在过往“双GP”架构私募股权基金（指在一支私募基金中的出资人安排了一名非管理人角色的普通合伙人，意图参与基金管理人的管理）中，强势的有限合伙人会委任一名非管理人普通合伙人角色，发挥其在基金运作各环节上的比较优势，节约资金成本并获取更多分配。随着近年来国有资本作为有限合伙人参与私募股权基金的程度越来越高，“双GP”架构基金更受青睐，逐渐成为国有资本全流程参与私募基金“募、投、管、退”工作的重要形式之一。虽然“双GP”架构诞生于我国，但是私募股权基金以及“双GP”架构私募基金在我国整体发展时间较短，相关政策和法律法规还不完善，行业发展受政策影响而产生的波动较大，在理论研究和模式实践方面非常有限，甚至存在理论落后于实践的情况。

本文以Q基金作为研究对象，研究非管理人普通合伙人在国资私募股权基金中承担的管理角色，为非管理人普通合伙人参与并解决Q基金的运作问题提出优化策略。本文第一部分对概念和文献进行研究，首先从概念上对有限合伙制基金法理基础、基本角色安排和机构设置进行了明确。然后研究了过往国资私募基金、政府引导基金、“双GP”私募基金的文献，对之中使用的理论基础、基金出现的问题和风险点和进行梳理，通过梳理明确了将委托代理和合作博弈作为本文分析的理论基础。本文第二、三、四部分是对Q基金的案例分析，首先回顾了Q基金设立的背景、架构和运作机制；其次以设立至今的时间线为线索，从Q基金运作期间的各个事件中依托委托代理理论和合作博弈理论提炼问题；然后从Q基金《合伙协议》出发分析问题产生的原因；最后依据理论和问题原因提出优化策略。

基于理论分析结果，本文发现Q基金的“双GP”架构主要存在如下几个方面的问题：一是初始决策权力分配不清晰；二是基金管理人选择机制不够有效；三是基金管理人激励约束机制设置不合理；四是出资人之间利益诉求未达成共识。为此，结合相关理论和Q基金管理实践，对应上述发现的问题，本文提出如下优化策略：第一，重新分配“双GP”架构的决策权利；第二，优化基金管理人的选择机制或加大监控力度；第三，优化《合伙协议》的激励约束机制；第四，优化《合伙协议》具体投资方向的约定内容。

In the past "dual GP" private equity funds (in which the investor in a private equity fund has arranged a non-manager general partner with the intention of participating in the management of the fund manager), the strong limited partner will appoint a non-manager general partner to play its comparative advantage in all aspects of the fund operation, save capital costs and obtain more distributions. With the increasing participation of state-owned capital in private equity funds as limited partners in recent years, the "double GP" structure fund is more favored and has gradually become one of the important forms for state-owned capital to participate in the "fundraising, investment, management and withdrawal" of private equity funds in the whole process. Although the "double GP" architecture was born in China, the overall development time of private equity funds and "double GP" architecture private equity funds in China is relatively short, the relevant policies and laws and regulations are not perfect, the industry development is affected by the policy fluctuations, and the theoretical research and model practice are very limited, and even the theory lags behind the practice.

This paper takes Q fund as the research object, studies the management role of non-manager general partners in state-owned private equity funds, and puts forward optimization strategies for non-manager general partners to participate in and solve the operation problems of Q fund. The first part of this paper studies the concept and literature. Firstly, it clarifies the legal basis, basic role arrangement and institutional setup of the limited partnership fund from the concept. Then, it studies the past literature of state-funded private equity funds, government-guided funds and "double GP" private equity funds, and sorts out the theoretical basis used in them, the problems and risk points of the funds, and makes clear that the principal-agent and cooperative game are the theoretical basis for the analysis of this paper. The second, third and fourth parts of this paper are the case analysis of Q Fund. Firstly, the background, structure and operation mechanism of Q Fund are reviewed. Secondly, taking the time line since its establishment as a clue, the questions are extracted from various events during the operation of Q Fund based on principal-agent theory and cooperative game theory. Then from the Q fund "partnership agreement" to analyze the causes of the problem; Finally, the optimization strategy is proposed according to the theory and the cause of the problem.

Based on theoretical analysis results, this article finds that the "dual GP" architecture of Q Fund mainly has the following problems: first, unclear initial decision-making power allocation; Secondly, the mechanism for selecting fund managers is not effective enough; The third is the unreasonable setting of incentive and constraint mechanisms for fund managers; Fourthly, there is no consensus on the interests and demands of the investors. Therefore, based on relevant theories and Q fund management practices, this article proposes the following optimization strategies to address the issues identified above: firstly, reallocate the decision-making power of the "dual GP" architecture; Secondly, optimize the selection mechanism of fund managers or increase monitoring efforts; Thirdly, optimize the incentive and constraint mechanism of the Partnership Agreement; Fourthly, optimize the specific investment direction agreed upon in the Partnership Agreement.