatism is not only compatible with Bayesianism, but also has anti-skeptic punch.