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中文题名:

 业绩压力、内部控制信息披露与中国上市公司违规治理研究    

姓名:

 冯冠霖    

保密级别:

 公开    

论文语种:

 chi    

学科代码:

 020105    

学科专业:

 世界经济    

学生类型:

 博士    

学位:

 经济学博士    

学位类型:

 学术学位    

学位年度:

 2023    

校区:

 北京校区培养    

学院:

 经济与工商管理学院    

研究方向:

 公司融资理论与政策    

第一导师姓名:

 李翀    

第一导师单位:

  经济与工商管理学院    

提交日期:

 2023-06-18    

答辩日期:

 2023-06-02    

外文题名:

 A Study on Performance Pressure, Information Disclosure on Internal Control, and Irregularity Governance of Chinese Listed Companies    

中文关键词:

 上市公司违规 ; 业绩压力 ; 内部控制披露质量 ; 污名化 ; 印象管理    

外文关键词:

 Listed company frauds ; Performance feedback ; Quality of internal control disclosure ; Stigmatization ; Impression management    

中文摘要:

自我国资本市场成立以来,一直深受上市公司违规行为的困扰。虽然国家 不断出台相关措施规范市场,加强监管,但该类行为依然屡禁不止。层出不穷 的上市公司违规行为严重阻碍了我国上市公司和资本市场的高质量发展。因 此,如何深入理解并解决上市公司违规问题亟待解决。本文研究了违规行为发 生的动机和违规行为的矫正,分别探讨了管理层业绩压力与上市公司违规行 为、内部控制披露质量与上市公司违规行为和企业社会责任与违规行为的矫正 三大问题,仔细梳理相关文献,讨论作用机制,进行实证研究,并在得出研究 结论的基础上针对如何有效防范上市公司违规行为,如何矫正违规行为带来的 严重后果提出了实践意见。本文的研究主要包括以下几个部分: 第一,本文首先对相关文献进行了梳理总结,并在此基础上厘清了上市公司 违规行为的定义,并与其他相似概念进行区分,明确了研究范畴。在此基础上, 对我国上市公司违规行为的现状和特征进行研究。指出了我国上市公司违规行为 的类别特征、发展趋势、行业特征、发生频率和处罚方式等问题。 第二,本文从违规行为的动因视角着手,实证检验了管理层业绩压力和内部 控制信息披露质量对公司违规行为的影响。结果表明:(1)由于管理层个人利益 最大化目标的存在,业绩压力会影响公司违规的发生概率。业绩逆差的存在、增 大和持续性均会增加违规行为的发生概率。(2)公司内部控制信息披露质量对公 司违规行为的稽查有促进作用,对违规行为的发生有抑制作用。这一作用受到包 括独立董事比例、股权集中度、是否雇佣四大会计师事务所的审计师进行审计和 分析师关注度四个内外部治理环境变量的影响。

第三,本文认为公司违规行为的后果具有传染性,严重的违规行为一经曝光 会在一定范围内产生从事件污名转变为核心污名的效果,并可能对其他没有实施 违规行为,仅仅是因为与相关公司有着相似性质的公司产生严重的负面影响。对 于这部分公司,基于恢复其声誉资本的动机需求,采用披露企业社会责任的方式 可以一定程度上矫正被污名化带来的负面影响,恢复公司合法性。此外,公司所 处地区的地域文化多样性的提高会增强这种影响。 第四,本文结合理论研究和实证研究结论,对我国上市公司的违规行为监管 和治理提出了增强监管措施和惩罚力度,建立提前预警机制等切实可行的政策意 见,并对如何矫正违规行为带来的负面影响提供了主动承担社会责任这一解决途 径。这对提高我国上市公司发展质量,维护中小股东权益和资本市场秩序有着重 要作用。 本文的主要贡献和创新有以下几点:(1)明确了相关研究范畴;(2)采用了 动因研究这一新视角;(3)一定程度上解决了内部控制和违规行为两个部分可观 测问题;(4)除了违规稽查与发生两过程外,加入对违规矫正过程的研究;(5) 阐述了由于违规后果的传染性而导致的事件污名到核心污名的演变过程,将二者 联系起来;(6)对减少违规行为提供新思路,为被迫污名化的公司提供矫正策略。

外文摘要:

Listed company irregularity has been disrupting the Chinese capital market since its inception. Despite government and regulatory efforts to enhance market discipline, such acts have never been eliminated, hindering the high-quality development of Chinese listed companies and the capital market at large. That makes it ever more urgent to develop in-depth understanding of listed company irregularity and explore solutions to it. This article probes into the motivations driving corporate irregularity and how to address it, focusing on three major aspects including performance pressure on management and irregularity, quality of internal control disclosure and irregularity, and corporate social responsibility and irregularity rectification. It proposes pragmatic suggestions on preventing listed company irregularity and remediating damages therefrom based on conclusions drawn from careful literature review, in-depth discussion of the mechanism of action and empirical studies. This article mainly consists of the following four parts: First, providing a clear definition of listed company irregularity with reference to past literatures and distinguishing similar concepts, thus explicitly defining the scope of research. On the basis of that, this article examines the status-quo and characteristics of listed company irregularity in China, and identifies its class features, development trend, industrial features, level of prevalence and penalties. Second, performing empirical examination of the impact of performance pressure on management and the quality of internal control disclosure on listed company irregularity from the perspective of the motivation driving such behavior. Results indicate that: 1) Performance pressure can affect the probability of corporate irregularity due to management members’ goal of personal interest maximization. The presence, increase and persistence of performance deficit could all raise the probability of irregularity. 2) Higher-quality disclosure of internal control information can facilitate inspection of irregularity and thus inhibit its occurrence. This mechanism is subject to influence from factors including the proportion of independent directors, ownership concentration, whether auditing is conducted by the Big Four accounting firms, and the level of analyst attention. Third, this article proposes that consequences from corporate irregularity are contagious. Exposure of severe irregularity could drive the evolvement from event stigma to core stigma, dealing negative blows to other companies with similar scope of business even if they have not had any irregularity. These companies could repair some of the damages by enhancing corporate social responsibility disclosure in order to restore their reputational capital and legitimacy, and greater cultural diversity at their location of business could have positive effects in promoting their reputation restoration. Fourth, proposing pragmatic policy suggestions, based on theoretical and empirical studies, for regulation and governance of listed company irregularity, while providing a solution to repairing its negative blows which is for stigmatized companies to proactively fulfill social responsibilities. This serves as an important reference for promoting the high-quality development of listed companies and protecting the interests of minority shareholders and the order of the capital market in China. Major contribution and innovation of this article include: (1) it has specified the scope of related study; (2) it adopts the new perspective of motivation research; (3) it has, to a certain extent, addressed the observability issues associated with internal control and irregularity; (4) it has studied the irregularity correction process in addition to irregularity inspection and occurrence; (5) it has explained the process of the evolvement from event stigma to core stigma as a result of the contagious nature of fallouts from irregularity and thus built connections between the two types of stigma; and (6) it offers new clues as to reducing irregularity and strategies of correction for passively-stigmatized companies.

参考文献总数:

 259    

馆藏地:

 图书馆学位论文阅览区(主馆南区三层BC区)    

馆藏号:

 博020105/23002    

开放日期:

 2024-06-18    

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