随着近年来国家“放管服”改革和“优化营商环境”部署持续深入推进，全国各级税务机关通过简化税务行政审批、转变征管理念方式、提升纳税服务质效等举措，有力推动了国家决策部署在税务领域落地生根。然而，由于制度不够健全、“放”“管”“服”三者不同步等因素叠加的现实处境，引发了税务部门外部税收遵从程度不高和内部税收执法风险滋生等实际问题，给基层税收执法工作带来了不小的风险和挑战。同时，基层税收执法人员群体作为“街头官僚”，受执法环境、高压问责、绩效考核等多种因素综合影响，在执法工作中出现了一定程度的避责行为，并存在演化为群体性特征的趋势，这也引起了税务部门和学界的关注。

      本文沿着“执法风险识别—中间因素影响—避责行为应对—产生结果影响”的研究脉络，构建了关于基层税收执法人员面对执法风险，为规避责任而进行“识别—应对”的分析框架，运用观察访谈、案例分析等研究方法，对北京市M区税务局的基层税收执法样态进行了剖析，发现：首先，执法人员在日常工作中可能会识别出各种执法风险，主要来自政策制度不完善、“放”“管”“服”不同步、岗责体系失位、内部控制薄弱、信息化支撑力度不足等方面；其次，识别执法风险后并不会直接导致避责应对行为发生，在识别和应对之间还存在着组织体制环境、干部个人特征、执法对象反馈等中间因素的影响，为识别风险后采取相关避责行为应对提供了催化驱动作用；同时，根据风险特征和环境作用的具体情境，执法人员通常会选择联合决策、内容控制、应付拖延、执法加码、留痕保护、转移责任等具体避责策略应对，从而达到防范化解当前或潜在风险、躲避责任追究的目的；从结果和影响看，消极避责行为在基层扩散蔓延，将会导致一定程度的政策执行偏差，阻碍税收工作良性健康发展，甚至影响政府权威及公信力；最后，从切实加强税收执法风险管理、有效改善基层避责行为的角度出发，提出了降低执法风险外部来源、防范内生执法风险、优化执法人员管理机制的三方面规范对策。本文以小窥大地检视基层税收执法中避责行为及其内涵运行逻辑，从而为研究街头官僚避责行为和加强基层行政执法类公务员管理提供了一扇生动的观察窗口，也将对税收执法风险的研究层次从宏观的风险管理层面延伸到微观的行为逻辑层面。

In recent years, as the reform of "improving regulation and service" and the deployment of "optimizing the business environment" continue to deepen, tax authorities at all levels across the country have effectively promoted the implementation of national decisions and arrangements in the tax field by simplifying administrative examination and approval, transforming the concept and method of tax collection and management, and improving the quality and efficiency of tax payment services. However, due to the imperfect system, "release", "management", "service" and other factors of the reality of the combination of factors, caused the tax department external tax compliance is not high and internal tax law enforcement risks, such as practical problems, to the grass-roots tax law enforcement work has brought no small risks and challenges. At the same time, as "street bureaucrats", grass-roots tax law enforcement personnel, under the comprehensive influence of law enforcement environment, high-pressure accountability, performance appraisal and other factors, have a certain degree of evasion behavior in law enforcement work, and there is a trend of evolution into a group characteristics, which has also attracted the attention of tax authorities and academic circles.

        In this paper, along the research path of "law enforcement risk identification -- influence of intermediate factors -- response to evasion behavior -- resulting impact", an analytical framework of "identification -- response" is constructed for grassroots tax law enforcement personnel facing law enforcement risks in order to avoid responsibility. Research methods such as observation interview and case analysis are used. The basic tax law enforcement pattern of M District tax Bureau in Beijing is analyzed, and it is found that: first of all, law enforcement personnel may identify various law enforcement risks in their daily work, mainly from the policy system is not perfect, the "release", "management" and "service" are not synchronized, the post responsibility system is out of position, the internal control is weak, the information support is insufficient, etc. Secondly, the identification of law enforcement risks does not directly lead to the occurrence of responsibility avoidance coping behaviors. There are also intermediate factors between the identification and coping, such as organizational system environment, personal characteristics of cadres, and feedback of law enforcement objects, which provide a catalytic driving effect for the adoption of relevant responsibility avoidance coping behaviors after the identification of risks. At the same time, according to the specific situation of risk characteristics and environmental effects, law enforcement personnel usually choose joint decision-making, information control, coping delay, law enforcement, leave mark protection, transfer of responsibility and other specific strategies to avoid responsibility, so as to prevent and resolve the current or potential risks, avoid accountability. From the perspective of results and impacts, the spread of negative evasion behavior at the grassroots level will lead to a certain degree of deviation in policy implementation, hinder the sound and healthy development of tax work, and even affect the authority and credibility of the government. Finally, from the perspective of strengthening the risk management of tax law enforcement and effectively improving the avoidance behavior at the grass-roots level, the author puts forward three normative countermeasures: reducing the external sources of law enforcement risks, preventing the internal law enforcement risks and optimizing the management mechanism of law enforcement personnel. This paper examines the evasion behavior and its operational logic in grassroots tax law enforcement with a small glimpse, thus providing a vivid observation window for studying the evasion behavior of street bureaucrats and strengthening the management of civil servants in grassroots administrative law enforcement. It also extends the research level of tax law enforcement risk from the macro level of risk management to the micro level of behavior logic.