自20世纪60年代以来随着新自由主义的兴起，与之相伴的批评也不断出现，平等主义思潮成为其中重要的一支。在这种理论的影响下，诸如反殖民主义追求民族平等的诸多政治运动，不同国家内部乃至世界范围内对不同性别平等的呼声，在世界范围内要求保障和提高全民基本收入的要求应运而生。以上社会实践无不表明平等的要求所具有的深度和广度。在现实情况下，平等在当前作为一种世界范围内共同追求的理念，呈现出新的面貌和挑战。罗纳德·德沃金的平等理论提供了一个对此而言的尝试性回答。他试图回答如下一系列问题：我们追求的是有关什么的平等？在自由和平等之间是否存在无法克服的冲突？平等和正义的关系是什么？

本文认为，德沃金的平等理论是对传统自然法、康德伦理学和罗尔斯的平等理论的继承与发展，试图修正自由主义中长期存在的对平等概念的误解。因此，在他的哲学体系中，德沃金采纳了罗尔斯所强调的康德化建构主义解释构造一种有关平等的规范性理论，在此基础上探究平等、自由与正义之间的复杂关系，将其融合为一个融贯的、整体化的价值系统，展示德沃金是如何建构他的平等理论框架的。

为此，本文首先从分配正义的角度探讨德沃金的资源平等理论。基于对功利主义—福利平等理论的反驳，他提出了资源平等的概念，即建立在荒岛假设和市场的“妒忌检验”基础上的初始资源分配机制。进而，针对再分配问题引入了运气平等主义的观点来补偿因非道德因素而导致的不平等，特别地容纳了传统自由主义所强调的个人责任考量，指出人们应对自己的选择负责，而政治共同体应对成员遭遇的不可抗力提供保障。

随后，本文通过探讨德沃金权利论意义下自由和平等的关系，指出了德沃金平等理论的自由主义属性，即对个人权利的绝对维护。在德沃金的理论框架下，自由与平等之间的冲突被认为是一种假象。德沃金致力于解决自由主义内部关于自由和平等可能冲突的问题，主张通过法律保护个体权利，从而促进公民作为平等伙伴参与民主政治。从平等的权利论入手探讨了对每个人尊严的保障——平等待人。

在此基础上，德沃金指出平等不仅是法律和道德的要求，也被视为实现社会正义的基石。通过对法律实证主义的批判和对共同体主义及多元正义理论的对比讨论，德沃金将个体的道德和政治权利纳入社会正义理论之中。因此，他试图建立一个整合了自由、平等和正义的价值理论体系。然而，这种价值整合论因为过分强调自由主义的个人权利论而未能充分考虑社会共同体内部的多样性显示出其理论局限。

With the rise of new-liberalism since the 1960s, there has been a steady stream of criticisms, and egalitarianism has become one of the most important of these. Under the influence of such theories, political movements such as the anti-colonialist quest for national equality, the call for gender equality within different countries and around the world, and the worldwide demand for a guaranteed and higher basic income for all have emerged. All these social practices demonstrate the depth and breadth of the demand for equality. In reality, equality has taken on a new look and challenge in its current form as a concept pursued jointly worldwide. Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality provides an attempted answer to this. He attempts to answer a series of questions such as: What is equality about that we seek? Is there an insurmountable conflict between freedom and equality? What is the relationship between equality and justice?

This essay argues that Dworkin's theory of equality is an inheritance and development of traditional natural law, Kantian ethics, and Rawls's theory of equality, which attempts to correct the long-standing misunderstanding of the concept of equality in liberalism. Thus, in his philosophical system, Dworkin adopts the Kantianized constructivist interpretation emphasized by Rawls to construct a normative theory of equality, on the basis of which he explores the complex relationship between equality, liberty, and justice, and fuses them into a coherent and holistic value system, showing how Dworkin constructs his theoretical framework of equality.

Therefore, this essay firstly discusses Dworkin's theory of resource equality from the perspective of distributive justice. Based on the refutation of the utilitarian-welfare equality theory, he proposes the concept of resource equality, i.e., the initial resource allocation mechanism based on the desert island hypothesis and the market's "envy test". He then introduced an egalitarian view of luck to redistributive problems in order to compensate for inequalities due to non-moral factors, specifically accommodating the traditional liberal emphasis on individual responsibility, stating that people should be held accountable for their choices and that the political community should provide safeguards against force majeure experienced by its members.

Subsequently, by exploring the relationship between freedom and equality in the sense of Dworkin's rights theory, the paper points out the liberal attributes of Dworkin's theory of equality, i.e., the absolute defense of individual rights. Within Dworkin's theoretical framework, the conflict between freedom and equality is considered an illusion. Dworkin works to resolve issues within liberalism regarding the possible conflict between liberty and equality by arguing for the protection of individual rights through the law, thereby facilitating the participation of citizens as equal partners in democratic politics. The guarantee of the dignity of each individual - treating people as equals - is discussed in the context of a rights theory of equality.

On this basis, Dworkin points out that equality is not only a legal and moral requirement, but is also seen as a cornerstone for the realization of social justice. Through a critique of legal positivism and a comparative discussion of communitarian and pluralistic theories of justice, Dworkin incorporates individual moral and political rights into a theory of social justice. Thus, he attempts to build a value theory system that integrates freedom, equality and justice. However, this integrated theory of values shows its theoretical limitations by overemphasizing the liberal theory of individual rights and failing to fully consider the diversity within the social community.