证词知识论是知识论中的一个重要分支，主要探讨人们如何借助他人的言论获取关于现实世界的知识，以及这种知识如何构成我们认知体系的一部分。其中，一个备受关注的问题是：证词是仅仅可以传递知识还是也可以产生知识？换言之，听者能否从一个自己并不知道p的说者那里获得关于p的知识？传递观和产生观分别对此给出了回答。其中，产生观对传递观最主要的反驳在于认为证词传递链中的每一环都有可能不知道p，因为他们可能有更强的理由不相信p。本文尝试给出的新的回应思路是借鉴解释主义的观点，重新定义作为知识基础的信念为一种具有“可归属性”的信念，而不一定要求信念是一种内省的心灵状态。随后尝试说明，当对p的证词被成功传递的时候，说者一定是相信p的，以此捍卫证词知识论中的传递观。

Epistemology of testimony is a significant branch of epistemology that primarily investigates how individuals acquire knowledge about the world through the testimony of others. A central concern within this domain revolves around whether testimony merely transmits knowledge or also generates knowledge. In other words, can a hearer acquire testimonial knowledge about proposition p from a speaker who themselves do not know p? The transmission view and the generation view provide contrasting answers to this question. Notably, the generation view offers its primary rebuttal to the transmission view by contending that each speaker in the chain of testimonial transmission may lack knowledge of p, as they may possess stronger reasons to disbelieve p. The novel response strategy proposed in this thesis draws upon the perspective of interpretationism, which involves redefining belief, the foundation of knowledge, as a form of belief characterized by ‘attributability’, without the necessity for belief to be an introspective mental state. Subsequently, it endeavors to demonstrate that when testimony about p is successfully transmitted, the speaker must indeed believe p, thereby defending the transmission view.