现代企业理论和西方实践证明，科学的管理层股权激励对于改善公司治理结构、降低代理成本以及提升管理效率有着积极的作用。目前我国许多企业正处于现代企业制度建设阶段，因此研究管理层股权激励的效果具有重要的理论和现实意义。中国证监会、国资委和财政部先后于2006年和2008年颁布了关于股权激励的法规，公司法和证券法的修改、股权分置改革的进行，都为我国的管理层股权激励的实施改善了环境。在管理层股权激励绩效的考核指标中，经济增加值（EVA）备受关注。EVA考虑了权益资本成本和风险，能更准确地反映公司的价值创造能力。在以企业价值最大化作为财务管理目标的现代企业中，EVA能体现企业为股东创造的财富价值量，可以为股东提供评价管理层绩效优劣的证据。近年来，国内越来越多的大中型企业将EVA应用于业绩评价和管理层激励。国资委自2004年起开始用经济增加值指标对全部中央企业的价值创造能力进行分析和测算，在中央企业第二任期（2007-2009年）经营业绩考核办法中鼓励企业将EVA用于年度经营业绩考核，并于2009年初明确表示2010年将把EVA考核正式纳入内企负责人经营业绩考核指标。这说明在当前中国，EVA在管理层业绩考核中的运用将越来越广泛。这也为本文以基于EVA的指标评价企业绩效提供了现实意义。本文首先分别从委托－代理理论、激励理论和人力资本理论方面论述了管理层股权激励对公司绩效的影响，并分析EVA相对于传统绩效指标的优点，进而阐述了选择EVA回报率作为管理层股权激励绩效评价指标的原因。然后采用了实证分析的方法，在论述相关研究成果和理论分析的基础上，提出关于管理层持股数量比例、管理层持股人数比例和CEO持股比例与EVA回报率之间关系的假设。并以我国实施管理层股权激励的上市公司作为样本企业，选取2005-2007年的截面数据，根据EVA模型的公式和调整原则对EVA进行计算和调整，然后选择变量，采用多元线性回归分析方法来进行检验。实证分析结果发现，管理层持股数量比例、管理层持股人数比例与EVA回报率之间均呈显著正相关关系；而CEO持股比例与EVA回报率之间没有显著正相关关系。最后本文在实证分析基础上为以EVA考核评价管理层业绩的应用提出政策性建议，帮助提高我国上市公司价值创造的能力。

The modern enterprise theory and western practice proved that, the implementation of management equity incentive enormously enhanced the corporate governance, reduced the cost of agency, and advanced the management efficiency. In the construction of modern enterprise mechanism in China, the management equity incentive system will play a more important role. In 2006 and 2008, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRS), the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of China published the legal documents of the shares equity incentive respectively, the new company law and the new securities laws were effective. And the split share structure reform is ongoing. They are the legal basis for management equity incentive, and they improve the implement environment of executive equity incentive.As one of the indexes of performance evaluation system, Economic Value Added （EVA）considering the risk and the cost of all capital that including equity, more accurately reflect the ability of value creation of corporate. EVA is also the performance measure most directly linked to the creation of shareholder wealth, so it can provide the evidence of measure managers’ performance. In recent years, more and more large and medium-sized enterprises applied EVA to performance evaluation and executive incentives. At the beginning of 2007, the SASAC started the operating results inspection of the central enterprises in second tenure of office (2007-2009), encouraged the central enterprise to use it to carry on the annual operating results inspection. After 2009, the SASAC will formally use EVA to inspect operating results comprehensively in the central enterprise. This indicates EVA will become more and more extensive use in the management performance evaluation in current China, and incarnates the realistic meaning to evaluate the corporate performance based on EVA.This paper discusses the effect of management equity incentives on company performance based on the theory of the principal-agent, motivation and labor capital, analyzes the merits of EVA relative to the traditional indexes of performance evaluation, then interprets the reason why this paper chooses EVAR as the performance evaluation index of management equity incentives. This paper uses the research method of Empirical Study. On the foundation of discussing the related research results and theoretical analyzing, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis of relation between the shareholding ratio of senior managers and the return rate of EVA (EVAR), and the relation between the shareholding senior managers’ ratio and the EVAR, and the relation between the shareholding ratio of CEO and the EVAR. This paper collects the listed companies of having carried the management ownership incentive plan into execution before 2005 as research sample, chooses the data of 2005-2007 as the panel data, and calculates the EVA based the formula and principle of EVA model, chooses variables and confirms the relationships with the method of multivariate linear regression.The results shows that there is a liner positive correlativity between the shareholding ratio of senior managers and the return rate of EVA (EVAR), and the relation between the shareholding senior managers’ ratio and the EVAR have a liner positive correlativity too. But there have no liner correlativity between the shareholding ratio of CEO and the EVAR. At the end, this paper puts forward some advances of application of the executive equity incentives with the aim to help the listed company to improve the ability of creating value.