近年来，我国A股市场高管减持现象愈加频繁和活跃。作为内部人的高管往往拥有私有信息优势，其减持行为往往被认为传递了有关企业前景的负面信号，引发投资者反应甚至造成市场动荡，因而一直以来备受社会各界关注。2010年，我国启动融券交易试点，卖空机制提升了股价对负面信息的吸纳能力，成为我国资本市场的重要组成部分。基于上述背景，本文以2010年融券交易启动之初至2016年底我国融券标的股企业发生的2680个减持事件为样本，采用事件研究法探究了高管减持对股票融券交易水平的影响，并具体观察了高管减持的比例、人数、及高管职位等减持行为的特征与融券做空力度之间是否相关。在此基础上，本文又进一步分析了上市公司未来基本面走势与减持信号传递效应之间的关系。 本文通过实证研究发现，被减持股票在事件窗口期的日均融券量较非事件期有显著增长，说明被本公司高管减持的企业会在减持公告前后的短期时间窗口内成为融券投资者做空的目标。在控制了相关控制变量的影响后，高管减持比例、减持人数与事件窗口期超额融券交易水平之间存在显著正相关关系，而减持高管是否为董事与超额融券交易水平之间则没有显著关系；说明减持比例越高、减持高管人数越多的高管减持事件对融券投资者传递的负面信号效应越强、融券投资者的做空力度越大，减持高管的职位是否为董事对高管减持信号传递效应则没有显著影响。 在此基础上，本文进一步研究了企业未来基本面表现对高管减持引发超常水平融券做空的调节作用，发现高管减持的负面信号效应受市场预期的公司未来基本面走势影响：上市公司的过去五年盈余波动程度对高管减持信号效应有正向调节作用，下年度现金流水平下降、增长能力下滑、或盈利水平下滑的公司高管减持对融券投资者传递的负面信号效应则更为显著，说明融券投资者在做空被减持企业时会受到预期的企业基本面走势的影响，历史盈余波动程度较大或市场预期未来基本面下滑的上市公司更容易在高管减持后成为融券投资者的做空目标。

In recent years, executives‘ reduction have become increasingly frequent and active in China’s A-share market. Executives who are insiders often have the advantage of private information, and their reductions are often considered to transmit negative signals about the company's prospects, trigger investors' reactions and even cause market turmoil. Therefore, they have always been concerned by the community. In 2010, China started the trial of short-selling trades. The short-selling mechanism enhanced the ability of stock prices to absorb negative information and became an important part of China's capital market.The incident research method was used to explore the impact of the reduction of senior management on the trading level of stocks and short selling, and observed in detail. The proportion of reductions in executives' holdings, the number of executives, and the positions of senior executives are related to the characteristics of short-selling behavior of short-selling investors. On this basis, this paper further analyzes the relationship between the effect of the executive holdings signal on the short-selling of short-selling investors and the market's expected future fundamental trend of listed companies. Through empirical research, this article finds that the daily average open-end borrowings of the reduced shares held in the event window period are significantly higher than those of the non-event period, indicating that the companies reduced by the senior management of the company will become short-term time windows before and after the reduction announcement. Short-selling investor short-term goals. After controlling the impact of the relevant control variables, there is a significant positive correlation between the percentage of senior management holdings and the number of shares undercut and the level of excess stock trading in the window of the stock event. Whether or not the holdings of senior executives are directors and excess securities There is no significant relationship between the transaction levels; the higher the percentage of reductions, the higher the number of executives who reduce the holdings of senior executives, the stronger the negative signal effect on the pass for securities lending investors and the more short-sighted the investors are. Majority, whether the reduction of senior executive positions does not have a significant effect on the signaling effect of the senior management on the reduction of senior management. On this basis, this paper further studied the relationship between executives' reduction of shares, short selling of short-selent securities and the fundamental performance of the company, and found that the negative signal effect of executives' reduction was affected by the market's expected fundamental trend in the future: Listed companies' The fluctuation of surplus in the past five years has a positive adjustment effect on the signal effect of the reduction of senior management, and the negative signal effect of lowering the cash flow level, declining growth capacity, and lowering profitability of corporate executives to pass-through investors is even more significant. Significantly, listed companies with greater historical earnings volatility or market expectations of future fundamental decline are more likely to become short-selling targets for short-selling investors after senior executives reduce their holdings. Short-selling investors are expected to be short-changed when they are short-changing. The impact of corporate fundamentals trends.