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中文题名:

 中国上市公司盈余管理研究——基于ST和退市制度    

姓名:

 李祥    

保密级别:

 内部    

学科代码:

 120201    

学科专业:

 会计学    

学生类型:

 硕士    

学位:

 管理学硕士    

学位年度:

 2008    

校区:

 北京校区培养    

学院:

 经济与工商管理学院    

研究方向:

 财务与会计    

第一导师姓名:

 吴沁红    

第一导师单位:

 北京师范大学    

提交日期:

 2008-06-09    

答辩日期:

 2008-06-05    

外文题名:

 Empirical Study of Earnings Management in Chinese Listed Firms ----Based on ST and Delisting Mechanism    

中文关键词:

 盈余管理 ; 退市制度 ; 博弈 ; 差异分析    

中文摘要:
ST和退市制度是我国证监会为了维护证券市场平稳发展所制定的一项准则,旨在根据上市公司的财务状况制定相对应的标准,来限制财务状况恶化或者违反会计准则的上市公司股票的流通。但是,在我国证券市场发展不够完善,相关准则和制度还不够规范的情况下,各上市公司往往会采取盈余管理的方式调节企业利润水平以规避退市制度给企业带来的不利状况。本文基于这种情况进行理论和实证研究,探讨盈余管理行为是否会对我国市场资源配置产生影响。盈余管理行为的定义目前在国内外仍存在争议,因此本文首先结合国内外的相关文献,对所讨论的盈余管理行为进行界定,阐述了我国证券市场中盈余管理行为产生的制度背景以及我国上市公司常用的盈余管理手段。在理论分析的基础上以及盈余管理行为会对市场资源配置产生影响的假设下,建立了参与人为证监会和上市公司的博弈模型,研究了在完全信息下静态博弈模型的混合策略求解以及动态博弈模型下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡。通过结果分析,本文验证了证监会首先采取行动,加大对盈余管理行为的检查和惩处力度是降低市场中盈余管理行为的最优策略。结合前文的理论分析,本文选取了中国证券市场02-06年上市公司的数据进行实证分析。首先本文按照上市公司三年间盈利水平的正负变化为标准,进行数据筛选,将上市公司中扭亏为盈的公司分为一组,其他公司分在另一组,分别代入到琼斯模型进行实证检验,发现在扭亏为盈的公司确实存在更高的盈余管理倾向。接着,继续建立模型,以上市公司是否进行盈余管理为因变量,以收入、费用、投资收益、营业外损益、折旧和摊销等要素为自变量进行回归,发现营业收入、营业费用和营业外损益三项因素最有可能成为盈余管理的工具。最后,并对两组样本的财务指标进行分析对比,发现两组样本之间存在显著差异,由此推断盈余管理行为可能对市场资源配置造成影响,因而监管部门应当采取措施制止这种行为。最后,根据理论分析与实证结果,提出了相应的政策性建议,希望能够为我国证券市场的成熟与发展提供帮助。
外文摘要:
ST and delisting mechanism are the standard established by China Securities Regulatory Commission for preserving Chinese stock market in order to limit the circulation of listed firms with worse financial condition. However, due to the faults of our stock market, many listed firms take the way of earning management to adjust the level of earning for benefiting themselves. According to it, this paper research whether the behavior of earning management makes the influence to our distribution of resources. There are some arguments about the definition of earning management. So, the paper explores the background of the system and the ways to make the earning management, after giving a clear definition. In base of theory analysis and the assumption that the earning management makes the influence to the market, a game model about CSRC and listed firms is founded to find the solution of Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies under a static game model with complete Information and sub game perfect Nash equilibrium under a dynamic game model. The paper conclude that the CSRC optimal strategy is to take the measures first that they strengthen the intensity of checking and punishment.The data of listed firms from 2002 to 2006 was used to take an empirical analysis. First, they are divided into two groups according to the level of earning and put in the Jones mode. The test results show that the firms from a loss to profit have a higher trend to earning management. Moreover, the whether the firms make earning management as the dependent variable and the income, the costs, the investment income, the operating profit or loss, the depreciation as independent variables are embedding in the regression model and we identify three factors of the income, the operating expenses and the operating profit or loss have possibility to be the tool to earning management. Finally, the paper compare with the financial index of the two groups of samples, a significant difference is found and the results confirm that the earning management maybe makes the influence to the distribution of market resources, so the supervision department should take the measures to stop the behavior. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the researching achievements of this paper and gives some suggestions. I hope to do some help for promote the maturity and development of Chinese stock market.
参考文献总数:

 47    

作者简介:

 李祥,男,1982年生,山西太原人,管理学硕士。2001年毕业于山西大学商务学院,专业为会计学,获得管理学学士学位;2005年考入北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院会计系,于2008年6月获得管理学硕士学位。在校期间,于2007年在中文核心期刊《财会月刊》发表论文“股权分置改革时代的对价支付和股东利益机制研究”。    

馆藏号:

 硕120201/0808    

开放日期:

 2008-06-09    

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