在公司治理研究中，存在两种典型的委托代理问题，第一种委托代理问题存在于上市公司股东与经理人之间；第二种委托代理问题则存在于上市公司大股东与分散的小股东之间。由于特殊的历史原因，中国上市公司第一大股东持股比例普遍偏高，第二种委托代理问题表现突出，如何抑制大股东对小股东利益侵害问题，是中国公司治理面临的重要问题。国内外关于股权制衡理论的研究为这一问题的解决提供了有益启发。在借鉴国内外公司治理关于股权制衡理论的研究的基础上，本文对股权制衡与公司治理安排的关系，股权制衡与公司价值的关系，公司制衡对两权分离引起的终极所有者侵占效应的抑制作用，以及第一大股东性质与第二大股东性质对股权制衡上市公司价值的影响，进行了理论分析，并提出了相应的研究假设。然后，本文以2006年上市公司作为研究对象，建立实证模型，对本文研究假设进行了实证分析。实证分析验证了本文的研究假设，得出如下研究结论：不同股权结构上市公司会形成不同的内部公司治理安排，股权制衡公司具有较优的内部公司治理安排，较好的内部公司治理安排使得这些公司具有较高的公司价值；与非股权制衡公司相比，因两权分离引起的上市公司终极所有者对上市公司的侵占效应在股权制衡公司中会受到抑制；上市公司第一大股东性质与第二大股东性质对股权制衡上市公司的股权制衡效应存在显著影响。最后，结合本文所得结论，对我国上市公司治理提出了一些有益的政策建议。

There are two kinds of agent problems in corporate governance: one is the agent problem between the shareholders and professional managers; the other one is between the large shareholders and external scattered minority shareholders. For complexity historical reason, the first block shareholder of Chinese listed company always has high share proportion. So, the agent problem between the large shareholders and external scattered minority shareholders has become a chronic disease. Therefore, how to effectively restrain the harming behavior of large shareholder has become a critical problem in theoretical studies on corporate governance in China.The foreign and domestic researches on the theory of check-and-balance ownership structure have provided a useful inspiration to solve this problem. Based on a review of studies around the world, this paper make a theoretical research on the relationship between check-and-balance ownership structure and internal corporate governance, the relationship between check-and-balance ownership structure and corporate value, the relationship of check-and-balance ownership structure and the entrenchment effect result from rights departure of ultimate shareholders, the effect of identity of the first large shareholder and the second large shareholder on the corporate values which has check-and-balance ownership structure and make four propositions. Then make an empirical research based on a sample of Chinese listed company from 2006.The empirical research validate the four proposition, the conclusion is as follow: ownership structure has an important effect on the internal corporate governance, company which has a check-and-balance ownership structure has a better internal corporate governance than the others; company which has a check-and-balance ownership structure can restrain the entrenchment effect result from rights departure of ultimate shareholders; identity of the first large shareholder and the second large shareholder has a significant effect on the corporate value which has a check-and-balance ownership structure. At last, based on the conclusions this paper gives some suggestions on the Chinese corporate governance.