在数字时代，数据被视为与土地、劳动力、资本、技术并列的五大生产要素之一，这一政策决定标志着数据的重要性被正式认可和强调。这不仅反映了数据在推动经济增长、促进产业升级、实现社会管理和服务创新中的关键作用，也意味着未来的市场竞争和监管将更加注重数据资源的开发、利用和保护。根据中国信息通信研究院的报告，中国数字经济的增长速度已显著超过传统经济，这一趋势不仅展示了数字经济在推动国家经济总体增长中的强大动力，也凸显了中国作为一个数字化转型国家的巨大潜力和成就。面对数字经济的快速发展，中国的立法和监管响应体现了对于这一新兴经济形态的重视。在保护数据安全和个人信息安全方面，2021年颁布了《数据安全法》和《个人信息保护法》，为数字经济的健康发展奠定了坚实的法律基础。在维护市场秩序方面，2021年发布了《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》，2022年《反垄断法》修改在总则中加入了数字条款，以防止平台经济的垄断行为和资本无序扩张。
近年来，以数据获取为主要目的的并购行为层出不穷，并呈现出主体较为固定、客体主要是数据、交易额较之营业额庞大以及以纵向并购和混合并购为主等特点，因而成为反垄断执法机构甚至整个社会关注的中心议题。
除去绪论和结语，本文主要分为四个章节。第一章明确数据及数据驱动型并购的定义，探讨数据驱动型并购如何损害公平竞争、减损消费者福利和阻滞市场创新，强调规制的必要性。第二章围绕数据驱动型并购的申报、审查及救济措施三个方面讨论在立法和实践中我国反垄断监管所面临的挑战。探讨现有申报标准无法准确反映数据驱动型并购的市场力量，及其对多边平台计算复杂化的挑战；分析相关市场界定困难、数据相关竞争影响因素的缺位等问题，说明传统审查机制的局限性；探讨结构性和行为性救济措施在数据驱动型并购中的适用性和监督难度，强调创新救济措施的需求。第三章对美国、欧盟的法律规定和经典案例进行梳理和分析，提炼对中国反垄断规制的启示，包括对大型数字平台的强监管立场、重视非价格竞争因素和注重行为性救济措施等。第四章提出数据驱动型并购反垄断法规制的完善建议。在调整申报门槛方面，提议引入多重标准，如交易额标准和用户规模标准，并加强对大型数字平台的规制力度，以适应数字经济特性。在更新审查机制方面，建议更新市场界定方法，拓展竞争影响评估的考量因素，以提高审查的准确性和有效性。最后，在创新救济措施方面，探讨设计有效的行为性救济措施和实施动态监督策略，以解决数据驱动型并购中的反竞争效果。

In the digital age, data are regarded as one of the five major factors of production, alongside land, labour, capital and technology, and this policy decision signifies that the importance of data has been formally recognised and emphasised. This not only reflects the key role of data in driving economic growth, promoting industrial upgrading, and realising social management and service innovation, but also implies that future market competition and regulation will focus more on the development, utilisation and protection of data resources. According to a report by the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, the growth rate of China's digital economy has significantly outpaced that of the traditional economy, a trend that not only demonstrates the powerful momentum of the digital economy in driving the overall growth of the country's economy, but also highlights China's enormous potential and achievements as a country in digital transformation. In the face of the rapid development of the digital economy, China's legislative and regulatory response reflects the importance it attaches to this emerging economic form. In terms of protecting data security and personal information security, the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law were enacted in 2021, laying a solid legal foundation for the healthy development of the digital economy. In terms of maintaining market order, the Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council for Anti-monopoly in the Field of Platform Economy were issued in 2021, and the Anti-monopoly Law was amended in 2022 to include digital provisions in the General Provisions, in order to prevent monopolistic behaviours and disorderly expansion of capital in the platform economy.
In recent years, mergers with the main purpose of data acquisition have emerged in an endless stream, and present the characteristics of relatively fixed subjects, mainly data as the object, huge transaction volume compared to turnover, and mainly vertical mergers and hybrid mergers, so it has become the focus of anti-monopoly issues that the competition law enforcement agencies and even the whole society are concerned about.
Excluding the introduction and conclusion, this paper is divided into four main chapters. Chapter 1 clarifies the definition of data and data-driven mergers, discusses how data-driven mergers harm fair competition, detract from consumer welfare and stunt market innovation, and emphasises the need for regulation. The second chapter discusses the challenges faced by China's anti-monopoly regulation in legislation and practice in three aspects: declaration, review and remedies for data-driven mergers. It explores the inability of existing filing standards to accurately reflect the market power of data-driven mergers and its challenge to the computational complexity of multilateral platforms; analyses the difficulties in defining relevant markets and the absence of data-related competition influencing factors to illustrate the limitations of the traditional review mechanism; and explores the applicability and supervisory difficulty of structural and behavioural remedies in data-driven mergers to emphasise the need for innovative remedies. Chapter 3 compiles and analyses the legal provisions and classic cases in the US and the EU, and distils the implications for China's anti-monopoly regulation, including the strong regulatory stance on large digital platforms, the emphasis on non-price competition factors and the focus on behavioural remedies. Chapter 4 puts forward suggestions for improving the anti-monopoly regulation of data-driven mergers. In terms of adjusting the filing threshold, it is proposed to introduce multiple criteria, such as the transaction volume criterion and the user size criterion, and to strengthen the regulation of large digital platforms in order to adapt to the characteristics of the digital economy. In terms of updating the review mechanism, it is proposed to update the market definition methodology and expand the considerations of the competition impact assessment, so as to improve the accuracy and effectiveness of the review. Finally, in terms of innovative remedies, the design of effective behavioural remedies and the implementation of dynamic monitoring strategies are explored to address anti-competitive effects in data-driven mergers.