中文题名: | NBA利益主体收入分配制度研究 |
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保密级别: | 公开 |
学科代码: | 040301 |
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学生类型: | 硕士 |
学位: | 教育学硕士 |
学位年度: | 2010 |
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研究方向: | 体育经济 |
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提交日期: | 2010-06-21 |
答辩日期: | 2010-05-20 |
中文摘要: |
NBA诞生六十多年来,其内部利益主体经过反复博弈、争夺,逐渐形成一套完整的收入分配制度。本文根据联盟中人力资本与非人力资本的特征,将NBA利益主体界定为劳方与资方,对其中的利益分配关系进行疏理,划分为两个主要的部分:球员与投资人之间的分配关系,不同球队投资人之间的分配关系;并针对这两个分配关系分别建立经济学模型,对不同利益主体的行为选择进行分析探讨,根据模型分析的结果对NBA收入分配的两个基本制度,即球员工资帽制度和球队间收入分配制度的运行效率做出评价。经过分析,NBA的工资帽制度作为一个软性约束,并不能有效地控制工资成本和实现球队间的竞争性平衡;NBA球队间收入分享的制度不能实现球队间的竞争性平衡,但可以增大联盟总体的利润。
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外文摘要: |
Having been gaming and fighting for more than 60 years, the stakeholders inside NBA gradually made a complete set of institution of income distribution. Using the definition of human capital and non-human capital, this paper defines the stakeholders inside NBA into employers and employees and divides the distribution relations among them into 2 parts: distribution between players and investors, distribution between investors of different teams. Afterwards, this paper builds economical models to analyze the behaviors of different stakeholders and appraises the efficiency of the Salary Cap and Income Share among Teams. After that, the following conclusions are achieved: as a soft restriction, Salary Cap of NBA cannot effectively control payroll cost or achieve competitive balance; Income Share among Teams cannot achieve competitive balance but can increase the profit of the association.
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参考文献总数: | 30 |
馆藏号: | 硕040301/1011 |
开放日期: | 2010-06-21 |