The significance of the corporate compliance program in criminal law has attracted global attention. The sentencing incentive system for compliance provides an approach that regard compliance as a defense reason for corporate crimes, and is therefore mitigated or even exempted from sentencing. If companies can prove that a reasonable and practical corporate compliance program exists internally to avoid punished heavily because of their employees’ job-related wrongdoing. The system originated in the United States and has been incorporated into criminal law by many countries around the world.

The respondeat superior principle applicable in the United States have made employees with criminal intent a nightmare for enterprises, and employees can completely bring down a relatively innocent enterprise by implementing illegal acts that are contrary to the wishes and policies published by the enterprise. In order to make up for the shortcomings and deficiencies of this principle, the United States Department of Justice(DOJ) has provided for a compliance sentencing incentive system in the Organizing Sentencing Guidelines, as well as standards for effective compliance programs. Proofs of focus in criminal proceedings can be divided into four types of defense, including due diligence defenses, affirmative defenses, good- faith defenses, and methods of regarding compliance programs as elements of a crime.

And the law should encourage companies to establish high-quality and strict compliance programs, not just a “fig leaf”. Establishing a sentencing incentive system for compliance programs can increase the deterrent effect of criminal law on enterprises, encourage companies to establish ethical and effective compliance programs, thereby reducing corporate crimes, and even help increase public confidence in the judiciary and optimize judicial allocation of resources, Companies may also cooperate spontaneously with the judicial agencies.

The regulations and practice of the system in Britain, the United States and other countries prove that the system is not an inexperienced risk-taking system, and it has a substantial positive impact on their justice. Of course, some scholars have seen such issues as possible false sincerity in the program, and they worried that the compliance program will become a decorated tool to escape from corporate criminal responsibility. These problems are not unavoidable under a reasonable system design.